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VOLUME 46 SUMMER 1969 NUMBER 3
BASIS ASPECTS OF A TRANSFER OF A
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST AND DISTRIBUTION
By MAXWELL A. SNEAD*
Literature on the income tax basis ramifications of transfers or
distributions of partnership interests is notably lacking in legal
scholarship. Mr. Snead analyzes this subject with a view toward the
tax consequences of the possible adjustments to basis which are
available under the Code when a transfer or distribution of a partner-
ship is made. He combines an analysis of the Code and the Regula-
tions with examples of the practical workings of the various sections
discussed. His article concludes with a discussion of allocation of
basis under the adjustment rules and the elections under Sections
754 and 755 of the Code.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE stated objectives of the draftsmen of subchapter K1 of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code were "simplicity, flexibility, and
equity as between the partners."2 One of the areas of federal partner-
ship income tax law in which the draftsmen appear to have fallen
short of their stated objectives8 is the matter of basis. More than
one-third of the sections within subchapter K are addressed to basis
determination.' Furthermore, it is often necessary to refer to the
Code's basis rules of general application contained in subchapter 0.'
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1964, §§ 701-71.
2 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954).
3 Dealing with the question of whether a transaction constituted the sale of an interest
or the liquidation of an interest, Raum, J. made the following critical comment:
"Although there can be little doubt that the attempt to achieve 'simplicity' has
resulted in utter failure, the new legislation was intended to and did brinR into play
an element of 'flexibility.'" David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 551 (1964).
4 Ten of the 27 sections of subchapter K contain the word "basis" in their titles. They
are: § 705, Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; § 722, Basis of Contributing
Partner's Interest; § 723, Basis of Property Contributed to Partnership; § 732, Basis
of Distributed Property Other Than Money; § 733, Basis of Distributee Partner's
Interest; § 734, Optional Adjustment to Basis of Undistributed Partnership Property;
§ 742, Basis of Transferee's Partner's Interest; § 743, Optional Adjustment to Basis
of Partnership Property; § 754, Manner of Electing Optional Adjustment to Basis of
Partnership Property; § 755, Rules for Allocation of Basis.
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1011-23.
ASPECTS OF PARTNERSHIP TRANSFERS
An understanding of the complexities of these basis sections is a
necessary prerequisite to successful partnership tax planning.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basis provisions of
the 1954 Code that apply to the transfer of a partnership interest
by a partner and to the distribution by the partnership of assets to
a partner. With respect to a transfer, examination will be made of
the basis aspects of the transferee's interest. Distributions present
basis determination problems for the distributee and the partnership.
In both areas, the Code provides general rules governing basis but
alternative treatment is made available by election. Elections available
to the partnership may have a significant impact on the present and
future movement of persons and property into and out of the partner-
ship structure. A partner may have a separate election available with
significant income tax consequences. In turn, a decision to make one
of the elections raises additional important issues.
The provisions of the Code to be examined herein clearly reflect
a theoretical difference of opinion about the nature of a partnership
that has continued to exist in the state law of partnerships, as
well as in the federal income taxation of that form of business
enterprise. The conflict exists on the question of whether a partner-
ship is a separate entity or an aggregate of persons. "The entity
theory treats the partnership itself as having an existence apart from
the partners and as such it is capable of engaging in business
transactions in its own right, apart from the partners themselves."'
On the other hand, "[t]he aggregate or the conduit concept views
a partnership as an association of individuals. Such concept does not
recognize the business organization as having any existence apart
from the individual partners. ' 7 The entity versus aggregate debate
highlighted discussions that attended the drafting of the Uniform
Partnership Act. The language of the Act supports the conclusion
that both theories were embodied, although perhaps inadvertently,
in the final draft.' Decisions of courts construing the Act have
taken different positions on the question of what theory governs.
On the one hand, the partnership has been treated as a separate legal
person apart from the individual partners;9 on the other, a clear
intent to adopt the aggregate theory has been found by some courts.' 0
6 Anderson & Coffee, Proposed Revision of Partner and Partnership Taxation: Analysis
of the Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter K, 15 TAx. L. REV. 285, 287
n.9 (1960).
7 Id. at 287 n.10.
8 E. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 293-301 (1929);
Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963).
9 Note, The Partnership as a Legal Entity, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 698 (1941).
10 Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937).
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The entity versus aggregate distinction prevails in the basis
provisions of the 1954 Code.1 ' The general approach is the entity
theory, with the result that a clear distinction is drawn between a
partner's basis in his partnership interest and the partnership's basis
in its assets. Upon the initial contribution of assets to the partner-
ship, the partners' bases for their partnership interests equals the
partnership's basis in the contributed assets,' 2 but thereafter the
respective bases are subject to changes which may affect one but
not the other. The draftsmen of the Code embodied the aggregate
theory of partnerships in the form of optional adjustments to the
basis of partnership property to bring the separate bases to the same
amount in the case of certain distributions and transfers. These dif-
ferent approaches, allowed by the 1954 Code, and their ramifi-
cations are the principal topics of this paper.
With certain notable exceptions, e.g., the family partnership,
the partnership provisions of the Code have not been the subject
of extensive litigation. In the absence of case law, reliance must be
placed upon congressional hearings, the income tax regulations,
revenue rulings, authors of law review articles and books, and stat-
utory interpretation by the writer.
A. Subjects Not Covered
For purposes of this discussion, the assumption implicit through-
out is that the partnership, either regular or limited, is a statutory
partnership within the Code,'1 and that no election to be treated
otherwise has been made.'4 Except as otherwise noted, partnership
property does not include unrealized receivables'" or substantially
appreciated inventory.' 6 The matter of termination of the partner-
ship 7 is considered where pertinent, but otherwise it is assumed
that distributions and transfers do not have such an effect.
11 See generally Anderson & Coffee, supra note 6, at 286-89; Jackson, Johnson, Surrey
& Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partner-
ships and Partners -American Law Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REV. 109 (1954);
B. Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partnership Income - "Entity" v.
"Conduit" Principle in Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX, 287
(1961).
12 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 722, 723.
13 The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture,
or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not,
within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate, or corporation; and the
term "partner" includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or organization.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (2).
14 Id. § 761(a).




ASPECTS OF PARTNERSHIP TRANSFERS
I. TRANSFERS OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Although the emphasis of this discussion is directed to the
special problems of the transferee of a partnership interest, it is
important to be cognizant of the tax consequences to the transferor
of a partnership interest because of their impact on negotiations in
the case of a sale, and taxation in the case of death. Of equal sig-
nificance is a description of the types of transactions which are
treated as a "transfer of a partnership interest" as that terminology
is used in the Code.
When a partner sells a part or all of his partnership interest
to one or more of the other partners, or to one or more outsiders,
he recognizes gain or loss on the transaction.' 8 The nature of the
underlying partnership assets determines the character of the gain
or loss recognized. If the partnership has section 751 property, i.e.,
unrealized receivables" or inventory items which have substantially
appreciated in value,20 separate treatment is accorded such assets,2 '
and a two-step computation is required, which in effect treats the
gain allocable to the 751 property as ordinary income. First, a
proportion of the sale price is allocated to the section 751 assets
on the basis of the values contained in the agreement between buyer
and seller if the transaction is at arm's-length or, in the absence of
an agreement on value, on the basis of the fair market value of
'8 1d. §§ 741, 751.
19 Unrealized receivables are defined by the 1954 Code to include,
to the extent not previously includible in income under the method of
accounting used by the partnership, any right (contractual or otherwise)
to payment for- (1) goods delivered or to be delivered, to the extent
the proceeds therefrom would be treated as amounts received from the sale
or exchange of property other than a capital asset, or (2) services rendered,
or to be rendered.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 751(c). Unrealized receivables also includes the selling
partner's share of the amount that would be treated as ordinary gain (1) from the
sale of section 617 mining property (property in relation to which the partnership
elects to deduct exploration expenditures subject to recapture), (2) from the sale of
section 1245 property, and (3) from the sale of section 1250 property, as if such
section 617, 1245, or 1250 property had been sold by the partnership at its fair
market value. Generally, the agreement between the buyer and seller as to the value
of such property establishes its fair market value. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.75 1-1(c) (4)
(1965).
:20 Substantial appreciation is defined by the Code as fair market value in excess of
-(A) 120 percent of the adjusted basis to the partnership of such property, and
(B) 10 percent of the fair market value of all partnership property, other than
money." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 751(d). The definition of inventory items has
broad coverage. As the name suggests, it includes stock in trade or property held for
resale in the ordinary course of business. In addition, (1) partnership property
which, on sale or exchange by the partnership, is not considered a capital asset or
a section 1231 asset (for example, the Regulations point out that unrealized receiv-
ables are also "inventory items"), (2) certain foreign investment company stock,
and (3) property, whether a capital asset or a section 1231 asset or not, which
would be an inventory item to the selling partner or the distributee, are included in
the definition of inventory items. Id. § 751 (d) (2).
21INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 751(a).
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such property at the date of sale of the partnership interest." For
purposes of determining gain or loss, the basis of the section 751
property in the hands of the selling partner is, in most cases,"
equal to the basis to the partnership of the selling partner's pro-
portionate share of those assets immediately before the sale of
the interest.24 The selling partner's proportionate share of the
partnership's adjusted basis for section 751 property is apparently
based on his capital ratio. 5 Where the capital and profit ratios
are the same, no conceptual difficulties are encountered. However,
where the capital and profit ratios are different, the employment
of the capital ratio will produce a questionable, and perhaps unex-
pected, result.2 ' The difference between the allocated sale price
and the basis of the section 751 assets is ordinary gain or loss.27
The second step consist of finding the difference between the
remaining balance of the sale price and the basis of the remainder
of the partnership interest (i.e., as reduced by the section 751
allocation) 28 This amount is capital gain or loss.29
When the partnership does not have unrealized receivables or
inventory items which have substantially appreciated in value, capital
gain or loss results as measured by the difference between the amount
realized (the sale price) and the partner's adjusted basis of his
partnership interest.30
A distinction should be made between the acquisition of a
partnership interest by the contribution of money or property to
the partnership and the acquisition of a partnership interest by
purchase from a partner or partners. This same distinction is made
in accounting terminology by referring to the former type of acqui-
sition as "investing in a partnership" and to the latter type as
2Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (1965).
2 If the basis to the partnership exceeds the partner's basis in his partnership interest,
the basis for section 751 property is limited to the latter. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 732(a),(b) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a) (2) (1965).
2 Contra, Barnes v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Ill. 1966). This case is
discussed in the text accompanying footnote 68, infra.
2
5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g) (example 1) (1965).
2 When the cash-basis partnership collects its receivables or sells its appreciated inven-
tory, the resulting income is divided among the partners in the profit and loss ratio.
Where the profit and loss ratio differs from the capital ratio, a shifting of ordinary
income from one partner to another results when section 751 is applied. Section 75f
was intoduced to combat the "collapsible partnership," i.e. the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain by the sale of a partnership interest. Although it accom-
plishes this result, it may result in inequity among the partners if the capital ratio,
rather than the profit and loss ratio, is employed in the allocation required by
section 751.
27 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 751(a).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a) (2) (1965).
29 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 741.
30 1d. §§ 741, 1001.
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"purchasing a partnership interest."'" Apart from its application
in the personal service partnership area, acquisition of an interest
by investment may arise where an existing partnership needs ad-
ditional money or property to expand its business. Where a con-
tribution of assets is made to a partnership as an investment, the
person acquiring a partnership interest does not recognize gain or
loss, and the amount of money or his adjusted basis in the property"
contributed becomes his basis in the partnership interest acquired.
83
Neither the partnership nor the other partners recognize gain or
loss upon the contribution of money or property to the partnership
in exchange for a partnership interest. 4 This rule applies regardless
of whether the contribution is made during the formation stage of
the partnership or after it is already in existence. " Although both
the Code and the Regulations do not so specify, it seems clear that
the nonrecognition rules applicable to contributions govern the
situation where a new partner is admitted to the partnership as
a result of a contribution that increases partnership capital in the
same manner as the contribution by a person already a partner.
However, when the investment method is the first step of what
is in reality the sale of a partnership interest, the Internal Revenue
Service may be expected to recharacterize the transaction to reflect
its true nature.88
31 For a detailed discussion of this distinction and the accounting treatment for both
methods see H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING: ADVANCED
17-23 (5th ed. 1963). "[P]artnership admissions are of two general classes: (1)
The new partner purchases all or a part of the interests of one or more old partners
and makes payment to them; [and] no new funds come into the partnership. (2)
The new partner invests assets in the partnership; [and] the partnership funds are
thus increased." Id. at 17.
32 The aspects of the admission of a service partner where another partner relinquishes
his right to the return of part of his capital contributions, thus giving rise to ordinary
income to the service partner, are considered in Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1960).
Services, as consideration for a partnership capital interest, are not "property" as
that term is used in the text.
33 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 721, 722.
34 1d. § 721.
35Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1960).
36 H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra footnote 31, make the following observations on
goodwill and bonus in the investment context:
When a new partner is admitted, the old partners may be allowed
goodwill or a bonus in recognition of the profitable business they have
developed.
Goodwill:
If goodwill is to be allowed the old partners, it should be placed on
the books before the admission of the new partner, and the credit
therefore should be divided between the old partners in their profit
and loss ratio.
A bonus:
Instead of setting up a Goodwill account, the old partners may
require that part of the capital contributed by the new partner be
1969
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credited to their accounts. Such a bonus should be credited to the old
partners in their profit and loss ratio.
On the other hand, the new partner may be allowed goodwill or a
bonus in recognition of a high earnings potential which he is bringing to
the business.
Goodwill:
If goodwill is allowed the new partner, the entry for his admission
should contain a debit to Goodwill.
A bonus:
A bonus to a new partner is recorded by making transfers from the
capital account of the old partners to the capital account of the new
partner, thus giving the new partner a total capital credit greater
than the amount of his investment. Such a bonus should be charged
to the old partners in their profit and loss ratio.
To illustrate, assume that A and B have capitals of $10,000 and
$20,000, respectively, with a 50:50 profit and loss ratio, and that C is
to be admitted as a partner by making a contribution to the firm capital.
Goodwill allowed to old partners. Assume that the problem states that
C is to invest, and obtain a capital credit of, $11,000, which is to be one-
fourth of the total capital. The total capital, therefore, is to be $44,000.
The capitals of A and B plus C's contribution amount to $41,000; there-
fore, there is a goodwill of $3,000. Since C's capital credit is equal to his
contribution, the goodwill is allowed to A and B, by credits of $1,500 to
each.
Bonus allowed to old partners. C is to invest $14,000, the total capital
is to be $44,000 and C is to have a one-fourth interest therein. Since C
invests $14,000 and receives a capital credit of only $11,000, A and B
will be credited with $3,000 of C's contribution as a bonus, shares in the
profit and loss ratio.
Goodwill allowed to new partner. C is to transfer, at a valuation of
$8,000, the assets of a business he has been conducting. C is to have a
one-fourth interest in an agreed capital of $40,000. Since the capitals of
A and B plus C's contribution amount to $38,000, there is a goodwill of
$2,000. Since C contributes $8,000 and is credited with $10,000, he must
receive the credit for the goodwill.
Bonus allowed to new partner. C is to invest $8,000; the agreed capital
is to be $38,000; and C is to have a one-fourth interest therein. The
capitals of A and B plus C's contribution amount to $38,000; therefore,
there is no goodwill. But since C invests $8,000 and receives a capital
credit of $9,500, a $1,500 bonus is allowed to him; A and B are charged
$750 each.
Id. at 25.
It must, of course, be remembered that the values assigned to capital contri-
butions by the partners are, except in the case of cash contributions, independent
of the income tax basis of the assets to the partnership. The partnership does not
terminate for income tax purposes because operations would not be discontinued
and a contribution of property, including money, is not a "sale or exchange" under
section 708(b) (1) (B). Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b) (1) (ii) (1960).
Where goodwill is allowed to either the old partners or to the new partner,
no adverse tax consequences would arise. In both situations, goodwill represents
pre-contribution appreciation in the value of the assets and section 704(c) clearly
allows such treatment as a reflection of the economic realities. Where bonus is
allowed, however, the transaction takes on the appearance of a contribution coupled
with a purchase. In the absence of a restriction upon the withdrawal of capital,
where bonus is allowed to the old partners, the incoming partner, C, has immediately
relinquished his right to receive $3,000 on liquidation and that amount is available
for distribution to partners A and B. Assuming that the capital accounts of the old
partners are the same as their respective bases for their partnership interests, the
investment by C of $14,000 is (1) a contribution of $10,000 and (2) the purchase
of an additional capital interest of $1,000 by the payment to A and B of $4,000.
Capital gain treatment on the purchase part of the transaction may result. This same
reasoning may be applied to bonus allowed to the new partner to find a bargain
purchase.
Neither the Code nor the Regulations treat this problem specifically but Treas.
Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) implies such a result. This problem is also discussed in
Note, Some Tax Consequences of Partnership Readjustments, 67 HARV. L. REv. 360
(1954).
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The investment method of acquiring an interest is not within
the scope of the discussion that follows.
Upon the death of a partner, three possibilities exist with
regard to ownership of the interest. Depending upon the provisions
of the partnership agreement, 37 the deceased partner's successor in
interest may: (1) continue as a partner, (2) sell the partnership
interest to one or more of the partners, or (3) receive distributions
from the partnership in liquidation of the interest. Common to
(1) and (2) is the present statutory scheme establishing the follow-
ing tax pattern: recognition of gain or loss by the deceased partner
because diminution or appreciation in the fair market value of the
partnership interest is foreclosed by the death of the partner;
38
depending upon the size of the deceased partner's estate, estate
tax39 may or may not be incurred as to the partnership interest; and
regardless of whether estate taxes are incurred, the deceased partner's
successor in interest receives the partnership interest with a new basis
for income tax purposes. The new basis may be higher or lower
than the deceased partner's basis before death. The new basis is
the fair market value at the date of death or the alternative valuation
date4 ° plus the successor's share of partnership liabilities, if any,
and minus income in respect of a decedent included in the amount
of fair market value.4 If the interest is sold by the decedent's suc-
cessor in interest to one or more of the partners, the seller recognizes
gain or loss in the same manner as previously described.
If the agreement provides for liquidation of the partnership
interest by the partnership, the rules of section 73642 apply. The
Code allows the partners to determine among themselves the tax
consequences of retirement of a partnership interest by liquidation.
The provisions of section 736 are quite complex. For present pur-
37 Uniform Partnership Act § 31(4) (1914) provides that the death of a partner shall
dissolve the old partnership. Some states have amended the uniform act to provide
for an agreement to the contrary. See Bromberg, Partnership Dissolutions, Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEx. L- REV. 631 '(1965). Some courts have given
effect to the terms of a partnership agreement or a provision in a deceased partner's
will providing for a continuation of the partnership. See Note, Partnership: Contin-
uation of the Business Upon the Death of a Partner, 20 OKLA. L. REV. 456 (1967) ;
Note, Partnership Continuation Agreements, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (1959). For
income tax purposes, the death of a partner, in and of itself, does not terminate
the partnership, even in the case of a two-man partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1-708-1(b)
(1960).
38 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014.
39 In the case of a deceased partner survived by a spouse, the present statutory scheme
generally allows a gross estate of approximately $120,000 to go untaxed. Id. §§ 2031,
2051, 2052, 2056.
40INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
41 
Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1960).
42 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 736(b).
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poses, it is enough to note that payments made under section 736
whether made as a distributive share of income, as a guaranteed
payment, for goodwill, or for an interest in the partnership, are
not considered a sale, exchange, or transfer upon death, within
the scope of transfers of a partnership interest.43 The distribution
aspects of section 736 are discussed infra in section III of this article.
The distinction between the sale of an interest after the death
of a partner and liquidation of that interest by the partnership is
of utmost importance." To the successor in interest, the method
chosen will make the difference between capital gain or ordinary
gain.45 To the remaining partners, a capital investment or reduced
taxable income are the alternative consequences. 46 The Code puts
the parties on opposite sides of the negotiating table for the reason
that "one of the underlying philosophic objectives of the 1954
Code was to permit the partners themselves to determine their tax
burdens inter sese to a certain extent .... .
When a transaction constitutes the transfer of a partnership
interest, the transferee of that interest determines his basis by ref-
erence to sections 742 and 743 of the Code. To summarize, trans-
actions which are treated as a transfer of a partnership interest, and
thereby bring into operation the transferee basis provisions of
the Code, are: the sale or exchange of a partnership interest by a
partner or by the partner's successor in interest and the transfer
of an interest by death. The statutory language "transfer . . . upon
43Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a) (1965).
44 In an exhaustive analysis of cases in which the distinction between a sale and a
liquidation was paramount, one author has concluded that the intent of the parties
as manifested by the location of the obligation to make payments controls. Swihart,
Tax Problems Raised by Liquidation of Partnership Interests, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1209 (1966). For a case dealing with the distinction between a sale and a liquida-
tion in the context of a buy-sell agreement funded with life insurance under a "cross-
purchase" plan or an "entity" plan, see Victor G. Mushro, 50 T.C. 43 (1968);
see also, Comment, Planning the Tax Consequences of Partnership Agreements,
Funded With Life Insurance, to Provide for Disposition of a Deceased Partner's
Interest, 30 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1965).
45 David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535 (1964). The court made the following observation:
If the transaction were a "sale" under section 741 Jacobowitz's [the retiring
partner] gain would be taxed as capital gain (there being no section 751
problem in respect of unrealized receivables or inventory items which have
appreciated substantially in value), and would be reported in 1957 [the
year of the sale) rather than in 1958 [the close of the partnership fiscal
year). On the other hand, if the transaction were a section 736 "liquida-
tion," the amounts received by him (to the extent that they were not for
his "interest . . . in partnership property" pursuant to section 736(b) (1))
would be taxable as ordinary income and reportable by him in 1958 rather
than 1957. The tax liabilities of the remaining partners . . . would be
affected accordingly, depending upon whether section 736 or 741 gov-
erned the transaction.
Id. at 550 n.7.
4
6 Id.
4 7 David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 551 (1964).
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the death of a partner" is apparently synonymous with the phrase
1acquired from ...the decedent" as used in the basis provisions
of section 1014(b) .4 It appears that a court ordered sale of partner-
ship assets, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case,
may be the sale of a partnership interest. 49 The basis provisions of
section 743 are not operative when a partnership interest is acquired
by contribution to an existing partnership or in a partnership liqui-
dation of an interest. Furthermore, no suggestion is made in the
Code or Regulations that the gift of a partnership interest is to be
treated as a transfer of a partnership interest for purposes of the
basis provisions of Sections 742 and 743, and it must be assumed that
the basis provisions of the Code relating to a donee's basis, control.5
A. The General "eNo Adjustment" Rule
The entity approach to partnership tax law is readily apparent
in the general rule of transferee basis upon the transfer of a part-
nership interest. It will be recalled that the entity approach views
the partnership as separate and apart from the individual partners.
In the corporate income tax area, the purchaser of stock takes as
his basis in the shares the amount of money or other consideration
paid for it,5 without regard to the proportionate amount of the
adjusted basis of the corporate assets that the purchased shares
represent. This same theory was applied to transfers of partnership
interests before its statement as the general rule in the 1954 Code.52
The rule was succinctly stated as follows: "A partnership's basis
in its assets is distinct from the partners' bases in their partnership
interests, and is not affected by changes in such partnerhip in-
terests. '5 3 In some cases based on pre-1954 law, taxpayer attempts
to step up the basis of partnership assets were successful on the
grounds that, under state law, the old partnership had terminated., 4
The 1954 Code settled earlier confusion and negated reliance on
48 Dupree v. United States, 391 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1968) (community property
transfer).
4 9
See Rev. Rul. 264, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 248. The ruling cited the following facts:
as a result of litigation among the five equal partners, the court ordered judicial
sale of the partnership assets; three of the five partners bought the assets and con-
tinued the business; the other two partners received their respective share of the sales
proceeds in liquidation of their interests.
50INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1015 (a,d).
51 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012.
2 Robert E. Ford, 6 T.C. 499 (1946); G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 CUM. BULL, 212,
revoking G.C.M. 10092, XI-1 CUM. BULL. 114 (1932).
53 Rev. Rul. 144, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 212, 213.
54Milton H. Jacobs, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 637 (1955) ; contra, Anderson v. United
States, 232 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1956).
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state law by establishing definitive rules governing termination
of a partnership. 5
Upon the transfer of a partnership interest by sale or exchange,
or upon the death of the transferor, the new basis for the partner-
ship interest to the transferee shall be its cost where sold or
exchanged, 6 or the fair market value of the interest at the date
of the transferor partner's death or one year thereafter.57 Unless
otherwise elected, no adjustment to the basis of partnership property
to reflect differences between the market value of the assets of the
business and the partnership's adjusted basis of those assets may be
made.58 Although the sales price of, or the estate tax valuation of,
the partnership interest reflect appreciation or diminution in the
value of the partnership assets, the basis of the underlying assets,
upon which the value of the partnership interest was determined,
remains separate and distinct under the general rule.
Perhaps the most illuminating method of demonstrating the
principal topic of this discussion - the operation of the adjustment
to basis provision of section 743 (b) -is to consider in detail the
effects of the general rule, mindful that the optional adjustment
approach alleviates the problems described. It is quite clear that
when the sales price, or the fair market value for estate tax purposes,
of the transferred partnership interest equals the adjusted basis of
that portion of the partnership assets attributable to the transferred
partnership interest, no benefit nor detriment accrues to the trans-
feree as a result of the application of the general rule. Therefore,
an election to adjust the basis of partnership assets would be incon-
sequential. It is also clear that such equality of bases is a rare
occurrence. Consideration must therefore be given to the effect of
the general no-adjustment rule on post-transfer depreciation, de-
pletion, gain, or loss from the sale of partnership assets and
distributions.
Where the partnership has property that has appreciated in
value and a partnership interest is transferred, the transferee en-
counters adverse tax consequences as a result of the application
of the general rule. The appreciation in the value of the partnership
assets is reflected in the price that he paid for the partnership
interest, or its fair market value at the death of the transferring
partner, but not in the transferee's proportionate share of the part-
55 
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 708(b).
5 6 Id. §§ 742, 1012.
5
7 Id. §§ 742, 1014.
58Id. § 743(a).
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nership's asset basis. To illustrate, the ABCD partnership has the
following assets, liabilities, and capital: 9
Adjusted Market
Assets Basis Value
Cash $ 1,000 $ 1,000
Accounts Receivable 2,000 2,000
Inventory 6,000 6,400
Building (net of straight-line depreciation) 5,000 7,000
Land 1,000 1,200
Royalty Interest in Oil and Gas Property 1,000 2,400
Total Assets $16,000 $20,000
Liabilities & Capital
Liabilities -0- -0-
Capital Accounts - A $ 4,000 $ 5,000
-B 4,000 5,000
- C 4,000 5,000
- D 4,000 5,000
Total Liabilities and Capital $16,000 $20,000
Assume that A sells his interest to E for $5,000 and that an
election under section 75460 to adjust the basis of partnership assets
pursuant to section 743(b) is not in effect. E's basis for the pur-
chased partnership interest is his cost, $5,000, pursuant to section
1012. The underlying partnership assets attributable to E continue
to have a basis of $4,000 under the general rule of section 743(a).
During the taxable year of the partnership, the following events
occur: (1) the inventory is sold for its market value of $6,400;
(2) depreciation on the building amounts to $250 for the year;
(3) royalty income is received and the partnership elects to take a
percentage depletion of $300 since cost depletion would have
amounted to $200 or one-fifth of the adjusted cost basis to the
partnership. E's distributive share of income and expenses are:
ordinary income from the sale of inventory, $100; depreciation on
the building, $62.50; depletion, $75.
The detrimental consequences to E may be readily demonstrated.
Had E purchased one-fourth of the assets of the partnership, instead
59 The type of assets and the amounts used are not intended to depict an actual partner-
ship, but rather are chosen as a vehicle for discussion purposes.
60 See section V infra.
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of purchasing a partnership interest based on the value of part-
nership assets, the income and expense picture would have been








Based on the same transactions detailed in the preceeding paragraph,
E would: (1) have no income upon the sale of the inventory items,
(2) have depreciation on the building of $87.50, (3) have taken
cost depletion, rather than percentage depletion, in the amount of
$120.00 (1/5 of $600).
In the absence of the election under section 732(d),61 the
general rule of section 743 (a) also has an adverse effect on E when
he receives a current or liquidating distribution of the appreciated
property. Assume that E receives, as a current distribution from the
partnership, one-fourth of the royalty interest in oil and gas property.
E takes as his basis the partnership's adjusted basis,6 2 $250.00 (1/4
of $1,000) instead of $600, the amount for which he would have
purchased the interest apart from the partnership interest. Cost
depletion would be limited to the $250 carryover basis. Further-
more, if E then sold the royalty interest for $600 (the amount of
his original cash outlay allocable to the asset), he would realize a
capital gain of $350. Distributions will be discussed in more detail
later in this article.
If the ABCD partnership had section 751 assets at the time
E purchased his interest, the general rule would prohibit a special
basis adjustment in the absence of a proper partnership election.
Thus, if the ABCD partnership's accounts receivable were, instead,
unrealized receivables, the basis of the unrealized receivables would
be zero as to the transferee's share and upon collection would result
in $500 ordinary income to E. Other section 751 assets which could
be expected to appear in this context are substantially appreciated
inventory and section 1231 assets with potential section 1245 or
1250 income.
81 See section II infra.
62 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 732(a).
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Whereas the purchase of an interest in a partnership with ap-
preciated assets has an undesirable immediate impact on the pur-'
chaser, the purchase of an interest in a partnership that has assets
which have declined in value has a favorable effect on the pur-
chaser. The decline in the value of the partnership assets is reflected
in the price he paid, or in the fair market value at the death of
the transferring partner, for the partnership interest but not in
his acquired share of the partnership assets. To illustrate, the FGHI
partnership has assets, liabilities, and capital of:
Adjusted Market
Assets Basis Value
Cash $ 1,000 $ 1,000




Royalty Interest in Oil and Gas Property 1,000 500
Total Assets $16,000 $12,000
Liabilities & Capital
Liabilities -0- -0-




Total Liabilities and Capital $16,000 $12,000
Assume that F sells his interest to J for $3,000 and the section
754 election is not made. J's basis for the purchased partnership
interest is its cost, $3,000, pursuant to section 1012. No change is
made in the basis of the partnership assets attributable to his interest,
which is $4,000. During the partnership taxable year, the following
transactions take place: (1) the inventory is sold for its market
value of $4,000; (2) depreciation on the building amounts to $250
for the year; (3) royalty income is received and the partnership
computes depletion, based on cost, which amounts to $200 or one-
fifth of the adjusted basis to the partnership. The partnership trans-
actions have the following effect on J: ordinary loss from the sale
of inventory, $500; depreciation expense, $62.50; depletion, $50.
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In this situation, the tax consequences to J are immediately
beneficial. Had he purchased the assets rather than an interest in








The transactions, if J had purchased the assets, would result in:
(1) no gain or loss from the sale of the inventory, (2) reducing
depreciation on the building to $50, and (3) reducing cost depletion
to $25.
If J receives a current distribution of property that has declined
in value, his basis in the distributed property is the same as it was
in the hands of the partnership, provided it does not exceed his
basis in his partnership interest. Hence, if one-fourth of the royalty
interest is distributed to J, his basis for purposes of cost depletion
or for a subsequent sale is $250, whereas the market value of the
royalty interest is $125.
The preceding examples illustrate the immediate tax con-
sequences of the general "no adjustment" rule of section 743(a),
but the overall effect of that rule on the transferee must be con-
sidered. First, however, an understanding of the operation of another
basis provision of the Code is necessary. The transferee's cost basis
for his partnership interest is increased by his distributive share of
partnership taxable income and decreased by: (1) distributions of
money or property, and (2) his distributive share of partnership
losses; but in no event shall the decreases result in a negative basis.63
When a sale by the partnership of assets which had increased
or decreased in value at the time the transferee received his interest
is followed by a liquidation of the transferee's interest, a variety
of results may occur. Where the partnership has appreciated assets,
the sale of the assets produces gain to the transferee partner and
his basis is increased in the amount of the gain. If the transferee's
interest is then liquidated by a cash distribution 4 after two years
631d. § 705(a)(1)(A).
64 Where a distribution is of property and the fair market value of the distributed
partnership property other than money is, at the time of the transfer of the partner-
ship interest, in excess of 110 percent of its adjusted basis to the partnership, section
732(d) must be applied. See section II infra.
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from transfer of the interest,65 the relief provisions of section 732 (d)
discussed in section II infra would not be available and a capital
loss is incurred by the transferee. Isolating the two transactions, the
amount of the capital loss on liquidation would equal the amount
of the transferee partner's distributive share of the partnership's
gain on the sale of the appreciated partnership assets. To illustrate,
assume that L purchases a partnership interest for $5,000. The
partnership assets attributable to L's interest have an adjusted basis
of $4,600 and the difference between the purchase price of the in-
terest and the adjusted basis of the underlying assets represents
appreciation in the value of those assets. Upon the sale by the
partnership of those assets for $5,000, L's distributive share of
taxable gain is $400 and the basis of his partnership interest is
increased to $5,400 ($5,000 cost plus taxable income of $400).
After two years, L's interest is liquidated by a cash distribution. Since
the partnership received $5,000 for the assets, that is the extent
of the money that L receives. L has incurred a capital loss of $400
($5,400 adjusted basis in partnership interest, minus $5,000 cash
received in liquidation of his interest) .66 If the appreciated assets
were capital assets, capital gain upon the sale by the partnership
would be offset by capital loss on the liquidating distribution. How-
ever, if the appreciated assets were other than capital assets, e.g.
inventory, ordinary gain to L would have been the result of the
partnership's sale of those assets. Therefore, ordinary gain upon
the sale is offset by capital loss on the distribution. Where the
partnership has assets that have declined in value at the time of
the purchase of the partnership interest, the assets are sold by the
partnership, and the transferee partner's interest is liquidated by
a cash distribution, the tax results are ordinary or capital loss on
the sale, depending upon the type of asset, and capital gain on the
cash distribution. Careful analysis demonstrates that the tax con-
sequences do not necessarily "even out in the end."
If the transferee, instead of receiving a liquidating distribution,
sells the partnership interest, the tax consequences are generally the
same. Assuming a stable market value of the partnership assets,
a sale by the transferee immediately after receipt of the partnership
interest would result in neither gain nor loss since the sale price
(market value) of the interest would equal the basis of the trans-
feree-seller.67 If the sale of the partnership interest by the transferee
occurs after the sale by the partnership of the assets which had
6-Section 742(d) may not be applied by the transferee after two years from the
acquisition of the interest. See section II infra.
66 1NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 731(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(2) (1956).
67 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1001.
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increased or decreased in value at the acquisition of the interest,
or after depreciation or depletion is taken on such assets, the re-
suiting tax consequences are the same as described in the immediately
preceding paragraphs where the transferee's interest is liquidated
by a cash distribution. The same ordinary income-capital loss and
ordinary loss-capital gain possibilities exist here as well.
The propriety of two taxable events with regard to one asset of
the partnership - recognition on the sale by the partnership and
recognition on subsequent liquidation or sale of the transferee's
partnership interest - was recently raised in Barnes v. United
States.8 The transferee taxpayer had purchased an interest in a
professional partnership which had unrealized receivables which
were subsequently collected. No election to adjust basis was made
and the taxpayer reported the collection of the receivables as ordinary
income. At the time when the taxpayer sold his partnership interest,
the receivables of the partnership were in excess of the amount
at the time of the taxpayer's purchase of the interest. The taxpayer
successfully argued that section 751, requiring ordinary income
treatment of unrealized receivables owned by the partnership at the
time of the sale, should not be applied to that portion of the un-
realized receivables which were equal to the unrealized receivables
at the acquisition of the taxpayer's interest. To illustrate, let us
assume that A purchases a partnership interest for $6,000. The
underlying partnership assets are unrealized receivables with a basis
!of zero and a fair market value of $3,000 and other assets with an
adjusted basis and fair market value of $3,000. The receivables are
collected, A reports his distributive share as $3,000 of ordinary
income, and his partnership interest basis is increased to $9,000
($6,000 cost plus $3,000 distributive income). At this point, if A
sold his interest or received a liquidating distribution, he would
incur a capital loss of $3,000 since the partnership would have
money and porperty with an adjusted basis and fair market value
of $6,000 attributed to A's partnership interest. This demonstrates
the ordinary income-capital loss pattern previously mentioned. If,
instead of liquidating or selling his interest, A works in the part-
"nership until the partnership has again accumulated $3,000 in un-
realized receivables and then A sells his interest for $9,000 ($3,000
cash from unrealized receivables collected, $3,000 market value of
other assets, and $3,000 in new unrealized receivables), section 751
requires separate treatment of the unrealized receivables. At this
.point, A's partnership interest basis is still $9,000 since the unreal-
ized receivables have no effect on his basis until collected. Section
68 253 F.Supp. 116 (S.D. I11. 1966).
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751 produces $3,000 ordinary income (fair market value less the%
partnership's basis of 0 carried over to A). This leaves $6,000 of!
the purchase price ($9,000 total purchase price less $3,000 allocated.
to unrealized receivables) to be offset by A's partnership interest!
basis of $9,000. Therefore, A also has a $3,000 capital loss on the.
transaction.
In Barnes, the court concluded that the $3,000 of unrealized-
receivables were being taxed too many times and that the taxpayer"
should be allowed to recoup his cost in the unrealized receivables.
While it expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of the result
required by the Code, the court rested its decision on two rather7
strained reconstructions of the transaction.
The case is significant in two aspects. First, the holding of the
case proceeds entirely upon the assumption that when A bought
into the partnership he purchased the underlying assets rather than
the partnership interest -an assumption clearly in opposition t6
the theory of the Code and prior case law.6" In the absence of this
assumption regarding the purchase, the application of section 751 (a)
to the sale of the interest is clearly within the Congressional purpose
of preventing the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain..
Second, the position asserted by the court would make resort to the
elective special basis adjustment provision of section 743(b) un-
necessary where section 751 is applicable.
The devastating impact that the general rule of section 743 (a)
may have upon the unwary taxpayer was recently demonstrated in
Dupree v. United States.7° The factual pattern, in chronological
order, may be summarized as follows: (1) a transfer upon the death
of a partner; (2) a sale by the partnership of a capital asset that had
appreciated greatly before the death of the partner; (3) a liquidating
distribution of cash and a proportionate interest in notes taken by
the partnership from the purchaser of the capital asset; and (4) the
death of the transferee partner. Relief under section 732(d) was'
not available because the distribution occurred more than two years
after the transfer of the interest. The sale of the capital asset resulted
in a substantial amount of capital gain which amount was, pursuant
to section 705, added to the transferee's partnership interest basis.
It should be noted that the facts of the case introduce two elements
not previously considered herein - a property distribution and death
of the transferee-distributee. The Code provides for recognition of
loss on a distribution in liquidation only in the event cash, unrealized
69 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 741-42; First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Commissioner,
183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 911 (1951) ; Commissioner v.
Long, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949).
70391 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1968).
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receivables, or inventory are distributed. 1 The distribution of any
property delays the recognition of a loss until the subsequent dis-
position of the property by the partner.72 The transferee partner's
basis in the partnership interest, after the reduction for the cash
received, became his basis in the distributed property. Just as de-
scribed in the previous examples of appreciated assets and liquidation
after their sale, the basis in the transferee's partnership interest
exceeds the transferee's proportionate share of assets before the
liquidating distribution. Therefore, upon liquidation Dupree had
a tax basis in excess of the fair market value (and for that matter,
in excess of the face amount) of the notes. The capital loss that
would have been realized upon collection on, or sale of, the notes,
which would have offset the capital gain recognized on the part-
nership's sale of its asset, disappeared, much to the chagrin of his
successors in interest, at his death. 3 There is, of course, "no equity
in tax law.
' 7 4
Three final comments are relevant to Dupree specifically and
to the general rule of section 743 (a). First, whenever the tax pattern
is ordinary income or capital gain upon the sale of assets by the
partnership and capital loss, upon liquidation of the partnership
interest and the taxable events occur in different years, the capital
loss may only be carried forward75 and, in the absence of capital
gains in the future, will offset up to $1,000 of ordinary income until
the capital loss is used up or expires at the death of the taxpayer. 6
Accordingly, the result may be a heavy tax burden initially, followed
by slow and uncertain recoupment. Where the tax pattern is ordinary
loss or capital loss upon the sale of assets by the partnership and
capital gain upon liquidation of the partnership interest capital
gain (partnership with assets that have declined in value), the same
problem does not exist. Second, death of a transferee partner in the
Dupree situation, but with assets that have declined in value at the
time of the transfer of the partnership interest, will allow the
transferee's successors in interest a stepped-up basis with no capital
gain treatment under existing law. Finally, and as an introduction
to the next section, an election to adjust the basis of partnership
assets for Dupree's benefit would have cancelled out his distributive




INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 731(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a) (2) (1956).
7 2
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 731(a)(2), 732(b).
73 1d. § 1014.
74 Dupree v. United States, 391 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1968).
7 5
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B. Optional Adjustment to Basis of Partnership Assets
The alternative approach provided by section 743(b) clearly
demonstrates an aggregate approach to partnership income tax law.
It has the effect of treating the transferee of a partnership interest
as the owner of his proportionate share of the individual partner-
ship assets apart from the collective group. The partnership form
that stands between the transferee under the general "no adjust-
ment" rule of section 743(a) is removed by the operation of the
basis adjustment alternative.
The special basis adjustment provision is not operative unless
the election required by section 754 is in effect. 7 The Code contains
specific rules for allocating the adjustment once it has been made.78
A limited alternative is available under section 732(d) to the
transferee when the adjustment rule is not utilized.7"
The amount of the adjustment to the basis of the partnership
property is determined by comparing the transferee partner's basis
for his interest in the partnership with his proportionate share of
the adjusted basis of the partnership assets. The adjusted basis of
the partnership assets is increased by the excess of the basis of the
transferee's partnership interest over the transferee's proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of the partnership assets. A decrease
results where the latter exceeds the former. 80
The ABCD partnership example81 may be used to illustrate the
operation of the special basis adjustment that increases the adjusted
basis of partnership assets. E purchased for $5,000 partner A's
one-fourth interest in the partnership. E's proportionate share of
the adjusted basis of partnership assets is $4,000. The special basis
adjustment is $1,000.
Likewise, the FGHI partnership example 82 provides a vehicle
for the illustration of the operation of the special basis adjustment
that decreases the adjusted basis of partnership assets. J purchased
F's one-fourth interest in the partnership for $3,000. J's proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of partnership assets is $4,000. The
special basis adjustment is a minus $1,000.
The adjustment to the basis of partnership assets is for the
benefit of the transferee.88 Although the adjustment is made by
77 See section V infra.
78 See section IV infra.
79 See section II infra.
80 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 743(b).
81 See p. 345, supra.
8 See p. 347, supra.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b) (1956).
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the partnership, the adjustment by itself has no effect on the other
partners.
For purposes of computing the transferee partner's distributive
share of depreciation, depletion, and gain or loss from the sale of
partnership property and for determining basis upon the distribution
of partnership property to the transferee, the special basis adjustment
becomes a part of the basis of partnership assets.8 4 The special basis
adjustment is allocated to assets in a manner which reduce the
difference between fair market value of the assets and the adjusted
basis of the assets to the partnership.8"
When the BCDE partnership sells its inventory that has an
adjusted basis of $4,600 for $5,000, the gain is $400. However, the
transferee partner's one-fourth share of the gain, $100 is offset by
the special basis adjustment of $100 attributable to the inventory.
A post-acquisition increase or decrease in the market value of the
inventory would result in gain or loss, respectively, to the transferee.
When the GHIJ partnership sells its inventory with an adjusted
basis of $6,000 for the market value of $4,000, a $2,000 loss results.
Again, however, the special basis adjustment attributable to the
transferee J's proportionate share of the inventory nullifies his
distributive share of the loss. A post-acquisition change in value
would also create gain or loss to the transferee.
When the special basis adjustment is allocated to depreciable
partnership property and is an increase to the adjusted basis of that
property, the transferee's depreciation is increased although there
is no change in the method that the partnership uses in computing
depreciation. A special basis adjustment that decreases the adjusted
basis of depreciable property, of course, results in lower depreciation
to the transferee. It should be noted that accelerated methods of
depreciation, when used for partnership property to which the
special basis adjustment is applicable, may not be applied to the
special basis adjustment that increases the adjusted basis of that
property.86 If the special basis adjustment decreases the adjusted
basis of property on which accelerated methods of depreciation are
applied by the partnership, the transferee partner must report
income in the amount of the difference between the accelerated
method and the straight-line method. 7
If the partnership has depletable property, cost depletion is
affected in the same manner as depreciation, but the Regulation's
approach to accelerated methods of depreciation on the special basis
84 Id.
85 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 755(a) (1) ; see section IV infra.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c)-1(a) (6) (1956).
87 Id.
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adjustment has not been carried over to the depletion area. The
Code goes even further in giving a special "tax break" to the
transferee of an interest in a partnership that has property subject
to depletion by providing that "any depletion allowable shall be
determined separately for the transferee partner with respect to
his interest in such property. "88 "If a transferee partner has paid a
high price [or if the transferee partner received the partnership
interest upon the death of his predecessor in interest at a fair
market value that reflects a substantial increase over the adjusted
basis of the partnership assets] for his partnership interest, he may
find it advisable to use cost depletion at the same time that other
partners use percentage depletion.''89
If the transferee receives a distribution of partnership property
to which the special basis adjustment applies, the basis of the
property in his hands includes the special basis adjustment. If another
partner receives a distribution of that property, the special basis
adjustment will shift from the distributed property to other part-
nership property. The shifting special basis adjustment is one of
the topics included in section IV infra.
Because of the effect that the optional adjustment rule of
section 743 (b) has in reconciling the basis of the tranferee's part-
nership interest and the adjusted basis of the underlying partner-
ship assets, the variety of post-acquisition income tax consequences
of a subsequent liquidation or sale of the transferred interest en-
countered in the application of the general "no-adjustment" rule
do not arise with the application of the optional adjustment rule.
The pattern of "gain now-loss later," or vice versa, and the danger
of a "gain now-loss never" Dupree result do not exist since the
initial taxable event in those patterns does not occur under section
743(b).
The Regulations contain several provisions intended to clarify
the effect of certain transactions which occur after the transfer of
the partnership interest and the application of section 743 (b). One
provision deals with the subsequent transfer of the transferred
interest and is designed to prevent the multiplication of special basis
adjustments - a possibility clearly not intended by the draftsmen -
and to allow, on the other hand, the subsequent transferee the full
benefit of the purchase price of the interest. To illustrate, assume
that A, B, and C contribute $5,000 each and that D contributes land
with an adjusted basis and market value of $5,000. When the land
has appreciated in value to $9,000, A sells his one-fourth interest
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 743(b); see also Neel v. United States, 266 F. Supp.
7 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
891 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 802(3) (1968).
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to E for $6,000 ( of the value of partnership assets). E has a
special basis adjustment of $1,000. The land appreciates still further
to $13,000 and E sells the partnership interest to F for $7,000 (V4
of the new value of partnership assets). Does F have a special basis
adjustment of $3,000 (E's adjustment of $1,000 plus F's adjust-
ment of $2,000) or does F have a special basis adjustment of $1,000
(the purchase price less E's share of the assets and E's special basis
adjustment)? In both instances, the Regulations would say no. F's
section 743 (b) adjustment is determined by referring to the common
basis of the partnership property without regard to E's section 743 (b)
adjustment. Therefore, F's special basis adjustment is $2,000 (the
purchase price less transferee's proportionate share of the common
partnership basis or $7,000 minus of $20,000)."°
Section 743(b) also provides that a section 704(c) (2) agree-
ment between the partners shall be taken into account in determining
the special basis adjustment. The Code recognizes that the partners
may agree that precontribution appreciation or depreciation in value
of the contributed property shall be allocated to the contributor upon
subsequent disposition of that property by the partnership." Where
the contributor of the property that had increased or decreased in
value from its adjusted basis before contribution transfers his part-
nership interest, the transferee computes his special basis adjustment
by including the precontribution change in value with his propor-
tionate share of postcontribution change in value (as reflected by
the difference between the purchase price of the interest and the
transferee's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership
property.92
A deficit balance in the capital account of the transferor may
create some confusion when the transferee computes his special
basis adjustment. The capital account must be carefully distinguished
from the adjusted tax basis of a partnership interest. The former may,
of course, have a negative balance but the latter may never be
reduced below zero.9 Assuming that, (1) the transferor's capital
account showed a deficit balance of $2,000, (2) his proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of partnership assets is zero, and (3)
he sells his interest for $5,000, the transferee's special basis ad-
justment is $5,000. The deficit account balance, if there is an
obligation on the transferor to repay "is a loan governed by section
707 (a) of the Code."94 If the transferee had assumed the transferor's
90
Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii) (1956).
91
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 704(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) (1964).
92
Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b)(2)(i) (1956).
93 
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 705(a)(2).
94Rev. Rul. 318, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 362, 363.
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obligation to repay the deficit, it seems definite that the transferee's
basis adjustment would, instead, be $7,000.
C. Summary Comparison of Section 743 (a) and Section 743(b)
It should be apparent that the general "no adjustment" rule
operates for the benefit, tax-wise, of the transferee when the price
he paid for the partnership interest, or the fair market value at the
date of the death of the transferee's predecessor in interest, is less
than the transferor's proportionate share of the adjusted basis, for
income tax purposes, of partnership assets. He receives the advantage
of a higher depreciation and, perhaps higher depletion, than his
purchase price would warrant had he purchased only the assets apart
from the partnership. He may be able to trade an ordinary loss for
a later capital gain, depending on the nature of partnership assets.
Should the transferee die after an ordinary or capital loss is incurred
but before a liquidating distribution of cash, or after a liquidating
distribution of property still held at his death, the present statutory
scheme will not tax the built-in capital gain. Because of these factors,
the transferee would have little, if any, interest in the alternative
rule of section 743 (b).
On the other hand, the alternative rule embodied in section
743(b) is most attractive to the transferee of an interest in a part-
nership where his basis in that interest exceeds his proportionate
share of partnership assets. He receives the full benefit of his cost,
or the fair market value at his transferor's death, in computing de-
preciation or depletion on property that has appreciated in value.
Depletion may be computed independent of the method used by
the partnership. He is not subject to realized gain on the preac-
quisition appreciation to the value of partnership assets. Tax traps,
as demonstrated by the Dupree case, do not exist. Movement out of
the partnership is facilitated since section 743 (b) makes immaterial,
in regard to preacquisition appreciation, the type of partnership
property chosen for a distribution liquidating his interest.
In light of the preceding discussion, it should be readily ap-
parent that the income tax ramifications of the transfer of a part-
nership interest on the transferee are of utmost significance. Serious
attention must be directed not only to the short range income tax
effects on the transferee but also to the long range consequences
of the transfer.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to examine
in depth the basis provisions of the Code and to isolate their effect
on the transferee of a partnership interest; but that is only part of
the story. The choice of the basis rule to be applied rests with the
partnership, not solely with the transferee partner. The reason for
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this is that the choice may, and probably will, to a limited extent,
affect the other partners both as to past transfers and distributions
and those that occur in the future. The problem of the partnership
election is the subject of section V infra.
II. DISTRIBUTIONS TO THE TRANSFEREE OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL RULE OF SECTION 743 (a)
Section 1A supra, emphasized the serious tax consequences that
a transferee of a partnership interest may encounter as a result of
the application of the general rule that the adjusted basis of partner-
ship assets is not changed by the sale, exchange, or inheritance of
a partnership interest. If the basis of the transferee's partnership
interest reflects an appreciation in the value of the underlying part-
nership assets in excess of the adjusted basis of those assets to the
partnership, the full tax advantage of the partnership interest basis
is denied the transferee and adverse income recognition may occur.
The draftsmen of the Code recognized the problems inherent in the
general rule of section 743(a) 5 and provided for a limited form
of relief for the transferee by the enactment of section 732(d). 9 '
The "consideration" for the relief provision was the mandatory ap-
plication of that Code section in certain circumstances.
A. Adjustment at the Election of the Transferee Partner
As will be described infra,"7 the election to adjust the basis of
partnership assets is a matter for the collective determination by the
partners. The advantages of the election may be far outweighted by
the disadvantages that are a part of the election and the result may
well be a refusal by the other partners to make the election for the
benefit of the transferee. Section 732(d) may be used by the trans-
feree to avoid the operation of the general "no adjustment" rule. Al-
though this provision of the Code does not require a collective
decision by the partnership to make it operative in an income tax
sense, an examination of the provision will make it obvious that the
collective decision may still be the determining factor.
If certain enumerated conditions are satisfied, section 732(d)
allows the transferee, at his election, to treat as the adjusted partner-
ship basis of the distributed property the adjusted basis such property
would have had if the optional adjustment rule of section 743 (b)
had been in effect at the acquisition of the transferee's interest in
the partnership.
95 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 391 (1954).
96 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 732(d).
97 See section V infra.
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The transferee may elect to have section 732(d) applied if
five conditions are met. They are: (1) a distribution of property;
(2) the distributee must be a transferee as that term is used in sec-
tion 743; (3) the distribution must be made within two years of the
acquisition by the transferee of a partnership interest; (4) the alter-
native adjustment rule of section 743 (b) must not have been in effect;
and (5) a proper election must be made in the manner required by
the Regulations."
The first requirement contains two elements - a distribution
and property. The former may be a current or liquidating distri-
bution."9 The need for a distribution is easily understood when it
is recalled that the alternative adjustment rule requires the partners,
rather than the transferee partner alone, to decide upon the use of
the alternative rule and its application to partnership property. If
a distribution was not required, an alternative to the alternative
rule would exist. The transferee partner alone could make the deci-
sion to adjust partnership property - a result clearly negated by
the express provision of section 743(b). Therefore, a distribution
is required and the transferee-distributee's decision affects distributed
property which is no longer partnership property.
The distribution to which the special basis adjustment applies
must be of property. A fundamental principle of tax law that money
cannot have a basis different from its face amount stands behind
the applicability of section 732(d) to property other than money.
Therefore, in the case of a current distribution of money, or if the
transferee's interest is liquidated by a cash distribution, the trans-
feree could not elect section 732(d) treatment. The transferee who
receives cash in liquidation of his interest would face the results
encountered under the general "no adjustment" rule of section
743(a) described in section 1A supra.
The Congressional proceedings' definitely support, and the
language of the Code may be construed so as to support, the position
that the property to which section 732(d) may be applied must be
the identical property to which an adjustment to basis under section
743 (b) would have been allocated at the time of the transfer of
the partnership interest. The Regulations take the position that
section 732(d) may be applied to both the identical property to
which an adjustment to basis pursuant to section 743(b) would
have been made and to "like property" if the transferee relin-
9 8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 732(d).
99 Id. The fact that the Code uses the word "distribution" generally, seems to indicate
that it should apply to both types of distributions.
100S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1954).
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quishes his interest in the identical property. 01 "Like property" is
not defined in the regulation dealing with section 732(d), but
because of that section's interrelationship with section 743, it may
be concluded that the definition of the term for purposes of section
743 also applies to section 732(d). Therefore, "like property" is
"property of the same class, that is, stock in trade, property used
in the trade or business, capital assets, etc.' '102 The position taken
by the Regulations seems more logical and is justified in light of
the purpose of section 732 (d), i.e. to give the transferee the benefit
of the provisions of the alternative adjustment rule of section 743 (b)
in a manner that does not do harm to the general "no adjustment"
rule of section 743(a) or to the restriction in section 743(b) that
a special basis adjustment is a matter for partnership determination.
It is no more than an extension of the concept that a special basis
adjustment may shift from one item of property to another.'
The second condition to the applicability of section 732(d)
is that the distributee must be a transferee as that designation is
used in section 743. As used there, a transferee is one who receives
a partnership interest as a result of a sale or exchange, or by in-
heritance.
Requirements (3) and (4) are self explanatory. The election
required of the transferee is discussed in section V infra.
It seems advisable to consider the operation of section 732(d)
as, by election, it applies to certain distributions in the context of
two now familiar situations- the transferee of a partnership in-
terest whose basis of the interest is greater than his proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of partnership property, and the trans-
feree whose proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership
assets exceeds the adjusted basis of his partnership interest. In
both cases, the partnership did not elect to adjust the basis of
partnership assets pursuant to section 743 (b) .104 The former type
of transferee and his situation will be referred to as "appreciated
assets" and the latter type as "diminished-value assets." Two dif-
ferent kinds of distributions may be involved in either case. In the
examples that follow it is assumed that the conditions imposed by
section 732(d) have been, or can be, met.
1. Appreciated Assets - Current Distribution
A current distribution of an asset with a market value in excess
of its adjusted basis to the partnership, at the time of acquisition
101Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(d)'(1) (v) (1956).
1
02Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b) (2) (ii) (1956).
103 Id.
104 See p. 357, supra.
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of the partnership interest by the transferee, will allow the trans-
feree to avoid the detrimental tax consequences which he would
otherwise encounter. To illustrate, assume that three parcels of real
estate held for investment are among the assets of the LMN partner-
ship. Each parcel has an adjusted basis to the partnership of $1,000.
At a time when each parcel has a market value of $1,200, L sells
his partnership interest to P for an amount which reflects L's one-
third interest in the property and its appreciation. Section 743(b)
is not made applicable. The partners agree to distribute one parcel
of land to P in return for a partnership agreement provision that P
will not share in the preagreement appreciation in the value of
the other parcels. Under the Code provisions concerning the basis
to the distributee of partnership property received in a current dis-
tribution, the adjusted basis of the distributed property to the part-
nership carries over to the distributee l °0 subject to the limitation,
not applicable here, that the basis in the hands of the distributee may
not exceed his partnership interest basis.'06 Under the general rule,
P's basis for the distributed property would be $1,000. However,
if P elects to make section 732(d) applicable, the basis in his hands
of the real property would be $1,200 ($1,000 partnership basis
plus a $200 special basis adjustment P would have had under
section 743 (b)) and the basis of his partnership interest would
be reduced by that amount. Assume, on the other hand, that one
of the assets on hand at the time of the distribution is a capital
asset to which a special basis adjustment would not have been
made if section 743(b) had been applicable. If P relinquishes his
interest in the three parcels of land, the Regulations provide that
he may make an adjustment in the amount of $200 to the basis of
the other capital asset upon receipt of it by distribution.
2. Appreciated Assets - Liquidating Distribution
The primary advantage of section 732(d) in this situation
appears to be that of preventing the distributee's basis in the dis-
tributed property from shifting away from assets that will produce
ordinary gain upon their sale, or shifting from depreciable assets
to nondepreciable assets. The problem sought to be overcome by
section 732 (d) is created by the allocation rules contained in section
732 (c) and in Regulations pertaining to it. In allocating the part-
nership interest basis to distributed property, the general rule is that
the partnership basis for inventory carries over to the distributee and
that the remaining partnership interest basis, after allocation to
unrealized receivables and inventory, is allocated to the remaining
105 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 732(a)(1).
10 'Id. § 732(a)(2).
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distributed assets "in proportion to the bases of such other properties
in the hands of the partnership before distribution.""1 7 To illustrate,
assume that A purchases W's one-fourth interest in the WXYZ
partnership. The partnership assets, liabilities, and capital at the
date of the transfer are:
Adjusted Market
Assets Basis Value
Cash $ 20,000 $ 20,000
Inventory 48,000 52,000
Buildings (net of straight
line depreciation) 24,000 28,000
Land- 4 equal parcels 40,000 40,000
Total Assets $132,000 $140,000
Liabilities & Capital
Liabilities $ 0 $ 0
Capital - W 33,000 35,000
- X 33,000 35,000
- Y 33,000 35,000
- z 33,000 35,000
Total Liabilities
& Capital $132,000 $140,000
It should be noted that no section 751 assets are present here.
A pays W $35,000 for his partnership interest and section 743(a)
is applicable so that no adjustment to the basis of partnership
assets is made. A has, however, paid W $2,000 for property appre-
ciation in excess of its adjusted basis. A's interest is liquidated by
the distribution of $5,000 in cash, one-fourth of the inventory, one
building, and one parcel of land. If the general allocation rule is
applied, the $30,000 partnership interest ($35,000 less $5,000 cash
received) would be allocated to the distributed property in the
following manner: $12,000 to inventory, $6,750 to the building
([6,000/16,000 x 18,0003)108 and $11,250 to land ([10,000/16,000]
x 18,000). Thus, the appreciation of $1,000 in inventory ( of
the market value minus of the adjusted basis) included in A's
basis for his partnership interest, has shifted from property that
produces ordinary gain on disposition to property that would produce
10'Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(c)'(1) (1956).
108 The $18,000 figure is the basis of the partnership interest after reduction for $5,000
cash received and allocation of $12,000 to inventory.
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capital gain treatment. If A then sold the inventory at its market
value, he will incur ordinary income of $1,000. There is, likewise,
a shift from property subject to depreciation to nondepreciable
property.
If section 732(d) is applied, the special basis adjustments that
A would have had if section 743(b) applied, may be used to correct
the results reached under the general rule for allocation. Therefore,
the adjusted bases to A of the distributed assets are: $13,000 to
inventory ($12,000 partnership basis plus a special basis adjustment
of $1,000), $7,000 to building [([6,000/16,0001 x 16,000) 109 plus
a special basis adjustment of $1,000], and $10,000 to land ([10,000/
16,000] x 16,000).
3. Diminished-Value Assets - Current Distribution
Upon the current distribution of an asset to which, if it had
been applicable, section 743(b) would require a reduction of the
proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property
attributable to the transferee, there appears to be no reason for an
income tax conscious partner to make an election to apply section
732(d). If the property distributed is depreciable, application of
section 732(d) would lower the amount of depreciation the dis-
tributee could properly take. If the property distributed is sold by
the distributee and section 732(d) had been applied, the loss which
was "built-in" the property would be nullified.
4. Diminished-Value Assets - Liquidating Distribution
As with a current distribution of such property, it is also true
that an election by the distributee to employ section 732(d) would
have adverse consequences for the taxpayer under the statutory
scheme as it now stands. To illustrate, the assets, liabilities, and
capital accounts of the QRST partnership are:
Adjusted Market
Assets Basis Value
Cash $ 20,000 $ 20,000
Inventory 48,000 40,000
Buildings (4 at equal
amounts and net of
straight line depredation) 20,000 16,000
Land (4 equal parcels) 40,000 40,000
Total Assets $128,000 $116,000
109 The $15,000 figure is the basis of the partnership interest after reduction for $5,000





Liabilities & Capital Basis Value
Liabilities $ 0 $ 0
Capital - Q 32,000 29,000
- R 32,000 29,000
-S 32,000 29,000
- T 32,000 29,000
Total Liabilities
& Capital $128,000 $116,000
Q sells his partnership interest to V for $29,000. V's partnership
interest is liquidated by the distribution of one-fourth of the cash and
inventory, one building, and one parcel of land. Under the general
rule for allocation of the partnership interest basis to distributed
assets, the partnership interest basis of $24,000 (after reduction for
$5,000 cash received) would be allocated as follows: $12,000 (the
basis to the partnership carried over to the distributee) to inventory,
$4,000 to the building ([5,000/15,000] x 12,000) and $8,000 to
the land ([5,000/15,000] x 12,000). In this situation, the general
allocation rule has the effect of shifting the negative special basis
adjustments which would have been made if section 743(b) had
applied up the scale of preferred types of tax-loss property. Thus,
a sale of the inventory at its market value would produce an ordinary
loss of $2,000.
If the distributee elected to have section 732(d) apply, the
special basis adjustments would result in the following bases of
property (other than the money distributed) in the hands of the
distributee: $10,000 for inventory, $4,000 for the building and
$10,000 for the land. Therefore, a sale of the inventory produces
neither gain nor loss.
The lesson learned from Dupree v. United States'11 suggests
one qualification to the desirability of foregoing the section 732(d)
election in this situation. That is, of course, that death of the dis-
tributee will result in a revaluation of the distributed assets which
were not sold or exchanged prior to death. Otherwise, neither the
Code nor the Regulation provide for a result different from the one
suggested here.
If the partnership in which an interest is acquired has both
property that has increased in value over its adjusted basis to the
partnership and property that has declined in value to a level below
the partnership adjusted basis, the application of section 732(d)
110 391 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1968) ; see p. 000, supra.
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must be preceded by permission to use a desired method granted
by the district director.11'
A matter of significant concern, which has not as yet been
considered, is the availability of section 732 (d). The time limitation
imposed as a condition to its applicability is relatively brief - two
years. In the case of a profitable partnership where the whole is
equal to more than the constituent parts, the transferee partner
may be reluctant to push the idea of a distribution to the point of
jeopardizing the firm's continuity. On the other hand, the circum-
stances may warrant demanding the distribution even to the point
of forcing dissolution."' In addition, the nature of partnership
assets may militate against a distribution. Finally, it seems more
than likely that negotiation by the partnership for the sale of assets
to which section 732(d) would apply, followed by a distribution
to the transferee and completion of the prearranged sale by the
transferee, would be recast as a sale by the partnership and a denial
of the applicability of section 732(d) to the transferee." 3
B. Adjustment Required by the Secretary
Section 732(d) must be applied to a distribution, regardless
of when made, "if at the time of the transfer [of the partnership
interestj the fair market value of the partnership property (other
than money) exceeded 110 percent of its adjusted basis to the
partnership.""' 4 The Regulations add the further condition that
section 732(d) must be applied to a liquidating distribution of
property to which section 743(b), had it been applicable at the
acquisition of the transferee's partnership interest, would have given
rise to a special basis adjustment, if the allocation of basis to dis-
tributed property rules of section 732(c) "would have resulted in
a shift of basis from property not subject to an allowance for depre-
ciation, depletion, or amortization, to property subject to such an
allowance .... .. 15 Apparently, the Commissioner has interpreted
the Code provision as having no application to current distributions.
The situation sought to be corrected is demonstrated in detail
in the Regulations"6 and may be summarized as follows. If the
adjusted basis of property not subject to depreciation, depletion,
or amortization is below the market value of such property (as
reflected in the transferee's partnership interest basis) and the
'I'Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(a)(2) (1956).
112 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 31, 32 '(1914).
113 Cf. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
114 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 732(d).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(d)(4) (ii) (1956).
116 Id. at example 1.
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adjusted basis of depreciable property equals or exceeds the market
value of the depreciable property (as reflected in the transferee's
partnership interest basis), the application of the general rule for
the allocation of partnership interest basis to distributed property
of both depreciable and nondepreciable property will result in a
shift in basis from the latter to the former and give the transferee
a higher amount of depreciation than the realities of his purchase
price would warrant.
It will be recalled that in section II A infra, an example was
given under the heading "Appreciated Value - Liquidating Dis-
tributions." That example demonstrated that the transferee may
elect, under certain circumstances, to apply section 732(d) to prevent
the shift of basis from inventory and depreciable assets to non-
depreciable assets. The application of section 732 (d) on a manda-
tory basis is designed to prevent the converse from happening where
the transferee's partnership interest basis (or purchase price) will
not justify a shift in basis.
III. BASIS ASPECTS OF DISTRIBUTIONS
A distribution of money or property by a partnership to a
partner creates basis considerations in respect to three different
types of property. A distribution will require the determination of:
(1) the basis of the distributed property to the distributee, (2) the
basis of the distributee-partner's partnership interest after the dis-
tribution, and (3) the basis of remaining partnership assets as they
exist after the distribution. This wide range of effects justifies a
careful analysis of partnership distributions in the contexts in which
they occur.
The successful tax planning of partnership distributions requires
that the tax planner have accurate information on the bases of the
partners' interests in the partnership as well as the partnership's
bases for partnership property. The distinction previously made
between the capital accounts of the partners as reflected in the
partnership accounting records and the income tax bases of the
partners' interests117 is important and should be reiterated. The
values assigned to property contributed by the partners to the part-
nership for capital account purposes are the result of the partner-
ship agreement. On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 provides that the basis of the partner's interest in the partner-
ship "acquired by a contribution of property, including money, to
the partnership shall be the amount of such money and the adjusted
basis of such property to the contributing partner at the time of
117 See p. 356, supra.
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the contribution."11 The partners may also agree upon the value
of property distributed to a partner and the capital account of the
distributee will be reduced by the agreed amount; however, in the
absence of a proper election and a particular set of circumstances
described in the Code, the income tax basis of the distributed prop-
erty or of the distributee's partnership interest governs. Confusion
of partnership accounting methods with income tax methods may
lead to disastrous income tax consequences.
The discussion that follows will first seek to define distribution
for purposes of determining what types of transfers to partners
receive treatment as distributions under the provisions of sections
731-36 of the Code and what types of transfers are not treated as
distributions. Once the definition has been made, the basis pro-
visions of the Code as they affect distributor and distributee will
be examined.
A. Distributions
A distribution is the actual or constructive transfer of money
or property by a partnership to a partner in his capacity as a partner
and without any resulting obligation on the recipient. Thus, a loan
to a partner is not a distribution.'19 Payment for services performed
by the partner for the partnership and payment by the partnership
for its use of capital contributed by the partner are not distributions
unless the amount of such payments is determined with regard to
partnership income.120 Therefore, the payment of a salary to a
partner in an amount which is not contingent upon, or measured
by, partnership income reduces partnership taxable income and is
reported as ordinary income by the recipient.' Provision for such
payments in the partnership agreement should insure the desired
treatment.
There are three types of transfers which satisfy the definitional
requirements of a distribution but which are accorded different
treatment by the Internal Revenue Code. Two of these exceptions
are designed to prevent the employment of the partnership form
as a vehicle for tax avoidance.
The first exception has been termed a disproportionate distri-
bution of assets. 2 The Code and Regulations require that sale or
118 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 722.
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1958).
120 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 707(c).
12 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1958).
122See Alexander, Collapsible Partnership, N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FED. TAX. 257
(1961), Costello, Problems Under Section 751 Upon Current and Liquidating




exchange treatment be given to a disproportionate distribution if
(1) the transfer is in partial or complete liquidation of the dis-
tributee's partnership interest;123  (2) the distributed assets were
not originally contributed to the partnership by the distributee ;
124
(3) the transfer would not otherwise be considered a distributive
share or guaranteed payment under section 736(a) ;125 and (4) the
distributive receives more or less than his proportionate share of the
partnership's unrealized receivables or inventory items which have
substantially appreciated in value .12  The effect of a transfer being
categorized as a disproportionate distribution is a constructive
exchange of assets which were transferred, for assets which were
not transferred, to the distributee." 7
The second type of transaction which may be denied treatment
as a distribution occurs when the transfer of property by a part-
nership to a partner is one step in a plan to effecuate an ex-
change of property among the partners. The criteria for determining
whether exchange treatment will be imposed is the occurrence of
contributions and distributions made "within a short period" of
each other. 128 Unless the facts of a particular case could lead only
to the conclusion that the sole purpose of the contribution-dis-
tribution pattern was to effectuate the exchange, the exchange
concept set forth in the Regulations should not be applied be-
cause it is in contradiction to the statutory position allowing tax-
free contribution of property to a partnership and providing for
separate and distinct treatment of distributions. Imposition of
exchange treatment, when sound business reasons or the operation
"2 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-(b) (1) (i) (1965).
124 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 751(b)(2) (A).
125 1d. § 751(b)(2)(B).
1 6 Id. § 751(b)(1). For the definitions of unrealized receivables, substantial appre-
ciation, and inventory items see notes 19 and 20 supra.
127 See the detailed analysis in Alexander, Collapsible Partnerships, N.Y.U. 19th INST.
ON FED. TAx. 247 (1957). The author's discussion suggests that the basis aspects
should be considered in two categories. First, in respect to the assets received by
the partner which are subject to section 751(b) sale or exchange treatment; the
following basis determinations result: the assets which were constructively exchanged
receive a cost basis in the distributee's and partnership's hands determined by the
values both parties are considered to have paid in the exchange. The distributee's
partnership interest basis is reduced by his proportionate share of section 751 assets
or other assets which were constructively distributed to him and then exchanged
with the partnership for the assets actually received by him. Second, if additional
assets were distributed and not subject to the operation of section 751(b), the
general rules of sections 731-36, discussed in the text supra, apply.
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1 (c)(3) (1956). The facts contained in Rev. Rul. 200, 1957-1
CUM. BULL. 205 prompted the Commissioner to require exchange treatment where
the distributions to the partners occurred "immediately after" the contributions.
A and B, members of the AB partnership, each owned 1/2 of the stock of X Cor-
poration and Y Corporation. A and B contributed the stocks to the partnership, the
partnership was liquidated, A received all of the stock of X Corporation and B
received all of the stock of Y Corporation.
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of local law require termination of the partnership (resulting in
a division of the contributed partnership property), would do
violence to the statutory policy.
The prerequisite to treatment of a transfer of property to a
partner as a distribution, depends upon the agreement of the
partners. When payments are made by a partnership to a retiring
partner or to the successor in interest of a deceased partner in liqui-
dation of his partnership interest, section 736 provides that the
payment or payments may represent several items. Payments for
the partner's interest in the partnership are treated as distribu-
tions 129 and are subject to the general rules for determining gain
or loss and basis. However, to the extent that substantially appre-
ciated inventory items constitute partnership assets, the sale or
exchange treatment required by section 751(b) applies to a dis-
proportionate distribution as discussed su/.ra."30 Distribution treat-
ment also applies to payment for a reasonable amount of goodwill
if specifically provided for in the partnership agreement.131 Other-
wise, payment for unspecified goodwill constitutes a payment under
section 736(a)."' To the extent that the payment by the part-
nership is not for the retiring or deceased's partnership interest,
section 736(a) requires classification of the payment as a dis-
tributive share or a guaranteed payment rather than as a distri-
bution. This classification results in reduced partnership income
for the continuing partners and ordinary income to the recipient.
133
Payment for unrealized receivables are considered section 736(a)
payments.
The Internal Revenue Code recognizes, and the Regulations
provide, definitions of two kinds of distributions. A liquidating
distribution 34 is a distribution which liquidates the distributee's
entire interest; a current distribution 135 is any distribution other
than one which liquidates a partner's entire interest. The classi-
fication of distributions as current or liquidating encompasses a
large variety of business purposes. The income tax term "current
distribution" includes the distribution of partnership income to
one or more of the partners,"36 payment by the partnership of its
129 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 736(b)(1).
130 1d. § 736(b)(2).
1311d. § 736(b)(2) (B) ; see Swihart, Tax Problems Raised by Liquidations of Partner-
ship Interests, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1209, 1241-50 (1966).
132 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 736(a).
133 1d.; Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(4) (1965).
134INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 761(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(d) (1956).
135 1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 731, 732; Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a) (1) (i) (1956).
136Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1958).
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liabilities, l"7 contribution to the partnership of property subject
to a liability, 138 and a partial liquidation of the interest of one or
all the partners.'l 9 A partner's drawings against his distributive
share of partnership income during the partnership year is treated
as a current distribution made on the last day of the partnership's
tax year.
140
Examples of liquidating distributions include: (1) a distri-
bution to all the partners upon the termination of the partnership
under federal income tax law, 14' and (2) that portion of a pay-
ment made to a retiring partner which is in exchange for his
partnership interest.
B. Basis of Distributed Property
As is frequently the case, the Code provides both a general
approach and an alternative approach to the determination of the
basis of distributed property in the hands of the distributee. The
alternative provided by section 732(d) has already been dis-
cussed 4 u and was shown to have only limited applicability. Sec-
tion 732(d) provides for the adjustment of the basis of dis-
tributed property (other than money) at the election of a partner
whose partnership interest was acquired by transfer within two
years of the date of distribution. Therefore, if the distributee is
not a transferee of a partnership interest, or if the distributee is
a transferee but acquired his interest more than two years before
the distribution, or if the distribution consists entirely of cash,
the general basis rules of section 732 apply.
Before considering the basis aspects of a distribution as it
affects the distributee, it is important to keep in mind the gain or
loss recognition potential of a distribution. The Code provides for
recognition in the following cases: (1) a current or liquidating
distribution of money will produce a capital gain if the amount
137 id. § 1.752-1(b)(1) '(1956). This is the necessary companion rule to the provision
of the Code which treats the incurring of, or the increase in, partnership liabilities
as a contribution by the partners of money to the partnership. Therefore, liabilities
of the partnership add to the basis of the partners' interests in the partnership and
payment thereof reduces that basis.
13 81d. § 1.752-1(c) (1956). The portion of the liability attributable to the other
partners, whether expressly assumed or not, is treated as a distribution to the con-
tributing partner.
139 1d. § 1.761-1(d) (1956).
140Id. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii) (1956).
141 A partnership terminates as a result of the complete liquidation of all partners'
interest if "no part of any business, financial operation, or venture of the partnership
continues to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership .... " INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 708(b) (1) (A). For the effect of the liquidation of one partner's
interest in a two-man partnership, see Rev. Rul. 65, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 168; Rev.
Rul. 325, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 249.
142 See section II supra.
VOL. 46
ASPECTS OF PARTNERSHIP TRANSFERS
of money distributed exceeds the distributee's partnership interest
basis before the distribution; (2) a liquidating distribution which
consists solely of money, unrealized receivables, or inventory items
will produce a capital loss when the distributee's partnership in-
terest basis, before the distribution, exceeds the money distributed
plus the basis of the unrealized receivables and inventory items
to the partnership. 143 The holding period of the partnership in-
terest determines the nature of the capital gain or loss. A current
or liquidating distribution of property, including unrealized re-
ceivables and inventory items, will not result in the recognition of
capital gain regardless of the difference between the fair market
value and the distributee's partnership interest basis." 4
When property is distributed in a current distribution, the basis
of the property to the partnership carries over to the distributee
and becomes his basis.'45 The basis of the partnership interest of
the distributee is reduced by the basis of the property distributed. 4 '
If the partnership's basis of the distributed property exceeds the
distributee's partnership interest basis before the distribution, the
basis of the distributed property is limited to the amount of his
partnership interest basis; 147 and, as a result, the distributee's
partnership interest basis is reduced to zero. Therefore, while the
partners would normally give effect to the fair market value of
the property distributed in their negotiations, any difference be-
tween fair market value and income tax basis will not be recognized
until subsequent disposition by the distributee.
Regardless of whether the distribution of cash is current or
liquidating, the fundamental income tax rule that the basis of
money is the amount thereof applies to such distributions. When
money and property are distributed simultaneously, the distri-
butee's partnership interest basis is reduced by the amount of
money prior to assigning basis to the distributed property.' 8
In a liquidating distribution of property (or of property and
money where the amount of money does not exceed the distributee's
partnership interest basis), the Code provides for the substitution
of the basis of the liquidated partnership interest for the basis of
the distributed property.149 However, the draftsmen retained the
143 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 731.
1
4Id. § 731(a)(1).
145 Id. § 732(a)(1).




4 9 Id. § 732(b).
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use of the partnership's basis for the distributed property for
purposes of allocating the substituted basis to the separate prop-
erties distributed. Therefore, the liquidated partnership interest
basis is allocated first to unrealized receivables and inventory items
as defined by section 751(c) and (d) in an amount equal to the
basis of those assets to the partnership, and the balance of the
partnership interest basis is allocated to other distributed properties
in proportion to their adjusted basis to the partnership.' °
A liquidating distribution of property will postpone the
recognition of gain or loss until subsequent distribution by the dis-
tributee. Predictably, the partnership provision for non-recognition
of gain or loss on distributions of property have been held to take
precedence over the Code's loss recognition provision contained in
section 165.' For example, the liquidating distribution of a
mortgage with a face amount which is less than the distributee's
partnership interest basis reflects a "built-in" loss which will not
be recognized until subsequent collection or disposition, and which
will disappear if the distributee dies before collection and without
disposing of the note.
152
When the distributee has a special basis adjustment resulting
from the prior application of sections 734(b) and 743(b), the
special basis adjustment is given effect in computing the basis of
the distributed property. For example, if a transferee receives a
distribution of property and relinquishes his right to property which
is subject to a special basis adjustment with respect to him, the
special basis adjustment will be applied to the property distributed
to him if the relinquished and distributed properties are of like
kind.1
53
C. Basis of Undistributed Partnership Property
The general rule governing the basis of undistributed part-
nership property is that the distribution does not give rise to an
adjustment.' The partnership's basis of its assets is, of course,
reduced by the basis to the partnership of those assets which it
no longer owns as a result of the distribution; but the general
rule prohibits an adjustment to reflect recognized gain or loss by
the distributee or a change in the amount of basis attributed to








Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii) (1956).
154 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 734(a).
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Therefore, when money is distributed in a current or liquidating
distribution, in an amount which exceeds the distributee's part-
nership interest basis, or when assets consisting solely of money,
unrealized receivables, and inventory items having a basis to the
partnership which is less than the distributee's partnership interest
basis are distributed in a liquidating distribution, gain and loss,
respectively, are recognized, but the gain or loss does not affect
the basis of remaining partnership assets. Similarly, in a current
or liquidating distribution, when property other than money takes
a lower basis in the distributee's hands than the property's basis
to the partnership, or when a liquidating distribution of property
results in an increment to the basis of the distributed property in
the distributee's hands, the resulting diminution and increment,
respectively, to the basis of the distributed property does not affect
the basis of remaining partnership assets.
The Code provides an alternative approach in section 734(b)
in the form of an optional adjustment to the basis of undistributed
property. The effect of this provision is, as stated by a leading
authority on the subject,
that the partnership's adjusted basis of its undistributed property
shall be:
1. Increased in the amount of taxable gain recognized to the
distributee.
2. Decreased in the amount of deductible loss recognized to
the distributee.
3. Increased in the amount of the decrease in basis of the
distributed property when it is passed from the partner-
ship to the partner.
4. Dcrased in the amount of the increase in basis of the
distributed property when it passes from the partnership
to the partner.
155
It will be recalled that the optional adjustment to basis as
applied in the case of a transfer of a partnership interest gave
effect to the purchase price, or the fair market value, of the
underlying assets. As applied to distributions, the optional ad-
justment to the basis of undistributed partnership assets has the
same effect in the case of a liquidating cash distribution. In the
case of property distributions, however, the optional adjustment
relates only to the changes which occur in the adjusted basis of the
distributed property as a result of the rules for determining the
basis of distributed property.
The optional adjustment is most frequently encountered when
a liquidation of one of the partner's interests occurs. To illustrate,








Cash $ 8,000 $ 8,000
Accounts Receivable 2,000 2,000
Inventory 8,000 8,000
Land 2,000 6,000
Total Assets $20,000 $24,000
Liabilities and Capital
Liabilities -0- -0-
Capital Accounts - M $ 5,000 $ 6,000
- N 5,000 6,000
-0 5,000 6,000
- P 5,000 6,000
$20,000 $24,000
Assume the partners agree to retire M's interest and that the
liquidating distribution shall be made in exchange for it. The
agreement of the partners meets the requirements of section 736(b)
and thus, distribution treatment is proper. Next, it is important
to note that the exception to section 736(b) for disproportionate
distributions does not apply since none of the "inventory items" on
the balance sheet are substantially appreciated in value.' 56
If M receives a $6,000 cash payment in liquidation of his
interest, M recognizes a capital gain of $1,000 as a result of section
731 (a). If the partnership elects to adjust its basis under section
734(b), it may increase the basis of remaining assets by $1,000.'15
A close correlation exists between the adjustment under section
743(b) for the transferee of a partnership interest and the cash
liquidation. The cash liquidation represents, in effect, the transfer
of the interest to the partnership.
If instead, M receives the land with a market value of $6,000
in liquidation of his interest, M recognizes no gain or loss under
section 731. If the distribution is subject to the special basis ad-
justment rule of section 734, a negative special basis adjustment,
measured by the amount of the increase in basis of the distributed
156The Code as interpreted by the Commissioner, requires that the fair market value
of all the inventory items be added and then compared with the sum of the adjusted
basis of the inventory items. Accounts receivable are inventory items. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.751-1(d)(2)(ii) (1965).
157 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 734(b).
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property when it passes from the partnership to the partner,
arises.' s Therefore, the special basis adjustment is a minus $3,000
(the difference between the basis of the land in the distributee's
hands under section 732(b), or $5,000, and the basis of the land
to the partnership, or $2,000).
If, instead, M receives three-fourths of the inventory, or a fair
market value of $6,000, and section 734(b) is applicable, an in-
creasing special basis adjustment, measured by the decrease in basis
of the distributed property when it passes from the partnership
to the partner, arises.15 9 The special basis adjustment would be
$1,000 (basis of three-fourths of the accounts receivable to the
partnership, or $6,000, less the basis of the receivables in M's hands
under section 732(b), or $5,000).
In both examples of property distributions it is important to
realize that the fair market value of the retiring partner's interest
in the partnership and the fair market value of the property dis-
tributed in retirement of that interest, while of importance in the
negotiations between the retiring partner and the remaining partners,
play no part in the section 734(b) special basis adjustment. Section
734(b) embodies the aggregate approach to partnerships as applied
to liquidating distributions. With respect to property, the adjustment
has the effect of applying the principle that in a nontaxable exchange
of property, the basis of the property exchanged becomes the basis
of the property acquired.' 6 ° Thus, in the distribution of the land,
section 734(b) treats the remaining partners as having exchanged
their share of the land with a basis of $1,500 (three-fourths of
$2,000) for the retiring partner's one-fourth share of the basis of
undistributed partnership properties, or $4,500 (one-fourth of $8,000
cash, $2,000 accounts receivable, and $8,000 inventory). In the
absence of section 734(b), the basis of the remaining assets is
$18,000 ($20,000 total basis minus partnership basis for land of
$2,000). Applying the nontaxable exchange rationale, the remaining
partners' proportionate share of the partnership assets not distrib-
uted ($13,500 - three-fourths of the cash, accounts receivable, and
inventory) is added to the remaining partners' basis for the property
exchanged which, as previously determined, was $1,500. The dif-
ference between the unadjusted basis of $18,000 and the $15,000
basis computed under the aggregate exchange approach is the same
amount that the statutory computation of section 734(b) produces.
Current distributions of money and current distributions of
property, where there is a decrease in the basis of the property, are
1
58 Id. § 734(b)(2)(B).
159 1d. § 734(b)(1)(B).
'60 WILLIS, supra note 155, at 338.
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also subject to the special basis adjustment provision if the election
to make the provision applicable has been made.16' The rationale
in the case of liquidating distributions cannot be applied to current
distributions since such distributions do not embody the concept of
an exchange. The possibility of a current distribution being subject
to the provision of section 734(b) are more prevalent than might
be expected. A current distribution to a partner who contributes
property with a low basis and a high fair market value may well
require an adjustment.' 62 The contribution of property subject to
a liability in excess of its adjusted basis could result in section
734(b) treatment if the amount of the liability assumed by the
noncontributing partners exceeds the adjusted basis of the contrib-
uted property 6 A decreasing special basis adjustment upon the
distribution of property is only possible where the distribution liq-
uidates the entire interest of the distributee. 64 A current distribution
of property will not result in a decreasing special basis adjustment.
As in the case of a transfer of a partnership interest, the special
basis adjustment is allocated to the partnership properties under
rules provided by section 755165 and will affect: (1) the subsequent
recognition of gain or loss by the partnership upon disposition of
properties subject to the special basis adjustment, (2) depreciation
on such properties, and (3) basis if the properties are subsequently
distributed. A special basis adjustment that increases the basis of
partnership properties is generally desirable to the remaining part-
ners, whereas a decreasing special basis adjustment is generally
undesirable. The special basis adjustment is more troublesome in
its applicability to distributions. When applied to transfers of a
partnership interest, the nature of the special basis adjustment is
readily apparent from a comparison of the transferee's basis and
the adjusted basis of the assets of the partnership. With distribu-
tions, the comparison required is that of the distributee's partnership
interest basis and the partnership's basis of the property to be dis-
tributed. It is therefore possible to have an overall appreciation
in the value of partnership assets above their adjusted basis, but
nevertheless to have a special basis adjustment which decreases the
basis of remaining assets. In the MNOP partnership example supra,
the adjusted basis of partnership assets was $20,000 and their fair
161 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 734(b)(1)(A); id. § 734(b)(1)(B).
162Milroy, Tax Aspects of Partnership Distributions and Transfers of Partnership
Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 636 (1966).
163 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1956).
164 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 734(b) (2) (B). Section 734(b) (2) (B) applies only to
distributions "to which section 732(b) applies" -i.e. distributions in liquidation.
165 See section IV,A infra.
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market value was $24,000. The distribution of inventory produced
an increasing special basis adjustment, but the distribution of land
would result in a decreasing special basis adjustment. This dem-
onstrates the need for careful selection of the property to be dis-
tributed to avoid unwanted results when section 734(b) is applicable.
IV. ALLOCATION OF THE SPECIAL BASIS ADJUSTMENT AND THE
SHIFTING SPECIAL BASIS ADJUSTMENT
In the foregoing discussion, a number of assumptions were
made about the nature of the special basis adjustment for purposes
of illustration and clarity. The assumptions were: (1) the partner-
ship owned classes of assets which had all appreciated in value
when compared with their respective adjusted bases or which all
had declined in value to amounts less than their adjusted bases,
(2) the classes of assets represented either one particular item of
property or a number of items of property all of which had
increased or decreased in value as compared with their respective
adjusted partnership bases, (3) the transferee's partnership interest
basis did not reflect payment for goodwill or going concern value
of the business enterprise, and (4) tle property to which the special
basis adjustment attaches either remained a partnership asset or
was distributed to the transferee. Each of these assumptions, while
justified for the purposes made therein, do not comport with the
realities of the circumstances in which a transfer or distribution
subject to section 743(b) is made. Therefore, it is the purpose of
this section to examine the operation of the 1954 Code with respect
to the actualities of the usual type of transfer of a partnership
interest and distribution of property to a transferee of that interest.
A. Allocation of Basis
Subchapter K of the 1954 Code contains rules for the alloca-
tion to partnership assets of a special basis adjustment occasioned
by a transfer to which section 743(b), and a distribution to which
section 734(b), are applicable.1"6 In transfers and liquidating dis-
tributions of cash, the special basis adjustment is presumably a
reflection of changes in the values of partnership properties when
such values are compared with the adjusted bases of the properties
to the partnership.1 67 The special basis adjustment may be attribut-
166 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 755.
7 It has been accurately pointed out that a special basis adjustment may arise absent
consideration of the value of the partnership property. For example, "a dissident
partner who is threatening legal action" may receive an excessive payment for his
interest in exchange for his partnership interest with the sole purpose of the
remaining partners being to exclude him from the partnership. In certain circum-
stances, the excessive payment would not represent goodwill or going concern value.
WILLIS, supra note 155, at 245.
1969
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
able to tangible and intangible partnership property, including
goodwill.
A basic feature of the allocation section is its reliance on fair
market value as one of the factors employed to make the allocation.
A question of significant importance is the role of the negotiating
parties to a transfer or a distribution in the determination of fair
market value. Unlike other partnership provisions,"' neither the
Code nor the Regulations mention the agreement between the parties
in the allocation provision. It does not seem, however, that omission
of a reference to the agreement between the buyer and seller, or
the partners and the distributee, should prejudice market values
established by it so long as they are reasonable. Section 751, dealing
with the sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership which has
unrealized receivables or inventory which has substantially increased
in value, has been construed by the Regulations to give effect to
the reasonable values contained in an agreement between the
parties. 6 ' Considering the relative similarity between section 751
and sections 741-43 (to which the allocation section may be applica-
ble), a good reason does not appear for according differing treatments
to the values established by negotiations, subject, of course, to the
requirement of reasonableness.
The application of the allocation provisions of section 755
requires four steps in a transfer. The first step requires the segre-
gation of the partnership property into two classes. Capital assets 7 '
and property used in a trade or business 171 are combined
into one class and all other partnership assets constitute the
other class. 172  The next step is to determine the propor-
tionate share of the special basis adjustment that is attributable to
each of the two classes. This is accomplished by comparing the fair
market value of each asset in the class with its adjusted basis to
the partnerhip and adding the individual increases and decreases
together to determine the net increase or decrease for each class.
Third, the special basis adjustment is then allocated to each class
in an amount representing the proportion of that class' increase or
decrease to the total increase or decrease. 7 3 The fourth step is to
allocate the special basis adjustment attributable to the assets within
the class "in a manner which has the effect of reducing the dif-
ference between the fair market value and the adjusted basis of
1
68 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (1965).
169
ld. § 1.751-1(c)(ii)(3) (1965).
1
70 
INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 1221.
171 d. § 1231(b).
172 1d. § 755(b).
173Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(c) (example 3) (1956).
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partnership properties .... ."' Presumably, this would be done
by allocating the special basis adjustment attributable to the class,
(1) in the case where the special basis adjustment to the class
is an addition to the adjusted basis of the partnership assets, to each.
asset in the proportion of its increase in fair market value over its
partnership adjusted basis to the total increases within the class,
without reference to any decreases attributable to assets in the class,
and (2) in the case where the special basis adjustment to the class
results in a decrease in the adjusted basis of the partnership assets,
to each asset in the proportion of its decrease in fair market value
below its partnership adjusted basis to the total decreases within
the class, without regard to any increases attributable to assets in
the class.
In the event of a distribution of money in liquidation of a
partner's interest, the Regulations provide that an adjustment to
the basis of partnership assets pursuant to section 734(b) "must
be allocated only to capital assets or section 1231(b) property
[used in a trade or business]."' 75 When applied to a liquidating
distribution of cash, the position taken in the Regulations is wholly
untenable. It ignores the realities of circumstances that attend a
liquidating distribution. The decision by the partners of the amount
to be distributed to the outgoing partner in most cases is based on
the market value of the partnership assets. If, for instance, the
partnership has inventory that has appreciated in value (but not
to the extent that it is substantially appreciated inventory within
the scope of section 751), that appreciation is reflected in the
amount of the cash distribution. The effect of the Regulation is to
shift the adjustment to basis from property that will produce ordi-
nary gain upon its sale to capital assets and depreciable property.
On the other hand, the allocation of a minus basis adjustment, if
applied in the manner set forth in the Regulations, would shift the
basis adjustment from property that would produce an ordinary loss
to capital assets or depreciable property. Either way the partnership
suffers unwarranted tax consequences because in the former situa-
tion, the sale by the partnership of its inventory results in a higher
ordinary gain and, in the latter, a justifiable ordinary loss is denied.
The statutory language of section 755 does not call for such a
result. It seems that the more appropriate means of allocating the
adjustment to basis of partnership assets is the method employed
upon the transfer of a partnership interest. As it now stands, the
method adopted by the Regulations may lead to invidious results
1 7
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 755(a)(1).
175 Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
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based entirely on the form (by the partners or by the partnership)
by which the outgoing partner's interest is purchased. Unlike the
effect of other provisions of subchapter K,' 76 this is not a matter
of the partners determining inter se the tax consequences of a trans-
action, since the present allocation rule has no effect upon the
distributee.
Where the transaction that gives rise to the special basis adjust-
ment is a distribution of property, the Regulations provide that the
special basis adjustment is to be "allocated to remaining partnership
property ...with respect to which the adjustment arose.' " v This
method appears to suffer from an infirmity similar to the one just
discussed. The character of the property distributed is the basis
for classifying the special basis adjustment, rather than the character
of the property with respect to which the distributee has relin-
quished his interest. The method for allocating the special basis
adjustment among the properties within the classes would be the
same as, in the case of allocation as a result of a transfer, steps
3 and 4 supra page 377.
The allocation procedures prescribed by the Code and Regu-
lations are deficient because of the use of two factors - the classi-
fication procedure and the use of net increase or net decrease
amounts -at two different levels -the classified group of assets
and at the individual asset level. The reasoning behind the alloca-
tion procedure appears to be a desire to prevent the procedure from
becoming a tax avoidance tool and to achieve simplicity. The one
is justifiable, the other, in the opinion of the author, is not.1 7 1
At the class level, a significant net increase for one class, used
for making the allocation, may be partially, or completely, offset
by a net decrease in the other class. 179 Since the Regulations' pro-
cedure does not provide for an increasing allocation to one class
and a decreasing allocation to the other class, only the net increase
or net decrease is used for allocation purposes. As between the two
classes, the result of the method may be to only minimally affect
the basis of the net increase class with no change in the net decrease
class. To illustrate, assume that the net increases to "all other prop-
erty" is $4,000 and the net decrease to capital assets and section
176 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 736 and the text accompanying note 44 supra.
177Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(b)(1)(i) (1956).
178 Little, if anything, contained in subchapter K, other than the effective date provision,
is, in fact, simple. Even the effective date provision involved some room for con-
fusion in 1954. See Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren, The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1235 n.100 (1954). In the
single-asset partnership, the allocation procedures are no doubt effective. But
where the assets are numerous and have varying fair market values and bases,"simplicity" may work inequity.
179 See WILLIS, supra note 155, at 242.
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1231(b) property is $3,000. The existing allocation method would
require the allocation of the special basis adjustment of $1,000
(assuming net increase also represents the difference between the
cost of the partnership interest and the transferee's proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of partnership property) to "all other
assets." But an increased basis in the amount of $1,000 is not a true
reflection of the transaction. Rather, an increase of $4,000 to the
basis of "all other property" and a decrease of $3,000 in the basis
of capital assets and section 1231(b) property would produce an
accurate accounting. If "all other assets" are sold, the sale would
produce a $4,000 gain allocable to the transferee, in the case of a
transfer, or to the partnership, in the case of a distribution, yet
only $1,000 of the gain is offset by the allocated special basis
adjustment. Capital assets and section 1231(b) property would
continue to have an adjusted basis that is $3,000 in excess of its
fair market value. This same situation may occur at the individual
asset level of the allocation method.
An alternative to the allocation method prescribed by the Code
and Regulations does exist. The Regulations provide that the part-
nership may file an application with the district director for per-
mission to use another method and the district director is permitted
to allow increases to the bases of some properties and decreases to
others, so long as such increases and decreases reduce the difference
between the fair market value and the adjusted basis of the partner-
ship property."' 0 Permission to adopt a different method is condi-
tioned upon a "satisfactory showing" of the values used by the
parties to the transaction, or in the case of transfer as a result of
death, the fair market value at the relevant date. Perhaps the matter
of most significance is the deadline for submitting the application.
That deadline is 30 days after the close of the partnership year in
which the special basis adjustment was created. Therefore, for the
first year to which the election under section 7558 to adjust the
basis of partnership assets pursuant to sections 734(b) and 743(b)
applies, application to adopt a different method of allocation will
precede the election to make the basis adjustments.
The question of whether the special basis adjustment allocable
to a single item of partnership property may exceed its fair market
value has been answered in the affirmative in United States v.
Cornish.15 2 Relying upon the legislative history, the court concluded
18°Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(a) (2) (1956).
181 The question of when the section 755 election must be filed is discussed in section
V infra. The Regulations provide that the section 755 election must be filed with
the partnership income tax return for the first taxable year to which it applies.
Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(b) (1956).
182 348 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1965).
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that the fair market value concept was not intended to establish a
limitation but rather to be used for allocation purposes.' 8 ' The
statutory phraseology, "reducing the difference" was found to mean
'that where there are several classes of depreciable partnership
properties, the percentage of difference between the fair market
vralue and the adjusted basis of each shall be maintained in allo-
cating the total amount of the increase in the adjusted basis attrib-
utable to depreciable assets."' 84 The decision has the effect of
nullifying two provisions in the Regulations that considered fair
market value as a limitation.
18 5
The Regulations require a portion of the special basis adjust-
ment to "be allocated to partnership good will, to the extent that
good will exists and is reflected in the value of the property dis-
tributed, the price at which the partnership interest is sold, or the
basis of the partnership interest determined under section 1014
... 18 "Going concern value"'8 7 has been held to be an intan-
gible partnership asset and the subject of an allocation of a special
basis adjustment.1' 8
The Cornish case, concerned an interesting allocation question.
The court found that the purchase price of a partnership interest
represented: (1) the fair market value of the tangible partnership
assets, (2) "going concern" value as an intangible partnership
asset, and (3) an overvaluation of the partnership interest. The
purchasing partners had, in effect, paid more for their interests
than they were worth. The government argued that the over-
valuation must be treated as if it was an intangible partnership
property. Instead, the court held that the overvaluation should be
prorated between tangible assets and "going concern value" on
the rationale, previously mentioned, that the adjusted basis of part-
nership property after the allocation of the special basis adjustment
could exceed the fair market value of the property.
1'3 Id. at 186 n.17.
184 Id. at 186. This same problem of overvaluation appears to have been present in the
facts of Victor G. Mushro, 50 T.C. 43 (1968), where a buy-sell agreement between
the partners, funded with life insurance, resulted in the payment to a deceased
partner's widow of an amount approximately 1.4 times the fair market value of the
interest at his death. However, no suggestion is made in the case that the buying
partners had attempted to allocate the overpayment to tangible partnership property.
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(a)'(ii,iii) (1956).
186d. § 1.755-1(a)(iv).
187See Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n., 289 U.S. 287 (1933),
wherein the Supreme Court distinguished going concern value and goodwill. Going
concern value is present where " 'there is an element of value in an assembled . . .
plant, doing business and earning money, over one not thus advanced.... ."
Goodwill, on the other hand is that " 'element of value which inheres in the fixed
and favorable consideration of customers, arising from an established and well-
known and well-conducted business .... Id. at 313.
188 United States v. Cornish, 348 F.2d 175, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).
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B. Shifting Basis Adjustments
The Code and Regulations contain two curious concepts that
may change the income tax consequences of the special basis adjust-:
ment. One is the shifting special basis adjustment and the other
the special basis adjustment in nubibus.189 The latter may be cre-
ated by, among other ways, the former.
The special basis adjustment in nubibus is the product of a
distribution, either current or liquidating, but, logically, not of a
transfer of a partnership interest. The special basis adjustment may
have existed prior to the distribution, in which case it is the shifting
that causes the in abeyance aspect) as is the case of a prior transfer
to which section 743(b) applied, or may be created by a distribu-
tion. If property is distributed and the partnership does not have
like property at the time of the distribution, the special basis
adjustment is held in abeyance. The definition of like property,
however, appears to vary depending on the distribution. Thus, in
the case of property to which a special basis adjustment is allocated
for the benefit of a transferee, a distribution of that property to
another partner will cause the special basis adjustment to shift
away from the distributed property. It will attach to other property
of a like kind." ° For purposes of this particular situation, like
property is "property of the same class, that is, stock in trade,
property used in a trade or business, capital assets, etc."' 19 If
property of a like kind is not owned by the partnership, the special
basis adjustment is in nubibus until it is acquired.
However, in the case of a distribution to which section 734(b)
applies, a shift in basis is not involved, and while not entirely free
from doubt, it appears that like property is determined by reference
to the two classes established in section 755 for the allocation of
the special basis adjustment. Under this interpretation, like property
is property of the same class, and the two classes are (1) capital.
assets and section 1231(b) property and (2) all other assets. This
reasoning has led one author to conclude that a special basis adjust-
ment in nubibus which is created by the distribution of capital
assets may be applied to depreciable property, if owned at the time
of the distribution or acquired before other capital assets are also
89 Literally, "in the clouds." The choice of the Latin designation serves the purpose
of a loose analogy to the feudal land law policy that title to land may not be in
abeyance. See A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE-INTERESTS, AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS
AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS 26 (1920). The present author feels that, although
the reasons behind the policy for land law purposes and income tax purposes are,
quite naturally, very different, the policy against such a situation should be the
same in both contexts. A. Willis refers to this same situation as the "Peter Pan"
adjustment.
'9°Treas. Reg. § 1.732-2(b) (example) (1956); Id. § 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii) (1956).
191 Id. § 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii) (1956).
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acquired, since both types of property are of the same class.19 2
In the absence of property to which it attaches, depreciation or
depletion on an increasing special basis adjustment would not be
available.
The foregoing suggests that attention must be directed to the
type of property that is intended to be distributed along with con-
iideration of the type of property that will remain in the partner-
ship after distribution.
V. THE ELECTIONS
A. The Section 754 Election
As previously mentioned, an adjustment to the basis of part-
nership assets occasioned by a distribution within section 734(b)
or a transfer of a partnership interest within section 743(b) may
be made at the option of the partnership, providing the election
required by section 75419 is properly filed. Since the burden of
making the election is imposed upon the partnership, section 754
deserves close scrutiny.
The Code provides for the filing of an election "in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate .... 14
Pursuant to the statutory command, a regulation has been promul-
gated stating that the "election . . . shall be made in a written
statement filed with the partnership return .... .. In addition
to declaring the election, the written statement must also contain
the name and address of the partnership and be signed by one of
the partners.'9 "
The proper date for filing the election in order to make it
applicable is a matter on which there exists a conflict of authority.
Neither the specific language of section 754, nor the Senate pro-
ceedings 97 at the time of adoption of the election provision, con-
tain any indication of when the election must be filed. The pertinent
regulation takes the position that the election must be "filed with
the partnership return for the first taxable year to which the election
applies ...... 198 Some degree of hindsight is clearly allowed the
partnership since the Internal Revenue Service has confirmed the
192 Jordan, Adjusting the Basis of Partnership Property: When to Elect, How to Deter-
mine, 22 J. TAx. 242 (1965).
193 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 754.
194 Id.
195 Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1 (b) '(1956).
196 Id.
197* S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 406 (1954).
198Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(b) (1956).
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logical conclusion, implicit in the statutory language, that the elec-
tion need not be filed in anticipation of the election's desired-
applicability."9' Nor do the Regulations require that the election
need be made when the particular transfer or distribution occurs.
It therefore seems desirable for the partners to review distributions
and any transfers of partnership interests made during the taxable
year, along with such other considerations as the effect of the
applicability of the election to future distributions and transfers
and the apparent difficulty of revoking the election once it has
been made, before the partnership return is filed each year. In
addition, it seems that a valid election may be made where the
partnership has been granted an extension of time for filing its.
return under section 6081(a) of the 1954 Code.2"'
The applicability of an election to a distribution or transfer of
a partnership interest made within a taxable year, where the election
is not filed within the statutory period for filing the partnership
return for that year, is foreclosed by the requirements of the Reg-
ulations2°1 and by a Revenue Ruling. 202 Taxpayers in two cases
have sought to avoid these limitations with interesting results. The
first test of the validity of the Regulations was made in Neel v.
United States,203 a district court case. In the Neel case, the partner-
ship filed the election approximately two and one-half years after
the filing date of its partnership income tax return for the year in
which a partnership interest was transferred upon the death of
a partner. The deceased partner's estate had, during the period
before the partnership filed the election, made an adjustment to
the reported distributive share of partnership income to reflect the
use of cost depletion. The use of cost depletion by the estate would
have been proper only by virtue of an adjustment to the basis of
depletable partnership property under section 743(b). The court
found the timely filing requirement of the Regulations invalid on
the grounds that a regulation, in order to be valid, must be reason-
able and that "[r]egulation § 1.754-1 adopted by the Commissioner
has the effect of imposing a penalty.....204 The Government
did not appeal.
199 Rev. Rul. 347, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 365.
200 "Presumably, an election is valid if it meets all the requirements [of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.754-1 (b)], even if the election statement accompanies a Form 1065 which is filed
on the last day of the maximum extended return-filing period of six months after
the statutory due date of the return." Jordan, Adjusting the Basis of Partnership
Property. When to Elect, How to Determine, 22 J. TAx. 242 (1965) (footnote
omitted).
201Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(b) (1956).
202 Rev. Rul. 347, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 365.
203 266 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
2o4 Id. at 10.
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Dupree v. United States,205 a court of appeals decision subse-
quent to Neel, held adverse to the taxpayer-partner's contention that
the partnership election was timely filed. Dupree and his wife
owned a community property interest in a limited partnership. Upon
the death of his wife in 1957, Dupree received a stepped-up basis
for his one-half of the partnership interest pursuant to section
.1014(b) (6). In 1960, the principal asset of the limited partner-
ship, a motel, was sold, the partnership was liquidated, and Dupree's
proportionate share of the capital gain realized on the sale was
reported on the final partnership return, but not on the taxpayer's
individual return. The section 754 election was not filed until 1962.
The court found that for a valid election to have been made for
1960 (the year of the sale of the partnership asset), it should have
been filed with the original partnership return for 1960 or with
an amended return filed within the statutory time for filing the
original return. The court specifically declined to decide the issue
presented in the Neel case- whether the election could only be
made with the partnership return for the year in which the partner-
ship interest was transferred.
20 6
These cases are susceptible of two interpretations. It may be
said that the Neel decision is not impaired by Dupree but that the
latter case puts a qualification on the position announced in the
former case. Thus, it may be argued that the two cases interpreted
together, do not require the section 754 election to be made in the
partnership return for the year in which a partnership interest is
transferred, but the election must be filed with the partnership
rehrn for the year in which the partnership asset (or assets) to
which the basis adjustment applies is sold or exchanged. However,
this interpretation raises more problems than it solves. First, where
the partner, in determining his taxable income, adjusts the reported
amount of his distributive share of taxable income to reflect the
basis adjustment to partnership assets, the partner rather than the
partnership has made the election. This is contrary to the require-
ment of section 754 that the election, because it potentially affects
all the partners, is to be made by the partnership. The effect of
allowing a partner to make such adjustments would destroy the
purpose of the partnership return. One transferee-partner would
Make adjustments where it would reduce his taxable income, whereas
another transferee-partner would not adjust his taxable income to
reflect an adjustment that reduces his proportionate share of the
basis of partnership assets, because such an adjustment may increase
205 
F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1968).
2olId. at 759.
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his taxable income. Moreover, absent the affirmative election ini-
tially, there would be no assurance that the partnership would ever
make the election.
The second deficiency inherent in this approach is the potential
confusion that would result in making the sale or exchange of the
partnership asset the transaction that gives rise to the filing require-
ment. Where the adjustment to basis of partnership assets would
result from the transfer of a partnership interest, the adjustment is
made to the assets, owned at that time by the partnership, that
have appreciated or depreciated in value prior to the transfer of
the partnership interest. Where such increase or decrease in value
applies to inventory items, the election may be required immediately
under this interpretation. Where the increase or decrease applies
to investments or fixed assets, it could be years before the election
would need to be filed.
20 7
Finally, the section 754 election applies to remaining partner-
ship assets after distributions as well as to transfers of partnership
interests. The proposed interpretation would allow the partners
to determine at the time of the sale of partnership assets, which
had appreciated or depreciated in value as of the date of the prior
distribution, whether to make the election. The election would
become a tool for blatant tax avoidance.
An alternative, and probably more accurate, interpretation of
Neel and Dupree is that Neel stands alone in allowing an election
to be made after the expiration of the statutory time for filing the
partnership return for the year in which the transfer of a partner-
ship interest occurred. It should be noted that the taxpayer's con-
tention in Dupree was that the election was in effect for the year
of the sale of the partnership asset. The taxpayer did not argue for
the application of the election to the date of the transfer of the
partnership interest. As a result, the court left the Neel issue up
in the air.
One clear factor must be considered when it appears desirable
for the partnership to make an election attempting to give it
retroactive application. The Internal Revenue Service does not agree
with the Neel decision and can be expected to press their position
whenever a taxpayer relies on Neel. In Dupree, Government council
urged the court to overrule the earlier Neel holding with no success.
It seems doubtful that the issue is, as yet, resolved.
The Code provides that "[sluch an election shall apply with
respect to all distributions of property by the partnership and to all
transfers of interests in the partnership during the taxable year
207 In this regard, compare the section 732(d) election discussed in section VI B infra.
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with respect to which such election was filed and all subsequent
taxable years.'"'20 For the unwary, this provision may create unde-
sirable tax consequences. The election applies to the whole year
for which the election is made, and it may encompass distributions
of property and transfers of partnership interests that give rise to
desirable and undesirable basis adjustments. To illustrate, partners
A, B, C, D, and E each own a 20 percent interest in the profits and
assets of the partnership. A's interest is liquidated early in the year
by the distribution of partnership property with a basis to the part-
nership which is less than the distributee's partnership interest
basis. Later in the taxable year, B sells his partnership interest to
F for an amount in excess of B's proportionate adjusted basis in
partnership assets. If, through inadvertence or a failure to read
the statute thoroughly, the partnership makes the election for F's
benefit, the election will require an adjustment reducing the basis
of the proportionate assets of the partnership held by each partner
to reflect the effect of the earlier distribution. While there is some
advantage to F, the election is disadvantageous to the other part-
ners. If these other partners are aware of the tax consequences of
the section 754 election, they would probably refuse to make the
election. This would, of course, deny F the full tax benefits of
the purchase price of his partnership interest.
The Code's choice of the partnership year as the device for
determining the applicability of the election to adjust the
basis of partnership property may be used as a tax planning device
with favorable consequences to present and potential partners. In
the example of the ABCDE partnership above, B should refrain
from making the sale until after the close of the partnership year.
An election filed for the next partnership year would give F a stepped-
up basis in his portion of the partnership assets without requiring
the partnership to reduce its basis in those assets to reflect the dis-
tribution to A in the prior year. There are, of course, other cir-
cumstances in which downward basis adjustments may be avoided
by completing the particular transactions that would cause such
adjustments before the year for which the election is made.
Since the election applies to the partnership, the decision to
make the election is a matter for collective determination. The
election is a matter of potential controversy since its binding, pros-
pective effect on the partnership may cause the decrease of partner-
ship asset basis which could more than offset any immediate benefits.
The partners may also hesitate where it appears that the benefits
gained may be nullified by the administrative burden that results
208 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 754 (emphasis added).
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from the extra record keeping. Therefore, the proper time for
partner consideration of the subject is in the planning stage. The
purchaser of a partnership interest will be well advised to determine
the positions of the other partners during prepurchase negotiation
and to reduce the matter to writing by a statement in the new
partnership agreement to the effect that the partnership elects to
have section 754 applied. A liquidated damages clause would give
the transferee a good measure of security against a later change
in heart by the other partners resulting in a failure to file. The
internal declaration, at the outset, of the partners' desire to have
section 754 made applicable, has the further advantage of providing
some insurance against events which occur prior to the formal
filing of the election. Short of effecting a dissolution under state
law, an intervening event, e.g. the insanity of a partner,20 9 would
not jeopardize the election since the filing of the election statement
is a ministerial act and only requires the signature of one partner.
Although there is a lack of direct authority on this point, a
refusal to file the election in violation of an express or implied
agreement to do so may be such as to sustain a cause of action for
damages. 1°
Section 754 provides for revocation of the election "subject
to such limitations as may be ...prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate."2"' The Regulations212 give examples of situations that
merit the allowance of the revocation. A change in the nature of
partnership business, a substantial increase in the assets of the
partnership, a change in the character of partnership assets, or in-
creased administrative burden to the partnership because of an in-
creased frequency of retirements or shifts of partnership interests
are cited as reasons for revocation. A "primary purpose" test is
contained in the regulation to the effect that revocation will be
denied where the primary purpose in seeking the revocation is to
avoid the decrease in the basis of partnership assets upon a transfer
or distribution. It follows that revocation is probably not available
when the partnership's adjusted basis in its assets exceed: (1) the
market value of the partnership assets for purposes of transfers of
partnership interests, or (2) the respective partners' adjusted basis
in their partnership interests. The application would, no doubt, also
fail if a transfer or distribution resulting in a basis step-down oc-
curred in the year to which revocation, if granted, would be effective.
209 It does not appear that insanity alone is a reason for dissolution of the partnership.
See, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31.
2 10See Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965).
211 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 754.
2 12 Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(c) (1956).
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B. The Section 732(d) Election
Unlike the requirement of section 754, section 732(d) requires
the election to be made and filed by the individual partner. Since
the partnership is not affected by the election, it need not make a
decision on the matter. The Regulations 13 provide that the election
is to be made by way of a schedule, included in the transferee's in-
come tax return, declaring the election and including a computation
of the special basis adjustment and a schedule of the properties to
which it is applied. Also, unlike the section 754 election, this election
is not stated by the Regulations to be a continuing one, so that if
within two years of the acquisition of the partnership interest the
transferee partner receives distributions to which section 732(d)
is applicable in different tax years, separate elections appear to be
necessary.
The proper time for filing the election depends upon the type
of property distributed. If the property is subject to an allowance for
depreciation, depletion, or amortization, the election must be filed
in the transferee partner's year of distribution. If other property is
distributed, the election must be made "in the first taxable year
in which the basis of any of the distributed property is pertinent in
determining his income tax .... .214
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Code governing the transfer of a partner-
ship interest and distributions are, indeed, very complex. The tax
ramifications of any transaction in this area may span a number
of Code provisions and identification of what Code provisions apply
is a difficult task for anyone without an intimate knowledge of the
intricacies of subchapter K. Although reform measures have been
considered by Congress, to date the provisions of the 1954 draft
have gone unchanged.2"5
The Commissioner has not been helpful in interpreting the
Code provisions. For instance, a person looking for information
about a distribution problem must look to not only the Regulations
covering the distribution provisions of the Code but also to the
Regulations dealing with transfers of a partnership interest to com-
pletely cover the problem. Where Congress has directed the Com-
missioner to promulgate rules, the results often appear to be unduly
strict and, sometimes, unworkable.
21 3 d. § 1.732-1(d)(3) (1956).
214 d. § 1.732-1(d)(2) (1956).
215 Anderson & Coffee, supra note 6, for an analysis of the proposed revisions.
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Some of the questions raised by the Code and Regulations have
been answered with darity by the courts. However, litigation has
covered only a small portion of the problems which arise in the
area. The confusion which attends distributions and transfers in
the Code and Regulations, in turn breeds case law which reflects
an equitable approach rather than an approach based on the stat-
utory policy.216 This is undesirable, particularly to the litigant whose
case is decided by a court which properly finds that equity is not
a part of the taxing system. Uniformity is necessary but is by no
means furthered by the Code provisions discussed herein.
The burden is placed upon the attorney representing one of the
parties to the transaction to be, at the least, aware of the pitfalls and
traps in this area of partnership income tax law. The outcome of
a transfer or a distribution in the absence of an awareness of the
Code's provisions and the case law may be devastating, costly, and
very discouraging to the client.
216 In Barnes v. United States, 253 Supp. 116 (S.D. Ill. 1966), the court emphasized
the inequity of the statute as applied to the taxpayer.
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PARALEGALS AND SUBLEGALS:
AIDS TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
By HOWARD K. HOLME*
In order to meet the rapidly growing need for legal services,
the author thinks lawyers must analyze and standardize routine
legal functions. Non-lawyers should be hired and trained as "sub-
legals" to perform these routine jobs that lawyers now perform.
Lawyers and law schools should also help train "paralegal" personnel
who, like welfare workers and claims adjusters, are not under the
direct supervision of attorneys, but need legal knowledge in addition
to their other skills. A comparison of the legal and medical pro-
fessions demonstrates the wisdom of recognizing and regulating
nonprofessionals rather than forcing the marketplace to provide
undertrained and unregulated competing occupations. Much research
and development is needed to upgrade the subordinate and comple-
mentary occupations to the laiv.
INTRODUCTION
M ANY of the problems plaguing the legal profession today-
high cost, long delays, some lawyers going without work,
while, at the same time, many people who need legal services are
unable to obtain them'- have existed, and have remained unsolved,
for over 50 years. But if the legal profession has been under fire for
not providing legal services to those in need, it had better prepare for
a far greater onslaught in the future. The growth of legal need,
far faster than the growth of population, is due both to the changing
society and a changing perception of the law. Increasing education,
income, and accumulated wealth of Americans are leading to greater
demands for legal services. Perhaps more important is society's
changing perception of legal services not as a privilege, but as a right.2
The thesis of this article is that the legal profession can best
respond to the increasing demand for legal services by providing
some legal services through "paralegal" or "sublegal" personnel.
The increasing need for legal services, the differing ways the legal
and medical professions have met the need for new services in
*Staff Member, Administration of Justice Program, University of Denver College of
Law; A.B., Stanford, 1967.
'E.g., R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919). The detailed table of conterts
would be entirely suitable for a book describing the inefficient American administra-
tion of justice today- 50 years later.
2Numerous Legal Aid and Public Defender programs are examples of this trend.
Mandatory representation of welfare recipients by lawyers at administrative proceed-
ings is additional evidence of this change. See Robb, HEW Legal Services: Beaut)
or Beast?, 55 A.B.A.J. 346, 347 (1969).
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their respective fields, and the current paralegal training efforts and
areas of utilization of paralegals are the subjects discussed.
Because the concept of non-lawyers providing legal services
is new, there is little established nomenclature. Such terms as
"trained, non-lawyer assistants," "lay assistants for lawyers," "legal
assistants," "legal technicians," and "legal subprofessionals," are
used to describe what are here called the "sublegals" and "para-
legals." "Sublegal" and "paralegal" are used here because the terms
are more precise and concise than, for instance, "paraprofessional."
The "sublegal," for the purposes of this article, is the person
who works under the supervision of a lawyer, usually in a law office.
He performs some of the routine work which does not require
full legal training. An obvious example of a sublegal is an experi-
enced legal secretary. The "paralegal" is one who is not a lawyer,
nor under direct supervision of a lawyer, but who needs some legal
training to do his job well. Examples of paralegals are welfare
workers, insurance adjusters, and probation officers. Similar work
might be described as sublegal or paralegal, depending upon the
supervisor. For instance, a housing specialist working with zoning,
housing code enforcement, or racial discrimination might be called
sublegal if he was supervised by a lawyer, or paralegal if his work
was not examined by a lawyer.
Lawyers can have a major role to play, if they choose, in the
initiation and implementation of plans concerning the distribution
of legal "know-how." Lawyers can have a dominant voice in de-
termining how their legal secretaries and clerks are trained before
beginning work, as well as how they are trained on-the-job. Lawyers
can also contribute to occupations not controlled by themselves.
By providing legal training for paralegals, attorneys can serve the
public by providing competent personnel who can do less complex
work, at less expense, in more available settings.
If lawyers do not choose to shape their own destiny, the market-
place will do it for them. Karl Llewellyn recognized that despite
unauthorized practice committees and licensing of attorneys, the
marketplace was already at work.3 As Llewellyn looked at claims
that "encroachers" were engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law, he concluded that: (1) "Old lines of business are certainly
drifting or being sucked into non-bar hands, but with real probability
that this is because they are being done more adequately or more
cheaply or both by outside agencies, first; and second, because
3 Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices -and Cures?. 5 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 104, 107 (1938).
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those outside agencies are making their serviceability known .... ";"
(2) "much business which has never reached lawyers at all .. .
much business which has only in the last decades come into existence
at all ... has been discovered and has been elicited from 'the public'
by these other agencies";5 and (3) "[encroachers] are specialists;
each has worked out machinery for handling with maximum use
of pattern, forms, routine, and concentration of expensive executive
decision, a semi-mass production of legal transactions or legal services
in a very limited field."6
I. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
There are several factors that help to explain the need for and
the potential success of sublegal and paralegal training now being
considered by bar groups. The growth and urban concentration of
the population, increased education and income, and the growing
complexity of the law create an increased need for legal services.
The relative lack of technological progress in the law, increased
competition among firms in an urban environment, and the increased
role of the government in the average person's life indicate a need
for cheaper and more accessible legal services. Also, occupational
trends indicate the increased availability of qualified personnel
needed for the sublegal and paralegal jobs. These trends include
a greater percentage of women working, a greater percentage of
white collar workers, and rapid growth in professional, technical
clerical, and various subprofessional occupations.
A. Endorsement of the Concept
Only in the last two or three years have leading groups in the
profession begun thinking about the basic concept of training indi-
viduals, who are neither lawyers nor law students, to handle some
legal problems. In August, 1968, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association endorsed attorney use of non-lawyer as-
sistants by resolving:
(1) That the legal profession recognize that there are many tasks
in serving a client's needs which can be performed by a trained,
non-lawyer assistant working under the direction and supervision
of a lawyer;
(2) That the profession encourage the training and employment
of such assistants .... 7
41d. at 112.
5 1d. at 113.
6 Id.
7 Proceedings of the House of Delegates: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 5-8,
54 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1968).
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At the same meeting, the A.B.A. set up the special committee on
Lay Assistants for Lawyers.8
A report by the American Assembly on Law and the Changing
Society stated:
Law Schools, in co-operation with the organized bar, should
consider the development of education and training programs for
subprofessional personnel. People have needs for domestic relations
counseling, consumer advice, small accident reparations, and small
claims settlements which the organized bar is not able to provide
sufficiently under the present structure of legal practice. 9
The Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Curriculum
of a conference of the Association of American Law Schools, held
at the University of Denver in 1968, recognized that "the need for
highly professional lawyers and the lack of an adequate supply
raises the question of increased reliance by the profession on para-
professional (sometimes called sub-professional) personnel to per-
form less demanding tasks now undertaken by licensed attorneys."'"
The belief that paralegal and sublegal occupations should be
developed is not confined to the legal profession. The Federal Gov-
ernment, through the National Commission on Technology, Auto-
mation, and Economic Progress, has called for the designing of
more than 5 million socially useful subprofessional jobs in a wide
variety of fields. In sympathy with these needs, the United States
Congress passed the Scheuer-Nelson Act" which provided $70 mil-
lion for the development of this goal.' 2 These occupations promise
to employ some relatively undereducated and unskilled persons in
needed and personally rewarding jobs.
B. Need for More Legal Services
Population growth and urban concentration are two of the
factors that must be considered in the increasing demand for legal
services. Table 1 shows that between 1950 and 1960 the nation's
8 Id.
9 THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON LAW AND THE CHANGING SocIETY, REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON LAW AND THE CHANGING SOCIETY 7 (1968).
10 C. Meyers, Association of American Law Schools, Report of the Chairman of the
Committee on Curriculum 1, Nov. 1968 (on file at the University of Denver College
of Law, Administrative of Justice Program). See also UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORP.,
PARAPROFESSIONALS IN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 14-19
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PARAPROFESSIONALS], for others who have called for
thought and action on this subject.
11 Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, 81 Stat. 672
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
1
2 Harrington, Introduction to F. RIESSMAN, NEW CAREERS: A BASIC STRATEGY
AGAINST POVERTY 3 (undated) (A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund, New York,
N.Y.). See also Id. at 7.
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population increased by 19 percent 13 and changed from 64 percent
urban to 70 percent urban.'" Colorado's population increased 32
percent from 1950 to 1960's and changed from 63 percent urban to
74 percent urban." The population of the Denver metropolitan
area increased by 52 percent from 1950 to 1960."7
TABLE 118
Population Increase and Urban Concentration
Population x 1000
% Urban
1950 1960 % Increase 1950 1960
U.S. 152,271 180,684 19 64 70
Colorado 1,325 1,754 32 63 74
Denver 612 929 52 100 100
The additional population necessitates at least a proportionate growth
in the need for governmental regulation and for legal services.
Urban concentration leads to more laws and ordinances with which
to comply, and more legal problems resulting from increased per-
sonal and business relationships. Government on all levels and
the legal system have grown enormously, attempting to provide
social stability in a society where more people with more power
for destruction and more property to destroy are crowded together
in increasingly tense and densely populated cities.
One governmental means of social control has been to define,
to a large extent, economic and social values. This process can be
seen in the granting or withholding of a license to practice a regu-
lated occupation, or in the placement of the "poverty line," which
determines whether one is eligible for welfare assistance. Professor
Charles Reich, in his brilliant article, "The New Property,'" points
out the many forms of "government largess," and indicates that the
local, state, and federal "largess" now constitute 40 percent of the
total personal income in the United States.2° Inevitably, as govern-
ment control is extended over an area, laws or administrative regu-
lations are instituted, and lawyers are summoned to interpret and
13 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1967 at 5 [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]-
14 Id. at 17.
1 51 d. at 14.
16 Id. at 17.
1
7
COLORADO STATE PLANNING DIVISION, COLORADO YEAR BOOK 1962-64, at 378
(1965).
18 Table 1 is compiled from ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 5, 14, 17 and COLORADO
STATE PLANNING DIVISION, COLORADO YEAR BOOK 1962-64, at 378 (1965).
19 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
20 Id. at 737. Reich notes the 1961 total governmental expenditures as $164,875,000,000
into which is divided total personal income of $416,432,000,000.
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dispute the decisions of governmental authorities; the need for
legal counsel multiplies.
Social welfare payments are one example of "government
largess." Payments are up from $8.9 billion in 1945 to an estimated
$88 billion in 1966,21 a ten-fold increase. Two recent decisions,
however, will further increase both the number of people on welfare
(now 8,000,00022) and the lawyers' role in welfare. First, the Su-
preme Court struck down residency requirements for welfare re-
cipients as unconstitutional.- Second, recipients or potential recipients
have the right to counsel at "administrative fair hearings. "24
Though it may seem paradoxical, especially to those aware of
the crushing legal problems of the poor and the ignorant, there are
indications that increased education2 5 and income 26 lead to more
legal problems. In Gresham Sykes' study, Legal Needs of the Poor
in the City of Denver, researchers found positive correlations be-
tween income, education, and the number of legal problems.2" In
Sykes' sample, half of which fell below the poverty line, 60 percent
of those households with no income and 51 percent of those with
$1 to $25 weekly income had no legal problems. A smaller per-
centaoe of the households with greater income had no legal problems
- only 23 percent of households with weekly incomes of $100 to
21 ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 283.
22 Robb, supra note 2, at 347.
23 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
24 Robb, supra note 2, at 347, citing 45 C.F.R. § 205.10, Fed. Reg. 1141 (1969).
25 YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY COLOR AND SEX
1950-66
% Completed % Completed Median
Four Years of Four Years of School
High School College Years
or More or More Completed
1950 White 35.4 6.4 9.7
(age 25 or older) Non-white 13.2 2.2 6.8
1960 White 43.2 8.1 10.9
(age 25 or older) Non-white 21.7 3.5 8.2
1966 White 52.2 10.4 12.1
(age 25 or older) Negro 27.8 3.8 9.1
1966 White 71.0 14.0 12.5
(persons 25-29 years old) Non-white 50.4 8.3 12.0
(The median years of education of the entire United States population increased
from 8.6 in 1940 to 12.0 in 1966.) ABSTRACT, supra note 13 at 114. 116.
26 Increased American affluence is evident. Per capita disposable personal income,
measured in constant 1958 dollars, increased from $1,646 in 1950 to $1,883 in 1960
and to an estimated $2,294 in 1966, an increase of almost 22 percent from 1960
to 1966. ABSTRACT. supra note 13, at 321.
27 G. Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver 33-34, 1968; (mimeo-
graphed report at the University of Denver College of Law, Administration of
Justice Program) ; to be published in 4 LAw AND SocIETY RaV. no. 2 (1969).
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$150, and only 17 percent of those with over $150 weekly income
had no legal problems."8 As to education, 54 percent of those with
eight years of schooling or less had one or more legal problems
while 69 percent of those with nine or more years of school had
one or more legal problems.2 9
Better educated and more affluent people not only have more
legal problems, they are better able to recognize which problems
can be resolved by a lawyer. Sykes' study indicated that poor people
often did not recognize that problems with workmen's compen-
sation, unemployment benefits, and welfare benefits might be allevi-
ated with the help of a lawyer. In fact, Sykes found that over two-
thirds of the legal needs of the poor in Denver were both untreated
and unrecognized. 3' However, Sykes found that when a problem
was recognized as having legal implications, 78 percent of those
interviewed went to consult a lawyer. 31
One final factor to consider in the need for increased legal
services is the growing complexity of the law. Much creative talent
is needed to solve our present and future legal problems. Using
scarce professional talent will be increasingly unfeasible for routine
or simple jobs; instead, the use of sublegals should free attorneys
to focus their attention on more difficult problems.
C. The Need for Less Expensive and More Available Legal Services
Even though the United States is comparatively wealthy and
urban, relatively inexpensive and more efficient legal services are
needed. The legal profession especially needs efficiency, because
it depends so much on creative thinking and so little on capital
investment and mechanization. Sublegal training seeks to lower
costs by training a larger number of lower-paid workers, who special-
ize in a very small area of the law, using standarized procedures and
forms. Can anyone doubt that the labor cost of a routine legal service
28Id. at 34. Sykes hypothesized that one reason for the positive correlation between
income and legal problems is that money leads to greater participation in society,
which leads to more legal problems. See also Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal
Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 279, 286 (1965). Obviously, the money.
if not the personage, of a Rockefeller is inevitably involved in many enterprises and
many conflicts. Another possible reason for the positive correlation is that society
has identified and legitimized the complaints and conflicts of the rich, but not the
poor. It has been difficult for poor people to establish any new "rights" to anything.
Until a person has the right to something, the denial of that something is not
usually recognized as a legal problem. Thus, the poor may be denied legal problems
by definition.
29 Id. at 33.
30 Sykes, supra note 27 at 28.
31 1d. at 25.
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has the potential for being low in an office where three attorneys have
twenty or more non-lawyer aides?
32
Another compelling reason for the legal profession to strive for
efficiency is its moral duty to provide services to all people having
legal needs, at a fee they can pay. In 1963, Legal Aid and Legal
Services received only 0.2 percent of the money spent for all legal
services.83 The great extension of legal services to the poor funded
by the Federal Government has meant that a growing number of
lawyers have been devoting their time to the poor, but this group is
still very small. In early 1969 there were 645 legal service centers
and 315 defender offices.34 However, of the almost 320,000 lawyers
in the United States, 35 2,300, or less than 1 percent, are devoting
their full time to the civil problems of the poor.36
A very direct measure of the need for more and less expensive
legal services is the attorney's income. The poor and many others
simply cannot afford to pay what most lawyers charge. Fees are
rising, as is indicated by increased earnings by lawyers. In 1959, the
median earnings of lawyers and judges was $10,587. 3 From 1961
to 1966 (a period during which the Consumer Price Index rose 7
percent) ,38 the average attorney's earnings increased by 20.8 percent;
New York City serves as an extreme example,30 by 1969 some
starting salaries exceeded $15,000. Wall Street firms could
not pay these wages and serve the poor. In fact, few firms
in New York City do. Seventy percent of the New York lawyers
in one survey said the median income of their clients was over
$10,000, while only 10 percent of the city population had income
over $10,000.40 In contrast, only 5 percent of the attorneys served
clients with median income under $5,000.
41
Law offices, as well as the client, need efficiency in legal services.
An increase in the number of lawyers means a greater selection for
32 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 71 et seq.
33 Carlin and Howard, Legal Representation and Class justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
381, 410 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Legal Services].
3 Toll and Allison, Advocates for the Poor, 46 DENVER L.J. 85 (1969).
3AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE 1967 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12 (F.
Weil, ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL REPORT].
3 Robb, supra note 2, at 346.
37 ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 232.
3 8 ld. at 355.
39 Id. at 240. In 1953, the starting salary for attorneys on Wall Street was $4,000.
Smigel, The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 25
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 56, 61 (1960).
4 Legal Services, supra note 33, at 382.
41 G. BRAGER & F. PURCELL, COMMUNITY ACTION AGAINST POVERTY 293 (1967).
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the client. The resulting competition demands efficiency. Larger
law firms develop and specialize, and lawyers within firms specialize
even more. Fewer single practitioners are able to succeed and more
non-lawyers and associates are used in law offices. The trends can
be seen in Table 2.
TABLE 242
National Distribution of Attorneys by Percent
Total Individual
Priv. Prac. Practice Partners Associates
National 1954 85.5 57.5 23.3 4.7
1966 73.5 39.1 27.1 7.2
Colorado 1966 74.6 39.2 27.9 7.4
Denver 1966 73.0 37.1 27.1 8.8
II. OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL TRENDS
A. General Occupational Trends
Various occupational trends are relevant to a consideration of
sublegal or paralegal training. Rising white collar employment is
part of the general shift of our economy from a production orien-
tation toward a service orientation. While nonwhites still face
many barriers to gaining white collar jobs, Table 3 demonstrates
that the percentage of nonwhite workers holding white collar jobs
doubled from 1950 through 1966.
TABLE 343
Employed Persons by Occupation and Color
96 White % Nonwhite
1950 1960 1966 1950 1960 1966
White-collar 40.3 46.4 47.9 10.2 16.0 20.8
Professional & Technical 8.0 12.0 13.3 3.0 4.7 6.9
Clerical 13.8 15.6 16.8 3.5 7.2 9.4
The number of professional workers has grown even faster than
the number of white-collar workers. As shown by Table 4, the
experienced male labor force grew 6.9 percent from 1950 to 1960
while the number of experienced male "professional, technical, and
kindred" workers grew 50.2 percent. The very rapid growth of
particular occupations especially suitable for paralegal or sublegal
training, including social workers, real estate and insurance sales-
men, and law enforcement personnel, is also notable.
42 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 18, 48, 88.
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Projections from 1965-1975 show a continuation of the trends
indicated by Table 4. Total employment is expected to rise by 22.8
percent, while employment in specific occupational groups will rise
as follows: professional, technical, and kindred - up 45.2 percent;
clerical and kindred - up 30.8 percent; all service producing in-












































dustries - up 31.9 percent; total government - up 39.1 percent;
Federal Government- up only 10.8 percent."
The rapid growth in participation of women, especially white
women, in the labor force indicates there will be many people
suitable for sublegal or paralegal training. As indicated in Table 5,
for instance, in 1960, 35 percent of white women over 14 worked.
The projection for 1980 is that 40 percent will be working, an in-
crease of 11 million workers.
TABLE 546
Labor Force - Total, and Participation Rates by Color and Sex:
1960 and Projections, 1970 and 1980
TOTAL
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
(In thousands of persons RATES
14 years old and over) (percent)
COLOR AND SEX 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980
TOTAL 73,081 85,999 101,408 57.4 57.5 58.3
MALE 49,563 55,844 64,981 79.7 77.0 77.2
White 44,666 50,027 57,596 80.0 77.3 77.5
Nonwhite 4,897 5,815 7,387 77.0 74.3 75.0
FEMALE 23,518 30,155 36,427 36.1 39.1 40.6
White 20,391 26,245 31,541 35.0 38.3 40.0
Nonwhite 3,127 3,910 4,886 45.5 45.4 45.0
B. Medicine and Law
A number of trends in the professions are very important to
subprofessional and paraprofessional training and occupations. One
is the general growth in expenditures and technology. Another is
the increasing specialization, whether formal or informal, by the
professionals themselves. The use of subprofessionals, is obviously
vital, as is the process by which paraprofessionals assume jobs
which formerly were performed by professionals.
1. General Growth
The improvement of health services has been a high national
priority during the last 20 years. The $40,751,000,000 health ex-
penditures of 1965 showed an increase of 217 percent from 1950.
4 7
Medical care expenses represented 6.5 percent of the national per-
sonal consumption for 1965, up from 4.6 percent in 1950.48 In
another mode of comparison, national income by industrial origin,
medical and other health expenditures rose from $4.4 billion in 1950
to $17.5 billion in 1966 (up 298 percent), while legal services rose
45 H. Sheppard, The Nature of the Job Problem and the Role of New Public Service
Employment, Jan. 14, 1969 (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
Kalamazoo, Mich.).
47 Id. at 70.
48 Id. at 323.
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from $1.3 billion to $4.3 billion (up 231 percent)." Thus medical
expenses grew substantially faster than legal expenses, even when
starting from a much larger base.
Tremendous amounts of money have been expended for the
research, construction, and machines of medical science. Medical
research expenditures increased 1174 percent from 1950-65, and
as of 1967 were $1.5 billion.5 In 1965 nearly $2 billion was spent for
construction of medical facilities." Much of this money went for
computers and other complex machinery. Few people need to be
reminded of medicine's technological progress in these days of
artificial hearts and organ transplants. In the law, a computerized
index to briefs5 2 is still a dream and it is an unusual law office that
even uses a magnetic tape typewriter.
2. Specialization
Specialization has occurred in the law,55 but it is generally
informal. The 1967 Economic Survey of the Colorado Bar showed
that approximately 59 percent of Colorado lawyers in private practice
who answered the questionnaire are highly specialized - 50 percent
or more of the lawyer's time is devoted to one field of law. The
degree of specialization, furthermore, seems to have increased
markedly since the last survey in 1961." 4 The extent and speed of
specialization is somewhat difficult to determine, partially because
the American Bar Association and other groups have been so slow
to recognize or regulate the trend.5"
In contrast to the legal profession, the medical profession started
certifying specialists in about 1920. Now there are at least 19 certified
medical specialities, many of which are dividing into subspecialities."
Specialization in medicine occurs only after the four-year, regular
course and one-year internship. Residencies leading to specialization
are very rigorous, often requiring several more years of study.
49 Id. at 325.
50 Id. at 70.
5 1 Id.
52 C. Decker, Institutionalization of Defender Services 6, undated (on file at National
Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, Washington, D.C.).
See generally Greenwood and Frederickson, Specialization in the Medical and Legal
Prolessions, 5 L. OFFICE ECON. & MAN. 175 (1964).
54. THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, REPORT ON THE 1967 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE COLORADO BAR 4 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC SURVEY].
5 See C. Smith, Specialization in the Law in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 9 (prepared by the
Standing Committee on Economics of Law Practice of the American Bar Ass'n,
1969).




Formal specialization may cause increased acceptance of sub-
professionals and paraprofessionals. Medicine is formally specialized
and uses many subprofessionals, while law is not formally specialized
and does not use many subprofessionals. Furthermore, the man who
is secure in the status of his job may be more willing to hire sub-
professionals than a man with less prestige, who may feel threatened
by the presence and competence of a subprofessional. It may be
that the specialists in medicine brought in the technicians and para-
medicals, while the general practitioners objected. In the American
Bar Association, the General Practice Section was the group most
resistant to the formation of the Lay Assistants Committee.5 7 The
widespread use of sublegals may not occur until the movement
toward formal legal specialization is further advanced.
3. Subprofessionals
While in recent years, the number of lawyers has grown faster
than the number of doctors, medicine has had a much faster growth
in the number of recognized and trained subprofessionals. The
number of doctors increased 31 percent from 233,000 in 1950 to
305,000 in 1965,"' while lawyers increased 43 percent from 222,000
in 1951 to 317,000 in 1966.5' From 1950 to 1965, the number of
nurses was growing twice as fast as that of doctors, and by 1965
there were twice as many nurses as doctors.6" Projections from 1965-
1975, when the number of doctors will probably grow less than
20 percent, suggested that other groups will grow as follows: nurses
up 42 percent, rehabilitative and other technicians up 54 percent,
medical laboratory personnel up 60 percent, and X-ray technologists
up 73 percent. 61
In 1965 doctors constituted approximately 10 percent of those
employed in health services,62 while lawyers probably constitute
over 50 percent of the legal profession. The 1967 Economic Survey
of the Colo.rado Bar indicates that a very large majority of Colorado
law offices have a ratio of one secretary or less per lawyer.63
4. Paraprofessionals
In general, the medical profession has accepted, trained, and
supervised its subprofessionals or "paramedicals." One need only
5 Conversation with Kline Strong of the A.B.A. Special Committee on Lay Assistant;
for Lawyers, in Denver, Colorado, Mar. 1969.
58 ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 66.
59 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 12.
60 ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 66.
61 Id. at 67.
0
2 Id. at 66, 67.
63 ECONOMIC SURVEY, Supra note 54, at 14.
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consider the lengthy training of nurses or pharmacists, which leads
to degrees and state licenses, to see the extent to which the entire
medical profession is trained and regulated. An example of medical
regulation is the bill passed in Colorado for "child health associates,"
who could handle up to 80 percent of the routine medical cases
involving children. The associates would work in doctors' offices
after five years of post-high school training and would be ap-
propriately licensed.
64
The attitude of the legal profession toward paraprofessionals
is very different from that of the medical profession and is exempli-
fied by the unauthorized practice of law committees. Rather thain
training non-lawyers to deal with legal matters, the profession has
tried to prevent all non-lawyers from performing this type of work.
Campaigns have been waged by bar association committees to prevent
real estate brokers from filling in the blanks on a form contract, and
to prevent insurance company adjusters from settling some claims.
The unauthorized practice committees were formed in the de-
pression of the 1930's. The zealousness of the committees in bringing
suits against "encroachers" has been less in prosperous times than
in lean, as might be expected of groups which are protecting their
economic livelihood as well as the public interest.65 The committees
have been influential enough, for over 30 years, to discourage the
consideration of paralegals as an integral part of the profession,
and have been a major factor in the dichotomy between paralegals
and sublegals.
C. Sublegal and Paralegal Occupations
At this point, a discussion of a number of jobs - some sublegal,
some paralegal - performed in connection with la., offices, courts,
the executive and legislative branches of the government, financial
institutions, real estate offices, insurance companies, tax specialists,
and other businesses is in order.
The law office is the logical place to find the sublegal -the
legal secretary probably being the first known to the profession. Yet
to be meaningfully classified as sublegal, the secretary should do
more than take dictation and type. To be classified as sublegal, one
should be a person with some training, as well as supervision, who
helps the lawyer by actually performing some of his tasks.
Several factors characterize the jobs which can be successfully
accomplished by sublegals. These jobs are high volume, and amen-
able to standardization of forms, and routinization of procedures.
6
4 Child Health Associate Act, Colo. H.R. Bill no. 1169. Signed into law July 14, 1969,
effective date Sept. 1, 1969.
'5 Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 109.
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They are broken down into separate steps, which are often listed
on checklists used by the sublegal.66 One firm, with three attorneys
and 23 lay personnel, has developed procedures and checklists for
33 different office and legal functions.67
Many tasks such as those described in Jerome Carlin's book,
Lawyers on Their Own,"5 are capable of being performed by sec-
retaries in most law offices, yet single practitioners are doing these
tasks. It might even be argued that some law schools really offer
paralegal training, because the men who graduate from those schools
do routine and simple work, not needing a complete legal education.
In this context, Carlin mentions corporate jobs such as establishing
or dissolving corporations and preparing and filing routine papers. 9
He also includes real estate jobs, including work on purchase agree-
ments, applications for mortgages, title guarantee policies, escrow
accounts, leases, landlord tenant squabbles, rent collections, and
evictions.7" Personal injury work, which in some cases could be
handled by subprofessionals, includes building the file, preparing
and explaining the retainer contract, interviewing, factual investi-
gating, and gathering the proof of special damages. 71 Other similar
work involves negotiating with a claims adjuster (a paralegal), and
preparing and filing court papers to bring suit. 72 Estate planning,
drafting of trusts, and preparation of wills also may involve much
work capable of being performed by a subprofessional. Carlin
noted that Chicago banks often do the preparation and drafting of
wills in return for an agreement that the bank be the executor. 71
Probate clerk sublegals may prepare and file an inventory of assets,
prepare estate tax returns, make status of accounts reports, and
transfer securities to beneficiaries.
74
Carlin's study concerns the single practitioner rather than the
sublegal, but the individuals he studied were forced to do jobs that
66 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 73.
67 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 99 n.26 lists these functions as: accounting,
appeals to Supreme Court, appointments, billings, brief files, calendar, corporations,
corporation dissolution, depositions, distribution of incoming mail, Federal Court
removals, filing and out cards, friendly hearings, insurance-liability defenses, inter-
rogatories-incoming, interrogatories-outgoing, library, office procedure memo, payroll,
pleadings, real estate specialists, subrogation, supplies, telephone ticklers, trainer of
new personnel, transcription, trials, workmen's compensation-defense, workmen's
compensation-claimant.
68 J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).
69 Id. at 43 et seq.
70 Id. at 52 et seq.
751d. at 71, 72.
"Id. at 72 et seq.
73 Id. at 102. In Denver, "Statement of Principles and Canons of Conduct between the
Denver Bar Association and the Trust Departments of the Denver Clearing House
Banks," signed in 1936, sets standards for bankers and lawyers.
74 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 72.
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might often be done by sublegals. Carlin, recognizing that these
lawyers' jobs are often threatened by lay competition,7" points out
some of the reasons for successful lay competition: (1) convenience
and efficiency-lay groups have standardized and simplified the
work and are often more accessible to the community; (2) balance
of skills and power - lay specialists may often become more skilled
in a given area than a general practitioner, and may belong to
economically strong groups; (3) visibility in the community - en-
hanced by advertising restrictions imposed by the canon of ethics;
and (4) lower prices charged by the layman. 76 If single practition-
ers are able to employ sublegals, they may be able to escape both
the threat of losing their source of income, and the task of having
to do routine and undesirable jobs.
Some legal services programs have explored the possible utili-
zation of sublegals. 77 Sublegals can alleviate two of legal aid's
greatest problems, the overwhelming caseload and the isolation of
the profession from many poor people in the community.
Uncontested divorce cases provide an outstanding example of
the usefulness of sublegals. Such cases provide about 50 percent of
the work load of a typical legal aid office 8 Legal aid lawyers
become frustrated and bored because they spend so much of their
time doing routine interviewing and form filling. These mechanical
tasks pre-empt the time which would otherwise be available for
the difficult and innovative cases which might have far reaching
results. The divorce client may just need someone to talk to and
may ramble while taking up a lawyer's precious time. The paralegal,
with counseling training, could be far more sensitive than the
average lawyer in this situation.
Several legal services programs have turned over nearly all
divorce work to sublegals.7 9 Sublegals can interview the client, using
a questionnaire to get all relevant information. Sublegals, with some
community experience and a reference list, can refer the client for
marriage counseling or advise other steps short of divorce. Sub-
legals, with a minimum of supervision, can oversee the typing and
filing of the complaint and summons, preliminary motions, and
all other documents. Any special problems that arise for the sublegal
in the divorce action can be referred to the supervising attorney
for consultation. Lawyers, of course, retain the ultimate responsi-
75 CARLIN, supra note 68, at 142 et seq.
76 Id. at 143, 144.
7 7 Id. at 70, 71.
78 Id. at 87. See generally Sykes, supra note 27, at 46. 47.
/9 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 65.
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bility for actual trial proceedings. The savings in time for the
lawyers are tremendous.
Another example of the kind of work sublegals can do is
the preparation of bankruptcy papers in routine cases. Personal
bankruptcy has grown tremendously in the United States, from 33,392
petitions filed in 1950 to 192,354 in 1966.80 This volume would
make it practical for nearly every legal aid office to train a sub-
professional to spend much of his time with bankruptcies. Since
bankruptcy is a federal procedure, the forms and procedures applic-
able to one state are applicable elsewhere.
Garnishments are another common legal aid problem. in the
Chicago area alone, garnishments have increased from 59,000 in
1962 to 73,000 in 1966.81 Legal aid offices can often negotiate to
prevent garnishments, if they learn of the debt soon enough, and
in some cases, overthrow the judgment on which the garnishment
is based, because of lack of service of process or other technical
defects. Sublegals can help obtain the facts and information, and
could negotiate some of the claims. In a Denver neighborhood
law office, debt cases made up about 20 percent of the caseload.8 2
Sublegals in legal service programs could also help serve a
longtime goal of "preventive law." It has been suggested that
sublegals do preliminary interviews or "legal checkups" with clients,
using a questionnaire to determine whether the client has unsolved
legal problems, some of them perhaps unrecognized. s The need
for this service was clearly shown in Professor Gresham Sykes'
study."4 This study indicated that a "legal checkup" questionnaire
(see appendix) often uncovered more legal problems than did the
usual interview with an attorney.8 5 The number of unrecognized
legal problems among the urban poor was found to be well over
twice the number of recognized legal problems.86
Sykes' work in Denver showed the need for a bridge between
the legal aid offices and the community. Increasing office hours
to nights and weekends brought few new clients, but two VISTA
lawvyers, through their daily contacts with the community, were
very helpful in referring individuals with problems to the office. 8
These community contacts were helpful, probably because, while
80 ABSTRACT, supra note 13, at 499.
81 D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE Xviii (1967).
82 Sykes, supra note 27, at 47.
83 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 87.
84 Sykes, supra note 27.
851d. at 23.
86 Id. at 28.
87 Id. at 56; see also BRAGER & PURCELL. supra note 41, at 200.
88 Sykes, supra note 27, at 51.
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the Denver Legal Aid Society has existed for 50 years, only 33
percent of the poor people interviewed knew it existed, and less
than 20 percent of these knew even the approximate location.8"
Sublegals could be utilized to acquaint the community with legal
aid services.
Intimate knowledge of the community can enable a sublegal
to point out particular problems to attorneys." The Dixwell Legal
Rights Association (D.L.R.A.) of New Haven, Connecticut, has
trained individuals, half of whom have less than a high school
education, for this function." During D.L.R.A.'s 3-month training
course, about 45 percent of a trainee's time is spent canvassing and
serving poor neighborhoods - finding residents who are either
inadequately served by various agencies or who qualify for more
benefits. 2 The Legal Assistance Association of New Haven has
hired many of the trainees.
9 3
The sublegal can also be valuable as a "legman," factual in-
vestigator, or "guide to the government bureaucracy.'"'" Britain's
Citizen's Advice Bureaus use sublegals to advise laymen about legal
aid (which grew out of the Advice Bureaus), to refer people to
other useful agencies, and to perform some of the functions of
an ombudsman.9
Community knowledge of Legal Aid, its effectiveness, and
its use of sublegals are all directly related. An increase in any
factor should bring increases in the others. Some legal aid programs
have been reluctant to use sublegals, partially because of past expe-
rience with local and state bar resistance even to the expansion of
Legal Aid use of federal money."' In the suburban metropolitan
Denver counties, until recently, many lawyers resisted any federal
funding of legal aid. A Denver Model Cities program proposing
an office staffed primarily with paralegally trained personnel found
stiff resistance from the board of directors of the Denver Legal
Aid Society before it was approved.
89 Id. at 39; see also BRAGER & PURCELL, supra note 41, at 200.
90 A. PEARL & F. RIESSMAN, NEW CAREERS FOR THE POOR 258 (1968).
91 D. Hunter, Research Report on Dixwell Legal Rights Association, New Haven.
Connecticut, 5, Summer, 1967. (A condensed version of this report may be found
in F. RIESSMAN & H. POPPER, UP FROM POVERTY, 1968).
92 Id.
3 Id.
94 THE CENTER FOR YOUTH AND COMMUNITY STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY,
TRAINING FOR NEW CAREERS 99 (1965).
95 Address by Professor Monrad G. Paulsen, The Law Schools and the War on Poverty,
in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY 77,
81 (1965).
96 Address by Charles J. Parker, The Relations of Legal Services Programs with Local
Bar Associations, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW
AND POVERTY 126 (1965).
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Without sublegals, the effectiveness of legal aid has been
lower. Legal aid has been afraid to make its presence widely known
in the community for fear of swamping itself with work. Yet where
offices have been swamped with work, some have responded by
using sublegals - e.g., the California programs which use sublegals
in divorce cases.
97
Of course, it is not only the private lawyer and the legal aid
office that employ sublegals, although these groups may have the
greatest potential for using them. The judicial, legislative and
executive branches of government also use some sublegals, and
many paralegals.
Courts use a number of sublegals and paralegals. Some munici-
pal court judges, county court judges, juvenile court judges, and
justices of the peace are not lawyers, although they obviously need
legal training.98
One new "parajudicial" occupation, which demonstrates the
potential for improving the legal profession through the recombi-
nation of skills in new occupations, is the "law clerk-bailiff." The
job of law clerk-bailiff will be filled by a night law student, who
would serve as bailiff, and also as the judge's law clerk, doing legal
research for the judge.
"Parajudicial" might also be used to describe referees, masters,
and arbitrators. Referees may often be used instead of judges. For
example, referees are used exclusively in bankruptcy court. Colorado
has passed legislation for the appointment of several water referees
to decide water law disputes." Also, in Denver, non-lawyer referees
are used in juvenile court to lessen the court's load. These referees
have much the same function as judges. Masters may be used by
judges to hear and evaluate complicated or time consuming factual
information.
The formation of neighborhood courts, having jurisdiction over
many minor offenses and juvenile offenses, has been suggested.
These courts could help reduce court congestion and would be
staffed by paralegally trained neighborhood residents. 100
One consequence of overcrowded courts and long delays before
trials has been the increased use of arbitrators to help alleviate this
situation. 1' In complex or technical cases, three arbitrators are
97 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 10, at 66.
98 Ronayne Law School Training for Non-lawyer Judges, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 197 (1964).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-4 (1963).
100 See remarks of Dr. Edgar J. Cahn in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARVARD CONFERENCE
ON LAW AND POVERTY 55-57 (1967).




often appointed - at least one lawyer and at least one expert from
the field in which the dispute arose. It obviously helps if the lawyer
also knows the technical field and the expert knows some law.
102
In the criminal field, subprofessionals may do much of the
factual investigation and interviewing of potential witnesses, as well
as the preparation for depositions and interrogatories. The police
force does the great part of the factual investigation and prepara-
tion for the prosecutor, even when he has his own sublegal investi-
gation staff. Presently, only the richer defendants can afford the
extensive factual investigation that the prosecution has at its dis-
posal. However, there is a growing recognition of the need for a
factual investigation staff for the Public Defender.10 8 When the
courts have been presented alternatives to sentencing the offender
to prison, they have often - about one-third of the time - chosen
programs diverting the defendant from prosecution or at least
deferring it.' 0 4 The new occupations developed by the project include
"program developers" and "follow-up counselors.''105
Other paralegal occupations supervise the convicted defendant.
Probation and parole officers have the difficult job of trying to
help the convict rehabilitate himself, as well as to supervise the
person and keep him out of trouble. The occupation already com-
bines the difficult roles of social worker and policeman. A knowl-
edge of the criminal law and the criminal justice system is needed
in both capacities. Parole board officers must balance the welfare
and rights of society and the individual in deciding whether or
when to release the convict from prison before the end of his
maximum sentence.
The executive branch of the government employs nearly 10
percent of all United States' attorneys. 1'0 In addition, many of its
non-lawyer employees need to know the law governing their par-
ticular specialty. Again, the criminal justice system provides an
obvious example. Policemen are the front line administrators of
the criminal law, yet their training in law most frequently is fairly
scanty. One of the best municipal police training academies allots
only 20 hours of training in the law out of 480 hours in the recruit
102 American Arbitration Association, The Lawyer and Arbitration, Brochure, June 1967.
103 C. Decker, Streamlining the Administration of Criminal Justice 12, undated (on
file at National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, Washington, D.C.).
104 Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia, Offender Rehabilitation Project of
the Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia 6 (unpublished: Second Grant
Application, Submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity, July 1, 1968 through
June 30, 1969).
1o5 Id. at 19, 21.
108 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 35. The executive and legislative branches together
employed 10.8 percent of United States' attorneys in 1966. Id. at 21.
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training course. 07 In Denver, new patrolmen receive 56 hours of
training in criminal law and evidence out of a total of 492 hours
in their training course.108 Prison officials and personnel also need
to have an overview of the whole criminal justice system as well
as detailed knowledge of the law relating to imprisonment.
The general area of social welfare encompasses many occupa-
tional groups which must deal with the law. Welfare, social security,
and unemployment compensation are obvious examples. For example,
few lawyers have examined the badly organized, badly indexed,
multi-volume sets of statutes, regulations, and guidelines governing
welfare, let alone become as expert as the experienced welfare
worker. Generally, welfare workers and administrators have gov-
erned the system, with little guidance, or counsel within the agency.
Welfare clients have generally been incapable of challenging either
the procedure or substance of decisions affecting them. However,
in the last few years, some clients have formed local groups of the
National Welfare Rights Organization (N.W.R.O.). These groups
have studied the regulations and trained welfare clients to represent
other clients at administrative fair hearings. In many cases, these
paralegal advocates have been embarrassingly successful from the
point of view of welfare departments. 0 9 Perhaps because of a
realization that clients were not getting all they deserved under
the law, perhaps partially because of the demonstration of inequity
by advocates in the N.W.R.O., the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare has promulgated requirements that clients be afforded
free representation by counsel at administrative fair hearings be-
ginning October 1, 1969.10 The H.E.W. program will also increase
funding to legal aid to provide services for former, present, and
potential welfare recipients."'
In the legislative branch of the government, the need for para-
legals, expert in the drafting of legislation and doing research in
the content and effect of past legislation, is imperative. Lawmakers
simply do not have time to do the extensive research needed to do
a thorough job and cannot rely on their own knowledge, even
though many of them are lawyers. States such as California lead
in providing assistants for each state legislator.
101 Decker, supra note 103, at 9.
108 Conversation with Lt. E.T. Ruby, Denver Police Academy, in Denver, Colorado,
May, 1969.
109Interview with Alfred A. Fothergill, Institute for Regional Development, Ohio
University, Athens, Ohio, in Denver, Colorado, April, 1969.
110 Robb, supra note 2, at 347, citing 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1969).
Mx5 Robb, supra note 2, at 347.
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One of the greatest needs of the poor may be to gain access
to, and representation in, the decision making processes of legisla-
tive and administrative bodies." 2 Those agencies are responsive
to the persuasion of well-documented arguments prepared with the
assistance of well-financed groups, and to pressure from large voting
blocs. The poor have little access to money, but they have sufficient
numbers to form a potentially potent voting force. Legal aid offices
will often use neighborhood representatives and paralegals to organ-
ize the poor community into a cohesive political bloc which can
demand and receive in the legislative processes.
Abstracting and title insurance companies are other outstanding
examples of how laymen can sometimes do as good a legal job as
lawyers.' 13 The TransAmerica Company in Denver employs about
ten non-lawyers to each iawyer, abstracting and searching titles in
real estate transactions. Law school dropouts have been a large
source of abstracters, but now demand is exceeding supply even for
the dropouts. The title examiner or abstracter has an important and
difficult job, but few lawyers engage in this task because the big
plant insurers are able to do it as efficiently and with less expense
by using non-lawyers."
14
Real estate brokers have established the right in Colorado to
practice law in a narrowly confined area relevant to real estate
transactions. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that "the prep-
aration of receipts and options, deeds, promissory notes, deeds of
trust, mortgages, releases of encumbrances, leases, notice terminating
tenancies, demands to pay rent or vacate by completing standard and
approved printed forms, coupled with the giving of explanation or
advice as to the legal effect thereof""15 does constitute the practice
of law, but permitted real estate brokers to prepare these documents
"in the regular course of their business ...at the requests of their
customers and only in connection with transactions involving sales
of real estate, loans on real estate or the leasing of real estate which
transactions are being handled by them."1 '
Insurance salesmen and claim adjusters are two examples of
the paralegal in the insurance business. Insurance salesmen attend
extensive conferences and participate in courses scheduled by the
112 See Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511 (1969). See also C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952).
13See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK, 273-314
(1967) for description of Chicago Title and Trust Co.
114 The bar has attempted to limit this work to attorneys. See e.g., Title Guarantee Co.
v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957).
11 5Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 411,
312 P.2d 998, 1004 (1957).
116 Id. at 413, 312 P.2d at 1006.
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Chartered Life Underwriters." 7 Instructors for these courses have
insurance or other business training and experience and often have
law degrees. The courses are taught on a college level and the
C.L.U. degree is granted upon the successful completion of the
5-part program and examinations. Undoubtedly, some of those
working in life insurance and taking these courses are as well
qualified to advise on certain aspects of the law concerning their
specialty as is the average lawyer.
Adjusters settle far more insurance claims than do lawyers.
They investigate, evaluate, and negotiate the vast bulk of bodily
injury claims, and virtually all property damage claims." 8 Adjusters'
personal and job characteristics show some common differences
between paralegals and lawyers. Adjusters are generally from a
lower socio-economic class; have lower academic standing, although
most finish college; and tend to fall into the job rather than plan
and prepare for it for many years. They are involved in a role
conflict because they must obtain releases for their employers, while
at the same time, they seek the independent status of professionals
who feel ethical restrictions against being unfair to the client." 9
Thus, while the lawyer is a full advocate avoiding all conflicts of
interest, the adjuster must balance his company's interest in profit
against his conscience and the interest of the insured. While lawyers
have a formal code of ethics and disciplinary procedures, the para-
legal must operate under far more ambiguous guidelines and
conditions.
These differences provide a genuine cause of concern, and the
unauthorized practice of law committees have tried to cope with
the problems. One of the major questions in paralegal and sublegal
training must be how to formulate and enforce ethical rules and
disciplinary controls for these occupations. Lawyers are subject
to some control from the court and the bar. To whom must the
paralegal answer? Some ethical training should be given during
their regular training and "treaties" between the bar and some
paralegal groups2 ° have been fairly successful, but additional
solutions must be sought.
117Central administrative offices and the campus of the American College of Life
Underwriters are at Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania; but courses are offered throughout the
country. In 1968-1969, at the Colorado University Denver Center, courses were
offered on Group Insurance, Health Insurance, and Pensions I; Group Insurance,
Health Insurance and Pensions II; Law, Trusts, and Taxation; Business Insurance
and Estate Planning; and Estate Planning.
118 H. Ross. SETrLED OUT OF COURT, ch. 2. Insurance Adjusters (to be published by
Aldine Pub. Co. in 1970).
119 Id.




Tax law is lucrative both for the lawyer and for the non-lawyer.
The median income of highly specialized tax lawyers in Colorado
in 1967 was $16,000.2 Yet the vast bulk of tax filings and returns
are prepared by non-lawyers. Certified public accountants are often
more qualified than the nontax lawyer, and can more easily prepare
the returns than an attorney. One need only look in the Yellow
Pages of the telephone book to find a great many commercial enter-
prises willing to aid individuals or businesses in preparing tax
returns.
The above elaboration of occupations is by no means all in-
clusive. Yet it does show that no law school will be able to teach
members of all occupational groups who need legal training. The
question is whether law schools or lawyers will teach anyone other
than law students and lawyers.
III. PAST PARALEGAL TRAINING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
The concern of the University of Denver College of Law with
paralegal and sublegal training grew out of a 1966 conference of
leading legal and social educators and administrators concerning
"Various Legal Roles." The participants concluded, in part, that
"the law has taken the path of ignoring, to a large extent, the
problems of training and qualifying people for occupations auxiliary
to the law, in spite of overwhelming evidence of the interdependence
and co-operation necessary for efficient operation in any profes-
sion."'I2 This conference was the beginning of an extensive program
at the University of Denver College of Law to provide paralegals
with a basic knowledge of our system of law and to encourage more
extensive use of paralegal services. An ultimate goal was estab-
lished to train paralegal personnel to function in co-operation with
legal specialists, forming legal teams after the long-established
practice of specialty teams in the medical profession.
The law school in conjunction with the University of Denver
Department of Political Science, prepared a training institute for
command officers of the Denver Police Department during the
summer of 1968. Senior police officers were given training in the
legal and sociological context of their work.
In the fall of 1968, law students were called upon to teach a
20-hour paralegal course to 20 housing specialists at the Metro
Denver Fair Housing Center. The participants in the class were of
varied educational backgrounds; most had completed high school
121 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 54, at 5.
122 Summary paper on Paralegal Programs of the University of Denver College of Law,
fall 1968 (unpublished paper on file with University of Denver College of Law,
Administration of Justice Program).
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and a few had some college education. The housing workers were
instructed in those areas of the law having the most immediate impact
upon their clients, including housing, consumer problems, welfare,
employment, domestic relations, and criminal law. The evaluative
comments of the observing attorney are revealing.
The goals of the course as designed seemed to be threefold;
(1) provide the class with an overview of the areas of the law with
which they were most likely to be concerned, (2) create an aware-
ness on the part of the class of potential legal problems, and (3)
equip the class with enough understanding of the law in their special
area of interest that they could render advice to their clients. This
third goal was not designed to encourage the unauthorized practice
of law. It was designed to train those working directly with the poor
to help the poor understand their rights and duties under the law
to the same degree most middle class laymen understand their rights
and duties.
One of the age-old fears of lawyers about teaching bits of law
to laymen is that the layman will suddenly imagine himself com-
petent to render legal advice. The subject questionnaire confirms
my belief that this fear is unfounded. When the class was asked
how they saw themselves using their new knowledge of the law,
the most common response was that the law seems more complex
than they had realized. They indicated that the use of their knowl-
edge would probably be in identifying legal problems and advising
people to consult a lawyer. The paralegal students repeatedly
described their role as a "liaison between lawyer and client."' 23
The College of Law has become deeply involved in the Denver
Model City Program. Beginning with the planning year when resi-
dents formed committees to outline different problems and possible
solutions to those problems, the College of Law, under the direction
of Professor Alan Merson, assigned law students as advisors to
each of the resident committees. Over the year, these students have
given the residents a substantial amount of "on-the-job" paralegal
training. The passage of the Community Development Consortium 24
means that the College of Law will be involved in extensive and
formal paralegal training for the staff and residents of the Denver
Model Neighborhoods.
The College of Law, in May 1969, offered a 25-hour paralegal
course to 20 caseworkers from the Denver Department of Welfare.
An 80-page curriculum outline of the law in relevant areas was
prepared .1 2  Law students, law professors, and local attorneys taught
the course and a local VISTA lawyer sat in on all classes in order to
123J. Houtchens, Paralegal Training for Metro Denver Fair Housing, Dec. 11, 1968
(unpublished memorandum on file at University of Denver College of Law, Admin-
istration of Justice Program).
124 DENVER, COLO., ORDINANCES §§ 178, 358, series of 1969.
125Paralegal Training in Poverty Law, Mar. 1969 (unpublished paper on file at
University of Denver College of Law).
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evaluate the course and to ask and stimulate questions. Television
equipment was used to video-tape the class session as an aid for the
improvement of teaching techniques. The course goal was to pro-
vide caseworkers with the legal background necessary for more
expert guidance of their clients.
IV. RESEARCH TO IMPROVE FUTURE SUBLEGAL AND PARALEGAL
TRAINING
A. Priorities: What and Why
Research must center on the problems of the poor. The College
of Law's ties to the Model City Program, and the lack of resources of
the poor to solve their own problems provide incentives for a con-
centration of effort on behalf of the poor. For this purpose, the
poor need not be defined in the same way as legal aid defines the
term. Indeed, those who are just above the income eligibility limits
for legal aid are certainly "poorer" when considering their ability
to obtain legal services than are those just below those limits; those
just below the poverty line are completely subsidized while those
just above receive no subsidy. It might be argued that the "all or
nothing" formulation of legal aid is unfair and should be changed.
B. Research Concerning Sublegals
The success of sublegal training depends upon a correct defi-
nition of the scope of legal tasks or operations that can be per-
formed by the sublegal, and which will provide incentive for the
lawyer to hire him. It may be that the training should be directed
primarily at those already employed by the profession, for example,
upgrading the training of the present legal secretaries. Perhaps then,
the routine tasks presently performed by the legal secretary could
be accomplished by the presently unemployable, after a minimum
amount of training.
Thus, one of the most important projects will be to study indi-
viduals already working under lawyers' direction. The sublegal's
general educational background must be known, as well as the
quantity and quality of his legal training. Of importance are the
specific tasks he presently performs, whether he is given work
primarily as a clerk and typist, or whether he is given work that
requires legal thinking and legal training. A time study has been
published on legal aid attorneys. 2 ' However, sublegal help was not
directly studied.
The feasibility of employing sublegals depends not only upon
the quality and quantity of those competing for the jobs, but also
126 PARAPROFESSIONALS, srupra note 10, at 37.
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upon economic factors within the legal profession. For sublegals
to be used, even after ethical problems have been resolved, a lawyer
must have enough business to make it profitable to hire a sublegal.
The advent of an effective plan to settle automobile claims without
attorneys, as is visualized in the Keeton-O'Connell plan,'27 could
lead to more effective use of a lawyer's time or could result in unem-
ployment of many lawyers. The resulting economic pressure on
lawyers, and the pressure on law schools to retrain the lawyers
rather than training paralegals and sublegals could postpone the
implementation of the paralegal and sublegal concepts for many
years. It is possible that a prerequisite to successful entry of sub-
legals into law offices is a change in the lawyers' availability to the
public. A more efficient lawyer referral service, increased efforts
to educate individuals as to their needs and of the ability of lawyers
to serve them, or further modifications of the ethical prohibitions
against solicitation and corporate practice, may be prerequisites to
lawyers' hiring sublegals.' 8
If, as we expect, there is enough demand for legal help to
create the need for sublegals, then, analysis of the nature of these
jobs is necessary in order to create and define occupations for the
sublegals. An example of a sublegal job and its development might
be as follows: a researcher and a number of lawyers specializing in
personal injury would discuss the procedures for developing personal
injury files. The researcher would become familiar with, collect
samples of, and possibly standardize the contracts for contingency
fees, the form letters used in getting copies of the records and bills
necessary for special damages claims, and the preferred formats for
complaints. He would also gather information about interviewing
and investigation techniques. After his investigation, the researcher
would train students in this particular area of the law. The training
would emphasize work as performed in law offices. The texts would
include copies and explanations of the forms used in the various
offices. Training would include a detailed study of the concept of
negligence and its application, and possibly, a study of civil pro-
cedure.
At some early stage, perhaps as soon as the student begins his
sublegal training, he would start to work for his post-training em-
ployer, starting, perhaps, as a file clerk and typist. As the student
gained competence, he could do preliminary interviews, gather in-
formation for the file, and write drafts of letters and complaints.
As part of his further training, the student might be taught tech-
127R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM; A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
12 See generally Llewellyn, supra note 3.
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niques of negotiation, and informed about the recoveries one might
expect from certain sets of factual situations. At this stage, the
student could begin to work more closely with the attorney, handling
the major part of most cases which might be settled out of court.
The attorney could thus devote his time either to trying cases,
diversifying his practice into other areas, or supervising a number of
sublegals.
The work inspired by Frank Reissman and Arthur Pearl, gen-
erally known as "New Careers,"'2 9 is instructive; those interested in
sublegal training, like those implementing the concept of New
Careers, are interested in training undereducated and underemployed
people to perform socially useful, semi-professional work. Hope-
fully, following the pattern established by New Careers, at the
same time the training for sublegal careers is begun, career advance-
ment "ladders" will be established which will eventually enable
trainees to become full-fledged professionals. However, the training
for lawyers is so long and rigorous, and the structure of the pro-
fession is such that building a career ladder all the way up to full
attorney status can only be a long-range goal.
To the extent that New Careers is a success, it should be adopted
by those working in sublegal and paralegal areas. Those who have
worked with New Careers should possess an experienced knowledge
base of how to teach the underemployed and poorly educated. They
should have information on the ability of the students to learn new
skills, and also on the job market for trainees. To the extent that
New Careers training has failed it should signal problem areas that
must be examined.
C. Research Concerning Paralegals
Paralegal occupations must be studied in much the same fashion
that sublegal occupations have been studied. Those nonlegal fields
which are particularly relevant to the environment of the poor, or
are particularly susceptible to occupational entry by the poor, must
be discovered and defined. More knowledge must be gathered about
the person who is presently performing the paralegal function. What
is his general and legal training? How much of his day does he spend
doing legal work? What areas of the law does he need to know
in order to do that work? What qualifications are needed to enter
that job? What on-the-job training is given now?
Another series of questions relates to the quality of the work
presently being accomplished by paralegal personnel. Is the para-
legal satisfied with his work? Is the supervisor satisfied with the
129 PEARL & RIESSMAN, supra note 90.
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quality of the work? What does the supervisor, the paralegal, or
the client want the paralegal to know more about?
Of course, the need for workers in the particular paralegal area
is vital. Is the pay high? Is the turnover high? Does the agency or
company have to advertise and give special benefits to those who
begin work? Would the agency or company be willing to pay to
have their present or future workers trained in the law?
We might find, for example, that there was a great need for
Negro and Mexican-American insurance claims adjusters to work in
their respective communities. If a sublegal personal injury course
and a paralegal insurance adjusters course were both developed,
much of the training would be applicable to both. Interviewing and
investigative techniques would be taught. There would be instruction
in the methods of negotiation and the amount of damages payable
under certain circumstances. The focus of the training would be on
the concept of negligence, especially as applied to automobile,
property, and personal injury litigation and negotiation.
D. Teaching Techniques
A final area of our study must be concerned with the methods
of teaching. Law schools have typically avoided using teaching as-
sistants, even at the cost of having classes of 100 or more students.
But for paralegal training, team-teaching by a number of advanced
law students may be more effective than traditional law teaching.
Students may be perfectly competent to teach the basic elements of
a small area of law. The law student may be a more motivated
teacher and engender more enthusiasm in his class. In other cases,
it may be lawyers from the community who would be the best teachers,
especially for the sublegals. In any event, an evaluation is necessary
to decide who would make the best teacher in each particular set
of circumstances.
Typical classroom techniques may not always be the best ap-
proach for all areas of legal training. For example, civil procedure
might be taught by presenting a mock trial, in which students would
interrupt to ask questions. Probably much or most of the training
should take place on the job. Many of the necessary skills could be
taught by practice in the environment where peculiarities of the
procedures and personalities within the office can be assimilated.
The variety of the post-training jobs is likely to be so great that
classes will not be able to cover all the skills needed on any particular
job. Research should indicate the amount and type of on-the-job
training required.
Programmed teaching may be especially effective with under-
educated students, who too seldom receive positive reinforcement
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for their efforts in school. The students may be more easily motivated
by a text which gives them encouragement as they answer questions
correctly. Also, this may be a possible entry for programmed teaching
into the general law curriculum. The basis of programmed teaching
is the same as the traditional Socratic method, and it may be that in
teaching only the more elementary concepts of a field of law, there
is an advantage over the much larger task of writing programmed





One way to meet the increasing demand for legal services is
through increased sublegal and paralegal training within law schools.
Research indicates the continuing growth of a demand for legal
services at a faster rate than the profession, as presently structured,
can accommodate. Population growth, urban concentration, and in-
creased education and wealth all put great pressure on the legal
profession. Because most legal work must be performed by people
rather than machines, the profession must search for cheaper labor.
There are many potential trainees, if the legal profession will train
and rely on sublegals and paralegals.
In many ways the medical profession has responded more wisely
than the law to increased needs. Medicine has provided for extensive
training and certification of aides and allied professionals. The legal
profession has attempted to monopolize the provision of legal services
through the concept of unauthorized practice of law. The law has
been slower to adopt new technology, supervised specialization, or
subprofessionals. As a result, paralegal jobs have developed with
largely unsupervised, and sometimes unprincipled, non-lawyers doing
legal work.
A great many sublegal and paralegal jobs are being performed.
A few of them have been very efficiently organized while many are
probably haphazardly organized. Clearly the field is too large for
any one university to organize. More research is needed. The present
structure and content of sublegal and paralegal occupations must
be determined. Jobs must be subdivided, standardized, specialized,
and performed on a mass production basis. Procedures, forms, and
checklists must be prepared for curricula designed to teach non-
lawyers how to do the greater part of many legal tasks. Research
should indicate how long training will have to be, and how it should
be distributed between classroom, or similar training, and on-the-job
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training. Especially, insofar as we are involved in teaching under-




INTERVIEWERS MAY NOT GIVE ANY LEGAL ADVICE
LEGAL NEEDS OF POOR STUDY
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW
13 1
HELLO, I'M . THE LAW SCHOOL AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER IS TRYING TO FIND OUT ABOUT
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THIS CITY. WE'D AP-
PRECIATE IT VERY MUCH IF YOU WOULD ANSWER A FEW
QUESTIONS. THE INFORMATION YOU GIVE WILL BE KEPT COM-
PLETELY SECRET: THE POLICE, THE WELFARE PEOPLE - NO-
BODY CAN SEE ANY OF THIS INFORMATION EXCEPT SOME
PEOPLE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER. WE DO NOT EVEN
WANT TO KNOW YOUR NAME. ALL WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW
IS SOMETHING ABOUT YOU AND ANY LEGAL PROBLEMS YOU
MIGHT HAVE RUN INTO SO THAT WE CAN FIND THE BEST
WAY OF GETTING LEGAL HELP TO PEOPLE IN DENVER WHEN
THEY NEED IT.
* (If respondent asks why he was chosen)
YOUR HOUSEHOLD WAS JUST PICKED OUT OF A HAT. WE
HAVE TO TAKE ADDRESSES THAT WAY SO WE CAN SEE WHAT
A WHOLE NEIGHBORHOOD IS LIKE. YOUR HOUSE CAME UP
JUST BY CHANCE.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF WE COULD SPEAK WITH THE
HEAD OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD.
(1) FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU IF YOU FEEL THAT
YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY HAS NEEDED
LEGAL ADVICE OR A LAWYER IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?
__Yes _______No
* (If respondent answers "yes," ask)
(2) WHAT WAS THAT ABOUT? Person_ Issue
*(Persons: e.g., respondent, spouse, father, mother, etc.)
(3) ARE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY DEALING
WITH A LAWYER NOW? ____Yes __ No
Person Issue_
(4) HAVE YOU, OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY, TALKED
WITH A LAWYER IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?
-. Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask)
(5) WHICH MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY TALKED TO A LAW-
YER? Person_
131 The questionnaire was the basic instrument used in Professor Sykes' study. Legal
problems were identified by submitting the answered questionnaire forms to a panel
of qualified attorneys. As a possible format for a legal checkup, it is an illustration
of a legal service which is not presently provided for within the resources of the legal
profession. Although the questionnaire has been renumbered and changed slightly
as to form, all of the questions are reproduced.
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(6) WHY DID YOU (or he, she) GO TO THE LAWYER?
(7) DID YOU GET A FAIR DEAL FROM THE LAWYER?
_ Yes No
*(If "no," ask)
(8) WHAT HAPPENED? (Probes: cost too much, no results, he didn't
care, didn't try).
(9) HOW DID THE PROBLEM TURN OUT?
(10) WHAT MONTH DID YOU (or he, she) FIRST GO SEE THE
LAWYER? Month_ Year_
(11) HOW MUCH DID IT COST ALTOGETHER TO HAVE THE
LAWYER? $
*(If respondent replied "no" to question 4 (i.e., did not have lawyer), but
replied "yes" to question 1 (i.e., felt they needed a lawyer or leagI advice)
ask)
(12) YOU SAID BEFORE YOU THOUGHT YOU NEEDED LEGAL
ADVICE, BUT YOU DIDN'T GO TO A LAWYER -WHY IS
THAT? (Probes: cost, didn't think it would help, don't trust them,
etc.).
(13) DID YOU OR ANYONE ELSE IN YOUR FAMILY SEE ANY-
BODY ELSE ABOUT A LEGAL PROBLEM IN THE LAST FIVE
YEARS? ___Yes __ No
* (If "yes," specify below)
(14) WHAT MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY? Family member
saw
(15) WHO DID YOU (or he, she) SEE? Family member
__ saw
NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
THINGS YOU MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BOUGHT IN DENVER
IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS. SOMETIMES THERE ARE LEGAL PROB-
LEMS ABOUT THE THINGS PEOPLE BUY AND THAT IS WHY
I WANT TO ASK THESE QUESTIONS.
(16) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY BOUGHT
SOMETHING IN DENVER AND GOTTEN GYPPED IN THE
LAST FIVE YEARS? __ Yes - -No
*(If "yes," ask the following)
(17) WHICH FAMILY MEMBER?
(18) WHAT DID YOU (or he, she) BUY?
(19) HOW MUCH DID IT COST ALTOGETHER? (Total) $__






.Discount store not in neighborhood
__ Chain store (neighborhood)
_ Chain store not in neighborhood
__ Other (specify)
(21) WHAT WAS WRONG WITH IT?
(22) DID YOU TRY TO GET YOUR MONEY BACK? -Yes -No
(23) (If "yes") WHAT DID YOU DO?
(24) THEN WHAT HAPPENED?
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(25) HAVE YOU OR ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY BOUGHT SOME-
THING ON CREDIT IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, HERE IN
DENVER, AND THEN LOST IT BECAUSE YOU COULDN'T
MAKE THE PAYMENTS? __Yes -No
*(If "yes," ask the following)
'(26) WHAT FAMILY MEMBER BOUGHT IT?
Family member Item
(27) WHAT DID YOU (or he, she) BUY?
(28) DID YOU (or he, she) PAY ANYTHING DOWN?
(29) HOW MUCH WERE THE PAYMENTS EACH MONTH?
(30) HOW MANY PAYMENTS HAD YOU MADE WHEN THEY
CAME AND GOT IT? (Record below)
Down Amt. of No. of_
Paym't Monthly Paym'ts
Amount Payment Made
(31) WHO CAME AND GOT IT?
(32) DID THEY TAKE ANYTHING ELSE? __.Yes --- No
(If yes, specify)
(33) DID YOU STILL HAVE TO PAY MORE MONEY AFTER THEY
TOOK IT BACK? ___Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask) HOW MUCH DID YOU STILL HAVE TO PAY AL-
TOGETHER?
(34) (Total Amount, after repossession) $
(35) DID YOU GET A PAPER TO GO TO COURT ABOUT THIS
EXTRA MONEY? __Yes __No
(36) DID YOU TALK TO A LAWYER ABOUT THE COURT
PAPERS? __Yes ____No
(37) DID YOU TALK TO ANYBODY ELSE ABOUT THE COURT
PAPERS? __Yes ---- No
(38) DID YOU GO TO COURT? __Yes -No
* (If respondent answers "yes," ask)
(39) WHAT HAPPENED IN COURT?
(40) HAVE YOU, OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY, LOANED
MONEY TO SOMEONE IN DENVER IN THE LAST FIVE
YEARS, AND THEN NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET IT BACK?
___Yes --. No
(41) WHICH MEMBERS DID? Family member
Total Amt.
(42) HOW MUCH WAS LOANED? Family member
Total Amt.
(43) WHO WAS THE MONEY LOANED TO?
(Check one) __Friend --- Relative ___Other (specify)
(44) DID YOU GET ANYTHING IN WRITING ABOUT THE
MONEY? __Yes --- No
(45) DID YOU TRY TO SUE TO GET THE MONEY BACK?
__Yes ___No
* (If "yes")
(46) THEN WHAT HAPPENED?
(47) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY BOR-
ROWED MONEY FROM SOMEONE IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS
AND NOT BEEN ABLE TO PAY IT BACK? IN THIS QUES-
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TION WE JUST WANT TO KNOW ABOUT MONEY, NOT
CREDIT OR MORTGAGES - JUST MONEY. __Yes --- No
*(If "yes," ask: If "no," skip to question 54)
(48) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY BORROWED MONEY?
(49) HOW MUCH MONEY WAS BORROWED?
(50) WHO DID YOU (or he, she) BORROW THE MONEY FROM?
Family Member Amount $
Borrowed From
(51) DID YOU (or he, she) SIGN ANY PAPERS WHEN YOU BOR-
ROWED THE MONEY? __Yes _--No
(52) DID THE OTHER GUY TRY TO SUE YOU? _____Yes -No
*(If "yes," ask)
(53) THEN WHAT HAPPENED?
THERE ARE A LOT OF LEGAL PROBLEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN
HAVE IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR JOBS. I WOULD LIKE TO
ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR JOBS HERE IN DENVER IN THE LAST
FIVE YEARS.
(54) DID YOU GET HURT ON A JOB HERE IN DENVER IN THE
LAST FIVE YEARS? __Yes -- _No
*(If respondent says "no," skip to question 64)
(55) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY WAS HURT? (Specify)
(56) WHAT KIND OF INJURY OR SICKNESS DID YOU (or he, she)
GET ON THE JOB?
(57) DID YOU GO TO THE DOCTOR BECAUSE OF IT?
__Yes --- No
(58) DID YOU FILE A CLAIM WITH ANYBODY? ___Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask)
(59) WHO DID YOU FILE THE CLAIM WITH? (Specify)
(60) DID YOUR BOSS TAKE CARE OF THE DOCTOR'S EXPENSES?
__Yes __No
*(If "no," ask)
(61) WHO DID PAY THE DOCTOR'S EXPENSES? (Specify)
(62) DID YOU LOSE A JOB IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS BECAUSE
YOU WERE HURT, OR DID ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY?
__Yes ____No
*(If "yes")
(63) WHICH FAMILY MEMBER DID? (Specify)
(64) DID YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY HAVE A
BOSS WHO DIDN'T PAY THE WAGES YOU HAD COMING
IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS HERE IN DENVER?
__ Yes ----- No
*(If "no," skip to question 70)
(65) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY WAS THIS? (Specify)
(66) DID HE EXPLAIN WHY HE WASN'T PAYING THE WAGES?
_____Yes -.- No (Specify)
(67) WERE THE WAGES GARNISHED? __Yes __No
(68) DID YOU OR ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY LOSE A JOB BE-
CAUSE OF GARNISHED WAGES IN DENVER IN THE LAST
FIVE YEARS? __Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask)
(69) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY WAS THAT? (Specify)
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(70) DID ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY FILE BANKRUPTCY IN
THE LAST FIVE YEARS IN DENVER? __Yes __No
(71) WHO WAS THAT? (Specify)
(72) WHY DID YOU (or he, she) DECIDE TO FILE BANKRUPTCY
(Probes: garnishment, heavy debts)
(73) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY ASKED
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT MONEY IN DENVER DURING THE
LAST FIVE YEARS HERE IN DENVER? __Yes --- No
* (If "no," skip to question 77)
(74) WHO ASKED FOR THEM? (Specify)
(75) DID YOU (or he, she) GET THE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
YOU ASKED FOR? __ Yes __No
*(If "no," ask)
(76) WHY DIDN'T YOU GET THEM?
(77) NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS
ABOUT YOUR INCOME TAX. WHO MADE OUT YOUR
INCOME TAX LAST YEAR? (Check one)
Respondent _ A friend
Accountant, tax adviser (private) -Social Worker
___IRS accountant ____Other (Specify)
(78) (If respondent did not file an income tax return, check here. )
* (If someone other than respondent made out income tax, ask)
(79) DID THEY CHARGE YOU FOR IT? __Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask)
(80) HOW MUCH DID THEY CHARGE YOU FOR IT?
(Total charge) $
MANY PEOPLE IN DENVER HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT
WITH POLICE ABOUT DIFFERENT THINGS DURING THE LAST
FIVE YEARS. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE KINDS OF CONTACT THAT YOU MAY HAVE HAD
WITH THE DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE LAST FIVE
YEARS.
(81) HAVE YOU OR ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY CALLED THE
POLICE TO ASK THEM FOR HELP DURING THE LAST FIVE
YEARS? __Yes _____No
(82) WHICH FAMILY MEMBER WAS THAT? (Specify)
(83) WHAT DID YOU WANT THE POLICE TO DO?
(84) DID THE POLICE DO WHAT YOU WANTED THEM TO DO?
__Yes --- No
* (If respondent says "no," ask)
(85) DID THEY EXPLAIN WHY THEY WOULDN'T DO WHAT
WANTED? ____Yes -.--- No
(86) WHAT DID THEY SAY?
(87) HOW DID THE POLICE TREAT AND TALK TO YOU OR
YOUR FAMILY WHEN THEY CAME?
(88) HAVE THE POLICE GIVEN YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF
YOUR FAMILY A TICKET OR A SUMMONS IN THE LAST
FIVE YEARS IN DENVER? '(Check one)
___Ticket
__Summons
NO ticket OR summons
*(If respondent replies "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 95)
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(89) WHAT WAS THE TICKET FOR? Ticket
Fair Not Fair
(90) DO YOU THINK IT WAS FAIR OR NOT? Ticket
Fair Not Fair
* (If respondent says ticket was not fair, ask)
WHY DO YOU THINK THE TICKET WAS NOT FAIR?
(91) DID YOU TAKE THE TICKET (or summons) TO COURT AND
FIGHT IT? __Yes -- No
* (If respondent thought ticket wasn't fair, but didn't take it to court, ask)
(92) WHY DIDN'T YOU TRY TO FIGHT IT IF YOU THOUGHT
IT WAS NOT FAIR?
(Probes: cost too much; wouldn't do any good; didn't know I could)
(93) DID YOU GET A LAWYER ABOUT THE TICKET?
__ Yes _____No




(95) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD
BEEN PICKED UP BY THE POLICE IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS
IN DENVER? __Yes ---- No
* (If respondent says "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 100)
(96) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY WAS PICKED UP?
(Record below)
(97) DID THEY GO TO COURT? (Record below) ("yes" or "no")
(98) DID THEY HAVE A LAWYER? (Record below) ("yes" or "no")
(99) WAS IT FAIR TO HAVE BEEN PICKED UP, OR NOT FAIR?
(Record below) ("yes" or "no")
Family Member Had Went to Fair
Picked Up Lawyer Court
(100) HAVE ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD BEEN IN JAIL
IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS IN DENVER? __Yes __No
*(If "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 106)
(101) WHICH MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY WERE IN JAIL?
(Record below)
(102) DID THEY GO TO JAIL BEFORE OR AFTER THEY SAW A
JUDGE OR DID THEY SEE A JUDGE AT ALL?
(Record below, with "before" or "after")
Family Member Before, After Judge Did Not See Judge
(103) DID YOU (or he, she) HAVE A TRIAL OR NOT? (Record below)
(104) WAS THE TRIAL FAIR OR NOT? (Record below)
Family Member Trial (yes, no) Fair (yes, no)
* (If respondent says the trial was not fair, ask)
(105) WHY DO YOU FEEL THAT THE TRIAL WAS NOT FAIR?
NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
CARS AND DRIVING.
(106) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY BEEN IN
A CAR ACCIDENT DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS?
* (If "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 121)
(107) DID A POLICEMAN COME AND CHECK THE DAMAGE AT
THE TIME OF THE WRECK? __Yes -.- No
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(108) WHICH MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY WAS DRIVING? (Specify)
(109) WHO WAS AT FAULT?
Respondent
__Other driver
__Other family member (Specify)
__Person driving other guy's car
__Other (Specify)
(110) WHO GOT THE TICKET? (Specify)
(111) DID YOU HAVE INSURANCE AT THE TIME OF THE AC-
CIDENT? -Yes -- No -Don't Remember -Other (Specify)
(112) DID THE OTHER GUY HAVE INSURANCE AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT? __Yes -- No -I don't know
(113) DID YOU GET YOUR CAR FIXED AFTER THE ACCIDENT?
___Yes ---- No
(114) WHO PAID FOR GETTING YOUR CAR FIXED? (Check one)
-Respondent Other guy
Respondent's ins. co. .- Other guy's ins. co.
__Other (Specify)
(115) DID YOU GO TO A LAWYER ABOUT THE ACCIDENT?
__Yes ___No
(116) WHAT DID HE SAY ABOUT THE ACCIDENT?
(117) DID YOU SUE THE OTHER GUY TO GET YOUR MONEY?
___Yes ----- No
*(If respondent says "yes," ask)
(118) HOW DID THAT COME OUT?
(119) DID THE OTHER GUY SUE YOU? _-Yes __No
* (If respondent answers "yes," ask)
(120) HOW DID THAT COME OUT?
(121) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY BEEN
HURT IN A CAR ACCIDENT IN ANY WAY IN THE LAST
FIVE YEARS? __Yes -- No
* (If "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 132)
(122) WHICH MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY WERE HURT? (Specify)
(123) WHAT HAPPENED?
(124) WERE YOU DRIVING? __ Yes --- No
(125) DID YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY GO TO THE
DOCTOR OR TO THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE OF THE ACCI-
DENT? -Yes -No
(126) WHO WAS AT FAULT IN THE ACCIDENT?
Respondent __ Other guy
(127) WHO PAID THE MEDICAL EXPENSES YOU HAD? (Check one,




(128) HOW MUCH WERE THE MEDICAL EXPENSES IN ALL?
(Total Amount) $
(129) WERE THERE ANY LAW SUITS BECAUSE OF THE ACCI-
DENT? __Yes --. No
*(If "yes," ask)
(130) WHAT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF THE LAW SUITS?
(Probes: who were parties? Outcome, esp. for respondent)
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(131) DID YOU SUE THE OTHER GUY? __ Yes -- No
(132) HAVE YOU OR ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY HAD YOUR
(or their) DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENDED OR TAKEN AWAY
IN DENVER IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? __ Yes - No
* (If "no," skip to question 136)
(133) WHICH PERSON IN YOUR FAMILY WAS THAT? (Specify)
(134) WHY WAS IT TAKEN AWAY?
(135) DID YOU HAVE A LAWYER WITH YOU IN COURT WHEN
THE DECISION TO TAKE AWAY YOUR LICENSE WAS
MADE? __Yes --- No __ Did not go to court
ANOTHER PLACE WHERE PEOPLE RUN INTO LEGAL PROB-
LEMS IS IN THEIR FAMILIES, WITH THINGS LIKE DIVORCE. I
WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF YOU MIGHT HAVE HAD ANY LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THIS KIND DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS.
(136) ARE YOU?: (Check appropriate items)
-- Married __ Divorced --- Remarried
-Single Separated -Widowed
(137) DO YOU HAVE CHILDREN LIVING WITH YOU?
__Yes -No
(138) HOW MANY BOYS DO YOU HAVE? (Total)
Age- Working_ In school__ In school and working .
(139) HOW MANY GIRLS DO YOU HAVE? (Total)
Age Working In school__ In school and working
* (If respondent is a WIOMAN and is divorced, separated, or widowed, ask
the following question, if a MAN, skip to question 146)
(140) ARE YOU SUPPOSED TO GET SUPPORT MONEY FOR YOUR-
SELF OR CHILDREN? (Check proper items)
__ .Yes, self Yes, children __ No, not for self or children
(141) DO YOU GET YOUR PAYMENTS?
-Always -Sometimes __ Never
-Usually -Not very often
(142) IS THE AMOUNT OF YOUR PAYMENTS FAIR?
__Yes _____No __ Ambivalent
* (If respondent replies "no," ask)
(143) WHY DO YOU THINK THE AMOUNT IS NOT FAIR?
(144) CAN YOU DO SOMETHING ABOUT GETTING THE PAY-
MENTS MORE REGULARLY? -Yes -No I don't know
(145) HAVE YOU SEEN A LAWYER OR SOME OTHER AUTHOR-
ITIES ABOUT GETTING YOUR PAYMENTS MORE REG-
ULARLY? __ Yes ---- No
* (If someone other than a lawyer, specify who)
* (If respondent is a MAN and divorced or separated, ask the following)
(146)ARE YOU PAYING SUPPORT FOR A WIFE OR CHILDREN
FROM A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE? __Yes __No
(147) DID YOU GET A COURT ORDER TO DO THIS?
__Yes --. No
(148) DO YOU THINK THE AMOUNT IS FAIR? __Yes __No
* (If respondent answers "no," ask)
(149) DO YOU THINK YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET THEM
CHANGED IF YOU SAW A LAWYER AND WENT TO COURT?
__Yes _____No _I don't know __I doubt it
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(150) HAVE YOU TALKED TO A LAWYER OR SOMEONE ABOUT
GETTING THEM CHANGED?
__.Yes______No (If other person, specify)
(151) AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE (separation) PROCEEDINGS
DID YOU HAVE A LAWYER? -. Yes -. No
(152) WHO TAKES CARE OF THE CHILDREN?







(153) DID A COURT MAKE THIS DECISION, OR WAS IT SOME-
THING THAT YOU DECIDED? __Yes __-No
(154) DO YOU THINK THIS IS A FAIR ARRANGEMENT?
__Yes __No Comments
ANOTHER PLACE WHERE PEOPLE SOMETIMES HAVE LEGAL
PROBLEMS IS WITH THEIR HOUSING. I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT HOUSING AND THE PLACES YOU'VE
LIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS.
(155) DO YOU OWN THE PLACE WHERE YOU LIVE OR DO YOU
RENT? __Own -- Rent
(156) DID YOU BUY A HOME IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?
___Yes ____No
(157) WHEN YOU BOUGHT YOUR HOME, WHO DREW UP THE
PAPERS? -Lawyer -- Real Estate Man __ Other (Specify)
(158) HAVE YOU HAD ANY SERIOUS ARGUMENTS WITH YOUR
LANDLORD IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? __Yes -No
* (If "yes," ask, if "no," skip to question 172)
(159) WHAT WAS THE ARGUMENT ABOUT?
(160) HAVE YOU MOVED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS BECAUSE
OF AN ARGUMENT WITH THE LANDLORD?
_Yes -- No -Partly for that reason
*(If respondent did move because of an argument, ask the following
questions)
(161) DID YOU GET ALL OF YOUR STUFF OUT WHEN YOU
MOVED? __Yes ---- No
(162) WHAT DIDN'T YOU GET, AND WHY:
(163) DID YOU GET BACK ANY DEPOSITS THAT YOU HAD
MADE? -_Yes __Some money back __Got none back
_-_.Didn't make any.
(164) WHY DIDN'T THE LANDLORD GIVE IT BACK?
(165) DID YOU TRY TO GET THE DEPOSITS BACK?
__Yes -.- No
*(If "yes," ask)
(166) WHAT DID YOU DO?
(167) HOW MUCH DID YOU LOSE IN DEPOSIT MONEY?
(Total) $
(168) DID YOU TRY TO GET YOUR STUFF BACK? -Yes -No
(169) WHAT DID YOU DO TO TRY TO GET IT BACK?
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(170) DID ANYTHING ELSE HAPPEN AFTER THE ARGUMENT?
(If "yes," specify)
(171) HOW WAS THE ARGUMENT FINALLY ENDED?
NEXT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
DISCRIMINATION WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE RUN INTO.
(172) DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE BEEN DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST WHEN YOU TRIED TO BUY OR RENT A HOUSE
IN DENVER IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? -Yes -- No
* (If respondent answers "yes," ask)
(173) WHAT HAPPENED?
(174) DO YOU THINK YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY
HAVE BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST TRYING TO GET




(176) ARE THERE PLACES IN DENVER YOU STAY AWAY FROM
BECAUSE YOU THINK YOU WOULD BE DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST? ___Yes --- No
*(If "yes," ask)
(177) WOULD YOU NAME A FEW OF THEM FOR ME?
(178) HAVE YOU TRIED TO VOTE AND NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO
IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, OR HAS ANYONE IN YOUR
FAMILY NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO? __Yes __No
* (If respondent answers "yes," ask)
(179) WHY WERE YOU NOT ALLOWED TO VOTE?
(180) DID YOU VOTE IN THE LAST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT?
__Yes -- No
(181) HAVE YOU VOTED SINCE THEN? -Yes ___No
(182) HAVE YOU BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN ANY WAY
WHICH WE HAVE NOT COVERED? ___Yes -. No
Comments
(183) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY COM-
PLAINED ABOUT DISCRIMINATION TO ANYONE IN DEN-
VER IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? ___Yes -No
*(If "yes," ask)
(184) WHOM DID YOU COMPLAIN TO?
(185) WHAT HAPPENED THEN?
(186) HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY ASKED
FOR ANY KIND OF CITY, STATE, OR FEDERAL WELFARE
HELP WHILE YOU WERE LIVING IN DENVER DURING
THE LAST FIVE YEARS? __Yes ---- No
(187) (Specify answer given about not receiving welfare benefits)
(188) DID YOU GET THE HELP YOU ASKED FOR? ___Yes -No
*(If "no," ask)
(189) WERE YOU TOLD WHY YOU DIDN'T GET THE HELP YOU
ASKED FOR?
(190) WHICH FAMILY MEMBER ASKED FOR THESE BENEFITS?
(Specify)
(191) WHAT KIND OF HELP WERE YOU ASKING FOR? (Or he, she)
Person Type of Help
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(192) HOW WERE YOU TREATED BY THE PEOPLE WHERE YOU
APPLIED FOR THE MONEY? (Verbatim)
(193) DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE GOTTEN LESS WELFARE
MONEY THAN YOU HAD COMING? __ Yes -- No
*(If "yes," ask)
(194) DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR
FAMILY HAS BEEN TREATED BADLY IN A DENVER HOS-
PITAL IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS? __Yes -- No
(195) WOULD YOU TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED?
(Probes: social and medical aspects)
(196) HAS A CHILD OF YOURS BEEN EXPELLED FROM A DENVER
SCHOOL DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS? __ Yes __No
* (If respondent answers "yes,' ask, if "no," skip to question 202)
(197) WHAT WAS HE (or she) EXPELLED FOR?
(198) HOW LONG WAS HE (or she) EXPELLED FOR?
(Months) (Weeks) (Days)
(199) DID HE (or she) GO BACK TO SCHOOL? __ Yes __No
(200) WAS THE SCHOOL WHICH EXPELLED YOUR CHILD A
DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOL OR WAS IT A PAROCHIAL
SCHOOL? __Denver Public ___Parochial School
(201) HOW OLD WAS YOUR CHILD? Years_
I KNOW THIS HAS TAKEN QUITE A BIT OF TIME AND THERE
ARE JUST A FEW MORE QUESTIONS I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU.
I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW SOME THINGS ABOUT YOU AND YOUR
FAMILY AND WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT LEGAL PROBLEMS.
(202) (Check sex of respondent: -Male __ Female
(203) HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED IN DENVER?
__ Years -- Months
(204) ARE YOU WORKING AT THE PRESENT TIME?
__Yes ---- No
*(If respondent says "yes," ask)
(205) WHAT DO YOU DO?
* (If respondent says "no," ask)
(206) HOW LONG HAS IT BEEN SINCE YOU HAVE WORKED?
___Years __ Months __ Weeks -Days
(207) WHAT KIND OF JOB DID YOU USED TO HAVE?
(208) BESIDES YOURSELF AND YOUR CHILDREN, HOW MANY
PEOPLE LIVE IN YOUR HOUSE (apartment) WITH YOU?
Males__ Age- Females___ Age-
Total_ Total__
(209) HOW FAR DID YOU GO IN SCHOOL?
Grammar School High School College
1 - 5 1 - 1
2 - 6 2 - 2
3 - 7 3 _3
4 - 8 - 4 - 4
(210) DID YOU GO TO ANY TYPE OF TRADE SCHOOL OR PRO-
FESSIONAL SCHOOL? __Yes -- No




(212) HOW OLD ARE YOU? __ Years -- Months
* (If respondent is married)
(213) WHEN YOU WERE MARRIED DID A MINISTER MARRY YOU,
DID A JUDGE MARRY YOU, OR NEITHER?
(214) (Check one) -Judge -Minister ---- Neither (first time)
(215) - Judge - Minister ----- Neither (second time)
(216) * (Interviewer, check appropriate ethnic-color group)
-Negro __ White __ Oriental
(217) 1 SAID BEFORE THAT WE DON'T NEED TO KNOW YOUR
NAME, AND WE DON'T. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW
IF YOU HAVE A SPANISH-AMERICAN NAME? JUST SAY
YES OR NO. __Yes __No
(218) IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO US TO KNOW HOW
MUCH INCOME YOU HAVE EACH WEEK. WOULD YOU
PLEASE TELL US ABOUT HOW MUCH MONEY COMES INTO
YOUR HOUSEHOLD EACH WEEK, AND WHO BRINGS IT IN.
Respondent_____ Amount $ (per week)
Spouse - Amount $ (per week)
Child __ Amount $ (per week)
Total $ per week $
Welfare - Amount $ (per week)
Pensions __ Amount $ (per week)
(219) NEXT I AM GOING TO READ OFF SOME THINGS YOU MAY
OR MAY NOT OWN. IF YOU OWN THEM PLEASE SAY YES
WHEN I READ THEM OFF TO YOU. DO YOU OWN:
__ a car __a dishwasher
__ a refrigerator -a washing machine
__ a TV set _ a clothes drier
__ a radio _ a sewing machine
__ a vacuum cleaner -. a phonograph
(220) NOW I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MANY TIMES YOU






NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE BEST WAY OF GET-
TING INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL HELP OUT TO PEOPLE. I
WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THE TV YOU WATCH, THE
RADIO SATIONS YOU LISTEN TO, THE NEWSPAPERS YOU READ
AND SO ON.
(221) ABOUT HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY
WATCH TELEVISION PER DAY? (Interviewer, convert this to
amount watched per week) -Respondent -Spouse
__Children
(222) ABOUT HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU LISTEN TO THE
RADIO PER DAY? -Respondent -Spouse -Children
(223) ABOUT HOW MANY TIMES DO YOU READ A NEWSPAPER
EACH WEEK?
(224) WHICH NEWSPAPER DO YOU LIKE BEST? (Specify)




(226) WHAT CLUBS OR ORGANIZATIONS DO YOU BELONG TO?
_ .Church .PTA
_ Social Club _ Other (Specify)
... Labor Union -Other (Specify)
(227) ABOUT HOW OFTEN DO YOU GO TO CHURCH A MONTH?
(228) WHAT CHURCH IS THAT?
(229) WHERE IS IT LOCATED?
(230) I AM GOING TO READ YOU A SHORT LIST OF PLACES
WHERE PEOPLE MIGHT GO IF THEY NEEDED LEGAL
ADVICE. WOULD YOU TELL ME IF YOU WOULD GO THERE
WHEN I READ THE PERSON. SAY YES, NO, OR MAYBE
*(Interviewer, record answer: Y-Yes, N-No, M-Maybe)
___A minister A doctor
_____A friend _A lawyer
______A politician A relative
__A social worker
(231) WHICH OF THOSE PEOPLE WOULD YOU GO TO FIRST?
(232) DO YOU KNOW IF DENVER HAS A LEGAL AID SOCIETY
OR NOT? -Yes -No -Maybe, I'm not sure -1 don't know
* (If respondent answers "yes," on last question, ask)
(233) CAN YOU TELL ME WHERE THAT IS?
(If not eractly, approximately)
-Respondent located exactly -Respondent located approximately
-Respondent did not locate it
(234) DO YOU KNOW IF DENVER HAS ANY OTHER WAYS OF
GIVING FREE LEGAL HELP TO PEOPLE? __Yes __No
* (If respondent says "yes," ask)
(235) WHAT ARE THEY?
(236) WHERE ARE THEY?
(237) HAVE YOU USED ANY OF THOSE PLACES? - Yes __No
(238) WHICH ONES DID YOU USE?
(239) WHEN DID YOU USE THEM?
(240) I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT
FINANCES. DO YOU OWE MONEY TO ANYBODY NOW
FOR THINGS YOU HAVE BOUGHT OR FOR ANY OTHER
REASON, LIKE MEDICAL EXPENSES OR SOMETHING LIKE
THAT? -Yes -No
Item Amount Owed $
Money owed to Total Owed $
THIS IS THE LAST GROUP OF QUESTIONS I WOULD LIKE TO
ASK AND THEY WILL TAKE JUST A FEW MINUTES. WE ARE
INTERESTED IN KNOWING HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT CERTAIN
THINGS PEOPLE THINK ABOUT AND SAY IN A CITY LIKE DEN-
VER. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS: THESE ARE
STATEMENTS THAT OTHER PEOPLE HAVE MADE AT ONE TIME
OR ANOTHER, AND WE WOULD JUST LIKE TO KNOW WHAT
YOU THINK, ABOUT THAT KIND OF STATEMENT.
(241) "WHEN I MAKE PLANS HERE IN -- Definitely -- Definitely
DENVER, I AM FAIRLY SURE I Agree Disagree
CAN MAKE THEM WORK." -- Don't know -Don't care
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(242) "THE AVERAGE PERSON CAN IN- -Definitely
FLUENCE THE WAY THE GOV- Agree
ERNMENT OF DENVER IS RUN." -Don't know
(243) "SOMETIMES I FEEL VERY MUCH -- Definitely
ALONE IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD, Agree
HERE IN DENVER." -Don't know
(244) "THE WAY THINGS ARE IN A -Definitely
CITY LIKE DENVER TODAY, Agree
PEOPLE CAN'T COUNT ON -Don't know
REALLY GETTING TO KNOW
EACH OTHER VERY WELL."
(245) "BECOMING A SUCCESS HERE IN -Definitely
DENVER IS PRETTY MUCH A Agree
MATTER OF HARD WORK: LUCK -Don't know
HAS LITTLE OR NOTHING TO
DO WITH IT."
(246) "GETTING A GOOD JOB HERE IN Definitely
DENVER DEPENDS ON BEING IN Agree
THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE __Don't know
RIGHT TIME."
(247) "PEOPLE LIKE ME CAN'T DO Definitely
MUCH TO PROTECT OURSELVES Agree
AGAINST SOME OF THE BIG OR- -Don't know
GANIZATIONS IN DENVER."
(248) "WHETHER YOU LIKE IT OR -Definitely
NOT, WHAT GOES ON IN DEN- Agree
VER OR ANY PLACE ELSE IS -Don't know






















JUST ANSWER THESE FOUR QUESTIONS BY SAYING "YES,"
"NO," OR "UNDECIDED."
(249) IF A MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY HAD COMMITTED A
SERIOUS CRIME, WOULD YOU HELP HIM KEEP FROM
GETTING CAUGHT?
__Yes __No __Undecided
(250) DO YOU KNOW OF A JUDGE WHO IN YOUR OPINION
SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE?
__Yes ___No -Undecided
(251) IF YOU RECEIVED A LETTER TELLING YOU THAT YOUR
REFRIGERATOR WAS ABOUT TO BE REPOSSESSED, WOULD
YOU CALL A LAWYER?
_____Yes -..- No -. Undecided
(252) IF YOU KNEW SOMEONE WAS GAMBLING NEXT DOOR
AND YOU SAW A POLICEMAN COMING, WOULD YOU
WARN YOUR NEIGHBOR?
_____Yes ___No -. Undecided
THIS IS THE END OF THE INTERVIEW. THANK YOU VERY
MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS
WILL BE OF A GREAT DEAL OF HELP IN KNOWING WAYS TO
GET THE RIGHT KIND OF LEGAL INFORMATION TO PEOPLE IN
DENVER WHO NEED IT. THANK YOU AGAIN VERY MUCH, YOU
HAVE BEEN A VERY BIG HELP.
1969












THE HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION ACT OF 1965:
A CASE STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE FRUSTRATION
By RICHARD D. LAMM* AND STEPHEN K. YASINOW**
A growing national concern with billboards and other forms of
visual pollution resulted in the Federal Highway Beautification Act
of 1965. This article suggests that the legislation has had little
positive effect and may actually work against highway beautifica-
tion, with two factors combining to tie the hands of those state
legislatures that seek to eliminate or reduce the number of billboards
on their highways. First, Congress has not appropriated any funds
during the last two fiscal years to enable the Federal Government
to pay its 75 percent commitment; and second, the "just compen-
sation" provisions of the act directly conflict with the laws of many
states, which provide for taking under the police power. Two
possible solutions to the problems are suggested: (1) Resort to
the courts for clarification of ambiguities in the act, and (2)
Amendment of the act by Congress to permit the states to elect
their own techniques by which to enforce federal standards.
T HE Congress of the United States in the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act of 1965 declared loftily: "[Tjhat the erection and
maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices in
areas adjacent to the Interstate System and the primary system should
be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such high-
ways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel,
and to preserve natural beauty."1
The subsequent history of the Highway Beautification Act indi-
cates these goals have not been realized and that the act which pro-
posed to control billboards serves as the single greatest impediment
in many states to passing effective billboard control legislation.2
*Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Student Practice Program, University of
Denver College of Law; Member of Colorado State Legislature, 1966 to Present;
B.B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1957; L.L.B. University of California at Berkeley,
1961.
** Second Year Student and Participant, Legislative Internship Program, University of
Denver College of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1963; M.A., Georgetown
University, 1967.
'Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(a) (1965). Both Houses of Congress
expressed an awareness of a national billboard problem. In the Senate, roadside
advertising was referred to as "a creeping cancer" which creates "blighted corridors"
and makes the nation's highways "a huge and garish want ad." 111 CONG. REC. 23891
(1965) (remarks by Senator Dodd). The House also expressed a strong interest in
eradicating "the garish clutter symbolic of a crass commercialism," 111 CONG. REC.
26140 (1965) (remarks by Representative Wright) in order to create scenic corri-
dors, 111 CONG. REC. 26276 (1965) (remarks by Representative Howard).
2 The Colorado Legislative Council made an inquiry of the fifty states. Replies were
were received from 37. Some sample replies: "The terrific administrative expense in
administering a program meeting the Federal requirements is a doubtful investment
on the public's part for the benefits derived therefrom." (Alabama) ; "The hindrance
encountered to date is a lack of participating Federal funds to implement the Federal
Act and State Legislation." (Maryland); "[It] has hindered our ability to enforce
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The fate of the act serves as an excellent illustration of how the
legislative process can be subverted, in that a single section in legisla-
tion inserted by a clever lobby or overlooked in the political process
can render the legislation inoperative and in effect make it counter-
productive.
The Highway Beautification Act of 1965 provides that any
state that the Secretary of Transportation determines has not pro-
vided for "effective control" of the erection and maintenance of
outdoor advertising along the interstate and primary highway system
would lose 10 percent of its Federal-Aid Highway allotment.3 The
Secretary is charged with the duty of setting certain national stand-
ards concerning the lighting, size, number, and spacing of signs'
and with setting standards of "customery use" which will allow
outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary
system which are "industrial or commercial" either as zoned or when
meeting certain standards agreed upon between the Secretary and the
individual state.
5
The act provides that "just compensation" shall be paid for the
removal of all outdoor advertising and provides that the states
must pay 25 percent of the just compensation, which includes com-
pensation to the owner of the billboard for the taking of his "right,
title, leasehold, and interest" in it. In addition, the property owner
on whose land the sign is located must be "justly compensated" for
the taking of his "right to erect and maintain" the billboard thereon.'
The act further stipulates that any billboard which is lawfully
in existence on September 1, 1965, and which is illegal under the act
(Illegal billboards are defined as signs other than official signs,
those which advertise the sale or lease of property, or which advertise
activities conducted on the premises.7) does not have to be removed
until July 1, 1970. All other lawfully erected nonconforming signs
are not required to be removed until 5 years after they become non-
conforming under the act." The compliance date for states to conform
to the Federal Act was set at January 1, 1968.' A 1968 amendment
our 1961 Act, due to the compensation factor and resulting delays occasioned by
several court injunctions filed in various Federal courts." (Washington). Legislative
Council Survey, Colorado General Assembly, Denver, Colorado, 1969, on file with
that agency [hereinafter cited as Survey).
3 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1965).
'Id. § 131(c).
5 id. § 131(d). A 1968 amendment to this section provides: "Whenever a bonafide
State, county or local authority has made a determination of customary [commercial
or industrial] use, such determination will be accepted . Federal-Aid Highway
Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1968).
6 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).





declared that no outdoor advertising shall be required to be removed
under the act until the federal share of the compensation to be paid
is available. 10
Two factors, both apparently unforeseen by even the sponsors of
the Highway Beautification Act, serve to severely tie the hands of
any state legislature which seeks to eliminate or reduce the number
of billboards on its highways. The first is the fact that no funds
were appropriated for 1968 or 1969 fiscal years by Congress to
enable the Federal Government to pay its 75 percent commitment.1 '
The second factor is an opinion issued by the United States
Attorney General which discusses the "just compensation" provision
and declares "that Section 131 is to be read as requiring each state
to afford their 25 percent share just compensation as a condition of
avoiding the 10 percent reduction of subsection (b)."12
The effect of the inability or refusal on the part of Congress
to fund its 75 percent share combined with the Attorney General's
opinion that requires states to pay to take down billboards or risk
losing 10 percent of their Federal-Aid Highway funds, has produced
state legislative inaction and has had a negative effect on a state's
ability to independently seek to control outdoor advertising.
13
The effects of this impasse are becoming increasingly clear. The
outdoor advertising situation reported throughout the United States
ranges from "worse than ever" to reports of little change.14 Only
21 of the 50 states have enacted legislation or taken steps to comply
with the federal program and most of these already had effective
billboard legislation prior to the act. 5 More serious, states that had
legitimated billboard regulation through their police powers were
confronted with the possibility of losing their Federal-Aid Highway
funds unless they made provision for "just compensation" by amend-
10 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(n) (1968).
"The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 1. Since questions still exist concerning
which areas are commercial and industrial, no valid determination on the costs of
"just compensation" nationwide is yet available. However, estimates of the cost of
compensating sign proprietors are $558 million. Id. at col. 3. In 1968, while consid-
ering the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Senator John Sherman Cooper recognized
the fact that "a difficult fiscal situation" had imposed upon Congress "a responsi-
bility to reduce, wherever possible, authorizations as well as appropriations."
3 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 3526 (1968). In
light of Senator Cooper's remarks, the authorization of $418.5 million for highway
beautification by the Federal Government appears highly unlikely.
12 Letter from Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, to John T. Connor, Secretary of Com-
merce, Nov. 16, 1966, on file with Highway department, State of Colorado, Denver,
Colorado (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Letter].
13 Survey, supra note 2.
14 The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
15 Of the 21 presently complying states, 15 had previously enacted strong billboard
control legislation. These states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 4.
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ing their laws.16 That the remaining states are not in compliance,
may reflect frustration or a lack of understanding on the part of
many state legislatures as to how to proceed on controlling outdoor
advertising.
The jurisdictions which have passed legislation in compliance
with the Highway Beautification Act show a great variance on
exactly what is "just compensation. ' 17 Many state laws provide that
"just compensation" means the full value of both the right, title,
and interest in the sign and in addition compensation to the owner
of the property for his right to erect and maintain signs thereon.18
Others provide for a combination of amortization and compensa-
tion.19 The dissatisfaction with the "just compensation" provision
is clear, judging from a number of state laws which provide that
compensation shall be paid "only when made mandatory by federal
law," and absent such a mandate, removal of billboards must be
effected by amortization without compensation. 0 The stilted lan-
guage of Vermont's law evidences that legislature's frustration at the
just compensation provision. The law provides:
Compensation shall be paid upon the taking or removal of
outdoor advertising under this chapter only if, and to the extent
federal law, when in effect, requires payment of compensation for
the taking or removal of outdoor advertising on state highways as
a condition for payment to the state of federal highway funds, and
the federal funds are available.
21
There are many reasons why a state may object to the "just
compensation" provision. There would appear to be no federal and,
in most states, no state constitutional requirement to pay "just com-
pensation" either to the owner of the sign or to the owner of the
16 Records of the Colorado Highway Department reveal that 23 states would have to
amend their laws. Records on file with the Highway Department, State of Colorado,
Denver, Colorado [hereinafter cited as Records].
17 Jurisdictions which have instituted regulations conforming with federal standards
are: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii. Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. The N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 4.
18See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-2501 (Supp. 1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 226.500
(Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE § 17-22-5 (1967). See also Survey, supra note 2.
19See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 177.840(3) (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 249-A
§ 11 (vi) (1969). The New Hampshire act provides:
In calculating just compensation to be paid to the owner of an advertis-
ing device required to be removed by reason of nonconformity with Section
5 of this chapter . . . it is intended that the five-year period of nonconform-
ing use shall be considered as whole or partial compensation to said owner
for his loss. It is further intended that in calculating just compensation to
the owner of land for which rental compensation has been paid for the five
preceeding years, such rental income during the period of nonconforming
use be taken into consideration as whole or partial compensation.
Id. Ch. 249-A § 11. See also Survey, supra note 2.
20 See. e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, ch. 38 § 2719(7) (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, ch. 14 § 336 (Supp. 1969). See also Survey, supra note 2.
21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 14 § 336 (Supp. 1969).
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land on which the sign is located." Under the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1958, which granted a bonus to states which passed outdoor
advertising control, 25 states had passed legislation and signed agree-
ments with the Secretary of Commerce, and of these, 23 chose to
use police power rather than eminent domain.23 Congress, therefore,
went against a large and growing body of law when it required
payment of "just compensation. 24
The reasons for the legislative decisions of these 23 states seems
clear and are reflected in the various State Supreme Court opinions
which upheld "police power" legislation. In New York Thruway
Authority v. Ashley Motor Court the New York court said:
[I]t is to be borne in mind that it was the very construction of the
Thruway which created the element of value in the land abutting
the road. Billboards and other advertising signs are obviously of no
use unless there is highway to bring the traveller within view of
them. What was taken by the regulation, therefore, was the value
which the Thruway itself had added to the land and of this the
defendant cannot be heard to complain.
25
In Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, the Ohio Supreme Court
said:
In the instant case, the statutes only deprive an owner of a claimed
right to use his land to communicate with those using the highway
... . [A]ny such right to so communicate can be taken from the
landowner without compensation by the state for the purpose of
improving the highway as a means of passage for the public. 26
The Supreme Court of Vermont, upholding general billboard
regulation, in Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, quoted with approval from
an earlier case, saying:
It is obvious that something more is claimed than the mere right to
erect and maintain bill-board structures upon lands adjacent to the
highway. In its essence the right that is claimed is to use the public
highway for the purpose of displaying advertising matter. This
fact has been well stated by the Philippine Supreme Court which
said that "the success of bill-board advertising depends not so much
upon the use of private property as it does upon the use of the
channels of travel by the general public. Suppose that the owner of
private property -- should require the advertiser to paste his posters
upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of the
property instead of the exterior. Bill-board advertising would die
a natural death if this were done, and its real dependency not
2Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago.
242 U.S. 526 (1917) ; St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235
Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913) ; New York
Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566,
218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425,
200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
23 Records, supra note 16.
2Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (g) (1965).
25 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 569, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (1961).
26 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1964).
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upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unre-
stricted use of the public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly
located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard
is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that
the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a
regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of
the streets and other public thoroughfares."
2
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, had this to say about the
right of private property:
The right asserted is not to own and use land or property to live,
to work, or to trade. While it may comprehend some of these funda-
mental liberties, its main feature is the superadded claim to use
private land as a vantage ground from which to obtrude upon all the
public traveling upon highways, whether indifferent, reluctant,
hostile or interested, an unescapable propaganda concerning private
business with the ultimate design of promoting patronage of those
advertising. Without this superadded claim, the other rights would
have no utility in this connection.
2 8
Congress in requiring ".just compensation," then, apparently
made its own legislative determination, and rejected the police
power approach taken by the vast majority of state outdoor adver-
tising legislation.2 9 In doing so it not only undercut the well estab-
lished practice of regulating outdoor advertising through the police
power, but also raised two questions: first, what is "just compen-
sation"; and second, can the Federal Government constitutionally
dictate not only the substantive end results, but also the procedural
means by which roadside beautification is to be achieved?
A study of the legislative history of the act shows that the
declared effect of the just compensation provision might be far dif-
ferent than that which Congress intended. The Administration bill
on highway beautification which was introduced into Congress in
May of 1965, authorized the use of state police power, not eminent
domain, for effecting the control of outdoor advertising. 0 But the
Committee on Public Works in the Senate amended the bill to require
"just compensation."3 1 It was explained that it was because the act
was to apply to the primary road system as well as to the interstate,
2 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527, 529 (1943), quoting from Churchill e al. v. Rafferty,
32 P.I. 580, 609, appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918).
2 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799, 808, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935), appeal
dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
2 Representative Thomas Pelly remarked during the 1965 beautification bill debates,
that 36 states were already able to regulate outdoor advertising by use of their police
powers. 111 CONG. REc. 26306 (1965) (remarks by Representative Pelly). This
statement is consistent with the fact that 23 police power states had signed agree-
ments with the Secretary of Commerce under the 1958 Highway Act. Records, supra
note 16.




and to the billboard industry and small businesses which had adver-
tised and developed with the primary roads for more than 40 years,
that compensation should be paid,82 even though it was acknowledged
that the zoning powers of the state had previously been used to
regulate that industry. However, it is clear that many Congressmen
thought the proposed legislation would allow the state to use the
police power if its own constitution permitted. Congressman Ed-
mondson stated in response to a question: "There is no question
but what title I and title II specifically authorized stricter standards
by a state if a state wishes to have them, both as billboard control
and on the junkyard problem."3 Many people interpreted the
Federal Act to merely make compensation available if states either
desired to pay compensation, or were forced by their own consti-
tutions to do so." They assumed that the use of the state police
power to impose billboard control restrictions, which were the same
or greater than those imposed by the federal statute, would continue
to be available and would not impose an obligation to "justly
compensate" upon either Federal or state Government."5 For these
people the opinion of the Attorney General declaring that a state
risked losing its Federal-Aid Highway funds if it did not provide
"just compensation" came as no small shock. 6
When the beautification bill reached the floor of the Senate,
initial opposition focused upon the 25 percent "just compensation"
contribution of the states.3 7 It was urged that the highway beauti-
fication program, being a national one, should be fully financed
by the Federal Government.," Those in favor of total compensation
by the Federal Government argued that the states were not in the
position to accept such a heavy administrative and financial burden
as the bill proposed to put upon them. 9 (There are 41,000 miles
of interstate roads and 225,000 miles in the primary system,4" and
a federal report estimates the number of illegal signs outside com-
mercial areas at 839,000.) 41 The fear was expressed by others that
payment made solely by the Federal Government would relieve the
32 Id. at 23798.
33 Id. (remarks by Representative Edmunson).
34 See generally Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Roads of the
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, Beautification and Highway Safety Programs,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-101 (1967).
SS Id.
36 Letters, supra note 12.
27 111 CONG. REC. 23796 (1965) (remarks by Senator Cooper).
38Id.
30ld. at 23871 (remarks by Senator Robertson).
40 d. at 23874 (remarks by Senators Holland and Randolph).
41 The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 3.
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states of all responsibility and would "lead toward inflated com-
pensation payments.
' 42
The proponents of state contribution were eventually successful
in retaining the 25 percent compensation burden provision. In
explaining the interrelated functioning of sections 131(e,f) of the
act, some members of the Senate strove to alleviate potential con-
fusion on the part of the states legislatures when confronted by
what appeared to be an intolerable financial drain upon state
resources:
Whatever interest remains at the particular time the States
act to compensate them, they would be paid, but as the amortization




[A]II that can be compensated for is whatever remains of the lease-
holds or the unamortized values, so that if, in fact, the billboard
has been completely amortized or the leasehold has expired, no
compensation will be paid under the bill.4 5
These comments go a long way in explaining the 5-year period
of nonconformance stipulated in section 131 (e) and what role that
period was intended to play in "just compensation." It was appar-
ently thought that partial or even full amortization of both sign
owner and property owner interests could be accomplished during
that time, thus making "compensation" as described in the act
partially or totally unnecessary.46 Viewed in a slightly different
perspective, a period of amortization could be seen as compensa-
tion; for that in essence is what the stipulated period of noncon-
formance accomplishes.
When one considers that amortization is a technique tradi-
tionally employed in phasing out a nonconforming use within the
police power function of zoning,47 and that compensation as referred
to is classically spoken of in light of eminent domain, 4S the coupling
of a nonconforming time period with "just compensation" appears
incongruous and confusing- but only when examined out of leg-
42 111 CONG. REC. 23874 (1965) (remarks by Senator Randolph).
4 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).
44 111 CONG. REC. 23872 (1965) (remarks by Senator Cooper).
45Id. (remarks by Senator Muskie). After looking through subcommittee testimony,
Senator Neuberger had noted "that the signboard industry [felt] that it [could]
amortize its investments in signboards in 5 years." Id. (remarks by Senator
Neuberger).
4Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).
47 See generally Katarincic, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures by Amortization -Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1963).




islative context. Taking into account the existence of an extremely
vocal billboard industry lobbying for compensation,4" and the fact
that in 1965, 36 states were able to regulate billboards by termi-
nating without compensation, after allowing for amortization of
costs,5° it becomes clear that just compensation after a reasonable
period of amortization was the logical Congressional solution to
a perplexing legislative problem.
The correct and apparently Congressionally intended inter-
pretation of section 131(g) is extremely important to the success
of the Highway Beautification Act. If "just compensation" means
"compensation" mitigated by "amortization" it could clearly result
in a somewhat more manageable federal and state expenditure,
while an interpretation requiring full compensation could not only
preclude Congress from ever funding the project, but could also
serve as an insurmountable impediment to other federal, state and
local beautification-through-zoning projects.
The Administration bill which was considered by the Senate
Committee on Public Works in May 1965, required that the Secre-
tary of Commerce deny all highway funds to a state that did not
comply with its provisions.51 Strong opposition in the committee
itself, to the imposition of this severe 100 percent penalty, succeeded
in reducing it to a 10 percent forfeiture. 2
The issue of whether the selection of a method of billboard
control, previously left to the discretion of the states, can be taken
from them by the 1965 act is worth examination. In his letter to the
Secretary of Transportation, then Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
responding to criticism that the act left the states no alternative to
compliance, declared that an option did exist,- the states could
ignore the act and incur the 10 percent penalty of its provisions.5 3
Attorney General Clark cited Massachusetts v. Mellon,5 4 wherein
a suit was brought which attacked the constitutionality of legislation
that provided matching funds to states for federally approved pro-
grams designed to improve maternal and child health care. By way
of dicta, the Court said:
Probably, it would be sufficient to point out that the powers
of the state are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation,
49 See generally Hearings on S. 2084 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Roads of the
Senate Comm. on Pub. Worhs, Highway Beautification and Scenic Road Program,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-28, 278-353, 390-408 (1965).
50 111 CONG. REC. 26306 (1965) (remarks by Representative Pelly). This responsi-
bility is currently the jurisdiction of the since established post of Secretary of
Transportation.
51 Id. at 23796 (remarks by Senator Cooper).
52 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1965).
5' Letter, supra note 12.
54262 U.S. 447 (1923), overruled, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1965).
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but simply extends an option which the state is free to accept or
reject.55
Nor does the statute require the states to do or to yield any-
thing. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting
them to yield, that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the
simple expedient of not yielding.56
The Attorney General believed that Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission57 was the case most nearly in point to the
present situation. In Oklahoma, the state objected to the discharge
by the Federal Government of a state employee, a member of its
highway commission, for a violation of the Hatch Act, 5  a federal
law. The state had received a grant of federal highway aid, and
that grant was conditional on compliance with the Hatch Act. The
Court upheld the position of the Civil Service Commission, declar-
ing: "While the United States is not concerned with, and has no
power to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials,
it does have the power to fix the terms upon which its money allot-
ments to states should be disbursed."59
The distinguishing element between the two cases cited by
former Attorney General Clark and a case which could arise under
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 is obvious. In Massachusetts,
matching funds for maternal and child health care were to be denied
where federally-approved programs designed for that purpose were
not utilized. 0 In Oklahoma, a state highway official could be dis-
missed by the Federal Government for violation of federal law,
where the Federal Government participated in highway development
in that state. 1 But under the 1965 Act, a state which refuses to
participate in a national program of beautification not only forfeits
Federal Government participation in the state's beautification effort,
i.e. a 75 percent share of compensation payments, but must also
sustain a 10 percent loss of federal funds for a defense-commerce
project, the construction of highways. Analagous to the situation at
hand would be a forfeiture of federal funds used in the construction
of a state's medical facilities as a result of the state's unwillingness
to comply with a federal program of recreation-area development.
The two contentions appear equally preposterous.
55 262 U.S. 447, 480. (1923).
56 Id. at 482.
57 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
5
8 Hatch Political Activities Act, 5 U.S.C. § 118 (1, k-n) (1964), 18 U.S.C. §§ 594-95,
600-01, 604-05, 608 (1964).
59 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
°Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), overruled, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968).
61 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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This inconsistency in the rationale of the penalty provision of
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was noted in the Senate:
[A]nd no state should be deprived of this assistance so necessary
to provide a complete nationwide system for commerce and defense
needs, by reason of not being able to qualify as a member in good
standing of an extraneous program.
62
Still another Senator commented:
I do not know of any Federal-aid program, in existence or
proposed, with the exception of this bill, which requires States to
take legislative action and make appropriations under penalty of
losing Federal-aid available under another program.
68
The issue thus arises as to what provision "violations" will bring
the 10 percent penalty into effect. The Attorney General's opinion"
declared that the "just compensation" provision was a condition of
avoiding the 10 percent reduction of section 131(b).
The major case to date interpreting the "just compensation"
section, "' Markham Advertising Co. v. State, held that its language
was not mandatory and that Congress did not pre-empt the field but
left the states free to act." The court declared that Washington's
billboard control statute which used police power was therefore valid.
It stated:
Our examination of § 131, supra, leads us to conclude that its
essential operation is to condition payment of 10 percent of a State's
share of federal-aid highway funds upon the state's exercise of its
powers to regulate outdoor advertising in a manner consistent with
federal standards. We think that the purpose of the federal statute
is obviously to induce the States to act, not to require them to do so.
The statute allows the state to choose between foregoing 10 percent
of its allotment of federal-aid highway funds and compliance. If
Congress had intended . . . [it] to be mandatory on the states,
there would have been no need to attach a monetary penalty to
noncompliance.67
The Markham case seems well reasoned and reflects the rule of
long standing that conflicts between Federal and state Governments
must be so "direct and positive" that the federal and state acts cannot
"be reconciled or consistently stand together." State legislatures,
however, in other states still have to resolve the "compensation"
62 111 CONG. REc. 26252 (1965) (remarks by Senator Berry).
63 1d. at 23798 (remarks by Senator Cooper). Further substantiation of the fact that
two different programs were therein involved may be found in the fact that § 131 (g)
of the act, suggesting "just compensation," was funded for fiscal years 1966 and
1967 not from the highway trust fund but from the general fund. Id, at 23869
(remarks by Senator Randolph).
64 Letter, supra note 12.
65 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (g) (1965).
66 439 P.2d 248 (Wash. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). See also
Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward, 414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967).
eld. at 257.
68Id., quoting from Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1937).
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problem, knowing that their states may have the penalty imposed
against them and that the courts may uphold the penalty in following
the reasoning of the Attorney General's opinion. 9 For these legis-
latures the question is not so much the odds but the stakes. The
traditional use of police power in this area will possibly deprive them
of a significant portion of much needed highway funds.
Thus, although the 1965 Highway Beautification Act, when
correctly interpreted to mean compensation after a period of amorti-
zation, permits compliance legislation which places a more reasonable
financial burden upon the state, the act has attempted to give
authority to the Federal Government to resolve problems previously
within state jurisdiction which were well on the way to solution by
state authorities. The zoning approach taken by the majority of
concerned states which drafted billboard control legislation prior
to the enactment of the 1965 act, contained no element of "just
compensation.'" An amortization period was considered to be com-
pensation enough.71 State and federal court decisions consistently
upholding the constitutionality of zoning to control the spread of
billboard blight along the highways," furnish yet another reason
why the states have not assumed a position of ready compliance
to the 1965 act's "just compensation" provisions.
Congressional action, suggesting the use of eminent domain in
the billboard control area, seems ironic upon consideration of the
rapid emergence and acceptance of zoning as the police power tool
by which aesthetics as an element of general welfare, or in its own
right, can be protected by the states.73
A common device by which zoning regulations actually based
upon aesthetics have been brought under the more traditional general
welfare umbrella, has been to declare that the promotion of aesthetics
69 Letter, supra note 12.
70 Records, supra note 16.
71 Id.
72 Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; St. Louis Poster Advertising
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913);
New York Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176
N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176
Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
Is Eskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rer'd, 159 So. 2d 209
(Fla. 1963); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Saratoga, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade
County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957) ; Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941) ; State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967) ; City
of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) ; City of New
Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941) ; Town of Lexington v. Govenar,
295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225
N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 '(1963); Ohio v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128,
243 N.E.2d 66 (1968) ; Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 351, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
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will improve the economy and will thus benefit the general welfare. 74
In the Florida tourism cases, 75 zoning restrictions on billboards were
upheld where the economic health of the city's major industry
(tourism) was at stake, and therefore, the general welfare of the
community's inhabitants was endangered. Somewhat similarly, in
City of New Orleans v. Pergament70 and City of New Orleans v.
Levy,77 the preservation of areas of historic interest was deemed
to be sufficiently important to the city's economy, hence zoning
towards that end was upheld as legislating for the general welfare.
In 1963, in People v. Stover, 8 the New York Court of Appeals
wrote a landmark decision in the history of zoning. That case
involved an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of clotheslines
in front or side yards abutted by a street. In the court's words:
[I]t is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an
attempt to preserve the residential appearance of the city ....
Once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative
concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legis-
lation designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible
exercise of the police power.79
Making that concession, recognizing that the statute in question
was based on aesthetic considerations, the court concluded that the
ordinance was properly grounded on a proper exercise of the police
power.8 0
As momentous as the Stover decision was to the field of zoning
for aesthetics generally, equally momentous was the impact of
Cromwell v. Ferrier,1 another New York case decided in 1967 on
the specific issue of billboard zoning for beautification. The ordi-
nance in Cromwell set forth a comprehensive plan for regulating
accessory signs, those related to a business located on the same lot,
and implicitly prohibiting all others.82 In discussing the validity of
74Eskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 159 So. 2d
209 (Fla. 1963) ; Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960);
Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.
2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480,
3 So. 2d 364 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d
798 (1953) ; City of New Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
75 The Florida Cases include: Eskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla.
1962), rev'd, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963) ; Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.
2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957) ; Merritt
v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland
Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 *(1941).
76 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
77223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
78 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963).
79 Id., 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
8 0 ld., 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39.
81 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
82 Id., 225 N.E.2d at 751, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
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that ordinance, the court recognized that the primary objective of any
anti-billboard ordinance is an aesthetic one, and rejected the notion
that aesthetic objectives alone would not support a valid ordinance.8"
The court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance in question
and approved the enactment of legislation prescribing outdoor adver-
tising, based primarily on aesthetic considerations. Billboard zoning
for aesthetics was thus confirmed as a proper function of the police
power.
Since the two New York decisions, other states have taken
similar strides in the same direction. In State v. Diamond Motors
Inc.,84 the court declared:
We accept beauty as a proper community objective, attainable
through the use of police power. We are mindful of the reasoning
of most courts that have upheld the validity of ordinances regu-
lating outdoor advertising and of the need felt by them to find
some basis in economics, health, safety, or even morality .... We
do not feel so constrained.85
In Ohio v. Buckley,"6 statutes which required junkyards outside
of a municipality to be obscured from the view of persons traveling
on the city's roads, were held a valid exercise of the police power
although they were based upon aesthetic considerations.8 7 Earlier,
the majority in Oregon City v. Hartke,88 joined Stover in its holding
that "aesthetic considerations alone [could] warrant an exercise of
the police power." 9 With such precedents established, it is not
surprising that today neither Ohio nor Oregon has fully implemented
the 1965 Federal Beautification Act, and that both are regulating
billboards by police power."
As shown by the recent decisions in Hawaii,
9 ' New York,92
Ohio,98 and Oregon, 4 the Stover decision in 1963 rather than
starting a trend in police power exercise - marked its culmination.
State legislatures, municipal zoning groups, and the judiciary, had
been promoting aesthetics through zoning for many years, cloaking
83 Id., 225 N.E.2d at 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
8 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
85 Id. at 827. The state supreme court was butressed in its decision by the HAWAIIAN
CONST. art. 7, § 5: "The State shall have power to conserve and develop its natural
beauty, objects and places of historic or cultural interest, sightliness and physical
good order, and for that purpose private property shall be subject to reasonable
regulation."
86 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 163 (1969).
B'Id.
8240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
8 9 1d., 400 P.2d at 262.
90 Survey, supra note 2.
9 1 State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
2Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
9 State v. Buckley, 243 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1968).
94 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
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their intent in an argument based primarily on health,"5 safety,9"
public welfare,97 or morals." While aesthetics had remained well
hidden in the dicta of pre-Stover decisions, times had slowly changed
and the attitudes of people toward aesthetics had changed with
them.9"
Whatever the reason for the ascendance of aesthetics, it appears
certain that beauty has finally acquired the mantle of legislative
and judicial respectability within the states. Were it not for the
highway beautification program of 1965, state legislatures could
clearly have a wide array of police power justification in preserving
beauty along our Nation's highways.
For the foregoing reasons, the majority of state legislatures
have not complied with the mandate of the Federal Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965. The fact that the Federal Government itself
is not able to perform its obligations under the act- pay its share
of compensation - has been a crucial factor in state noncompliance.
Confusion has arisen over antithetical provisions which join "just
compensation" and amortization concepts. Also, the act, in seeking
to create a national program of beautification, has established a
potentially dangerous precedent in threatening to withdraw a portion
of federal funds from one federal-state program for a state's non-
compliance with another.
In addition, in the interpretation of the act, there exists great
confusion as to the effect of the term "compensation"; whether,
despite the Attorney General's opinion,1"' the nonexistence of a
direct and positive conflict between the Federal Act and an existing
state act,' 0 ' may still permit the state to operate under "stricter' '102
standards which utilize the police power?
5 See generally St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911).
9
6Id. See also Los Angeles v. Barrett, 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (1957)
In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York
Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566.
218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961) ; Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200
N.E.2d 328 (1964).
97Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rel/d, 159 So. 2d 209
(Fla. 1963), Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade
County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d
364 (1941) ; City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) ;
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941) ; Town of Lexington
v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
9 8 See generally St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911).
0 The Oregon supreme court described that change in attitude as "a reflection of the
refinement of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing
society." Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
100 Letter, supra note 12.
101 Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 439 P.2d 248 '(Wash. 1968).
102 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(e) (1965).
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Finally, courts have for many years recognized the constitution-
ality of controlling the billboard problem through zoning.1 °8 Sud-
denly, the application of eminent domain principles may be demanded
of the states by an ambiguous federal act. The reaction of state gov-
ernment is understandably one of confusion.
Although the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 has generated
much confusion, the act should not "join Prohibition in the Federal
annals of noble experiment. ' 10 4 For the motivation of the Adminis-
tration and the legislators who drafted and enacted it was one of
an urgent interest in controlling our environment and preserving
our Nation's heritage of natural beauty. A solution to this frustrating
situation would be to amend the act to permit the states to elect their
own techniques by which to enforce federal standards, thereby trans-
forming the highway beautification program into an effective, truly
federal effort. A return to the incentive system as presented in the
1958 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 105 but with an incentive offered to
the states in the form of any needed highway beautification funds,
could be an innovative aspect of that amended act.
Should amendment to the 1965 Act not be made by the current
Congress, resort to the courts for clarification of ambiguities of the
act will be necessary. A declaratory judgment action by a state official
asking the court, under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,"0 6
to determine whether there is a conflict between the Tenth Amend-
ment10' and the Attorney General's interpretation of section 131(g)
of the 1965 Act would be brought. Such a course of action would
probably involve extensive litigation, during which time noncomply-
ing states, enforcing billboard controls by locally determined pro-
cedures, would be doing so under threat of penalty. It appears clear,
then, that this confusing situation may be most expediently resolved
by the Congress through its amendment procedures, and that it
should be the Congress, therefore, that solves the problem which it
has created.
103 Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919) ; Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis,
235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913); New
York Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d
566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St.
425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
104 The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 7.
105 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 122(c) '(1958).
106 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
107 U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
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NOTE
TIPPING VIOLATIONS AND CIVIL
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10B-5
INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit handed down what has become, and what was
expected to be,' one of the most significant decisions in the area of
securities law rendered in the past decade.2 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur dealt comprehensively with the expanded application of
Rule lob-5,3 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 4 as a device to control insider trading.
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy aspects of Texas Gulf
Sulphur was its holding that "tipping"5 is a violation of Rule Iob-5. 6
It was clear at the outset from the cases interpreting Rule lob-5 that
1 See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications o1 the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 U. VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965) ;
Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW. 1057
(1965); Mundheim, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Complaint, A Major Step in Restrict-
ing Insider Trading in Corporate Securities, 1966 J. Bus. L. 284.
2 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), affg in part and rev'g
in part, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(Justice White dissenting). For commentary on the District Court decision, see, e.g.,
Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws, The Codifica-
tion Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Sw. U.L. REV. 872 (1967); Wiesen,
Disclosure of Inside Information - Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L.
REV. 189 (1968) ; Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside
of Rule Iob-5, 46 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1966); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Duty
of Disclosure, Another View, 55 GEo. L.J. 664 (1967); Note, Securities Transac-
tions -SEC Rule lOh-5 -Disclosure of Material Information by Corporate Stock
Optionees, 41 TUL. L. REv. 722 (1967) ; Note, Rule lOb-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur:
An Evolution of Questions and Answers, 20 U. MiAMI L. REV. 939 (1966) ; Com-
ment, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 353 (1967); Comment, 80 HtA.v. L. REV. 468
(1966); Comment, 65 MiCH. L. REV. 944 (1967); Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 318
(1966). For commentary on the Circuit Court decision, see, e.g., Bromberg, Cor-
porate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731
(1968) ; Note,Scienter and Rule lob-5, 69 COLM. L. REV. 1057 (1969) ; Note, Texas
Gulf Sulphur Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule lob-5,
43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 425 (1969); Note, Securities-Rule 10b-5 is Violated
Whenever an Insider Purchases Stock Without Disclosing Information that Would
Affect the Judgment of a Reasonable Investor, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 509 (1969) ; Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND. L. REV. 359 (1969) ;
Comment, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 326 (1969); Comment, Inside Trading on the
Open Market: Nondisclosure and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 309
(1969); Comment, Securities Regulation -Trading by Insiders, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 755 (1969).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240. iob-5 (1969).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh-1 (1964).
5 For definitions of "tipping," see text accompanying notes 29 & 34 infra.
6 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
a corporate or organizational insider, who purchases or sells securities
issued by the corporation in a direct transaction with a member of
the investing public without disclosing material inside information
possessed by him, could be held in violation of lob-5 and could be
held civilly liable to the purchaser.7 It also appeared that the "tippee'' s
of such an insider would be held to be in violation of the Rule and
civilly liable, in the same manner as the corporate insider himself.'
Texas Gulf Sulphur enlarged the scope of tipping regulation one
step further in holding a tipper who did not trade in the securities
in question to be in violation of the Rule.'"
Texas Gulf Sulphur resolved some significant issues but also
raised new ones to which it did not address itself. The most important
of these is: Can civil liability be imposed on one who "tips" -i.e.,
selectively discloses material inside information to one who there-
after trades in the security in question? If so, under what circum-
stances can the "tipper" be held liable, and to what extent?
The importance of this issue is clear. A tipper who is merely
a violator of the Rule may be subject to an SEC action for injunctive
or other administrative relief." A tipper who is held civilly liable
for his violation may be subject to a multiplicity of claims for damages
suffered by those trading on the securities in question, as a result
of the tipper's violation. 2
Although a great number of factors may become involved in
considering the primary question of "tipping" violations of Rule
lob-5, four underlying questions seem to be of crucial importance
in discussing the imposition of civil liability for tipping violations:
(1) Who may be held to be subject to the Rule?
(2) What are the theoretical bases for holding "tipping" to
7 See text, section IV(C) (1) infra.
8 A "tippee" is one who receives inside information by selective disclosure in breach of
trust. However, the distinction between an "insider," as defined in the text accom-
panying note 25 infra, and a "tippee," as defined in the text accompanying notes 29
& 34 infra, is often blurred. As further discussion will point out, once a violation of
Rule 10b-5 is found, it is felt that the distinction should not be crucial in determining
the civil liability of such a person.
9See text, section IV(C)(2) infra.
10 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or phophylactic relief to establish all the
elements required in a suit for monetary damages." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), quoting from, Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967), and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
12 See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind In
lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 441-44 (1968).
Approximately 59 private actions have been filed against Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company, et al. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 1 97,372 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969). Only one of these
is known to have been decided on the merits at this time. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf




be a violation of the Rule and the doctrinal grounds for
imposition of civil liability therefor?
(3) In view of the fact that Rule 10b-5 requires that the pro-
hibited acts be performed "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,"'" what types of transactions are
subject to the Rule, and what constitutes a sufficient "con-
nection with" the transaction?
(4) What additional factors must be considered in answering
the above questions in connection with a civil action for
damages, rather than an SEC action for injunctive or other
administrative relief?
This Note will analyze the primary question generally, in terms
of these four aspects of a Rule lob-5 civil action. To clarify the
considerations involved with each of the four aspects, they will be
analyzed more or less independently of each other before attempting
to determine the relationships between them and their combined
effect upon the question of liability. For this reason and to provide
the legal context in which the issues arise, the persons, the acts, and
the transactions which fall within the ambit of 10b-5 for purposes
of determining a violation, will first be considered.
I. PERSONS WHO MAY VIOLATE THE RULE
A. Insider Violations under 1 Ob-5
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942 under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 and is one of many provisions
in the securities laws designed to prevent fraud.' 5 Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
13 See text of Rule quoted in text accompanying note 16 infra.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh-1 (1964).
15 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) states:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in the connection with the purchase
of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase
of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a
loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase.
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.1t
The Rule does not utilize the word "insider." Nevertheless, the
courts have interpreted Rule 10b-5 to mean "that a corporate insider
purchasing stock from an outsider must disclose any material fact
known to him by reason of his inside position but not known to
the outsider."' 7 In deciding who was to have the status of an insider,
the courts have applied the rule to officers and directors,'" and
controlling shareholders.'9 The Commission has taken the position
that any person trading unfairly in the stock of the corporation while
knowingly possessed of information unavailable to the general public
should be regarded as violating Rule lob-5.2 0 The SEC expanded
the definition of insider by developing an "access test''21 relying on
the "any person" language in the Rule." This expanded reading
of the Rule was first presented in Cady, Roberts & Co.,2 3 in which
the Commission stated:
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are
phrased in terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has
been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers,
directors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however,
do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1969).
17 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1
8 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) ; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il. 1952); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73
F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
19 Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
20 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Comment, Liability for
Failure to Disclose Under Rule 10-b-5, 20 STAN. L. REv. 347, 352-53 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Failure to Disclose].
21 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Bromberg, Corporate
Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Bromberg, TGS].
Bromberg states:
The SEC laid down an "access test" which treats as an insider anyone with
a relationship to an issuer giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose of the issuer.
The test was adopted by both lower and upper courts in TGS, and was
described by the latter as "the essence of Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 739.
22 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Comment, Insider Liability
Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U.
CHr. L. REv. 121, 131 (1962); Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts,
17 Bus. LAw. 939, 947-53 (1962).
2 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advan-
tage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing. In considering these elements under the broad
language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed
'by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is
to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer cor-
relative duties in trading in its securities.
2 4
The "access test" thus defines or treats as an insider anyone
who has a relationship to a corporation and either directly or indi-
rectly is given access to information intended for corporate purposes. 5
The courts seem to be willing to accept this expanded definition.26
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,27 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, speaking of the access test, stated:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may
not take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public.
2 8
The door is thus opened for liability extending to many persons who
receive inside information from the corporation.
B. First Generation Tippees
Tipping is generally "the selective disclosure of material inside
(nonpublic) information for trading or other personal purposes.
' 29
The first case finding a lOb-5 violation by a tippee was Cad),
Roberts & Co.,3 ° which was also the first case applying the "access
test.""' Gintel, a partner in the broker-dealer firm, was given infor-
mation by Cowdin, a director of Curtiss-Wright, prior to its public
release. Upon receiving this information, Gintel called his associate
at Cady, Roberts, and instructed him to buy Curtiss-Wright stock.
In its opinion, the Commission stated: "Cowdin's relationship to
the company clearly prohibited him from selling the securities af-
fected by the information without disclosure. By logical sequence,
24 Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
25 id.
2 See material quoted in note 21 supra.
27401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 Id. at 848 (footnote omitted).
2A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD-SEC RULE lob-5 § 7.5(2) (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG, FRAUD]. For a discussion of the obligation of tippees
to disclose, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1451 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
3040 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that Cady, Roberts & Co. is
more properly classified as an insider under the "access test." See note 10 supra
and text accompanying note 25 supra. However, Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), cited Cady, Roberts & Co. for the proposition that tippees are
subject to the same duty as insiders. Id. at 410.
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it should prohibit Gintel, a partner of registrant. This prohibition
extends not only over his own account, but to selling for dis-
cretionary accounts and soliciting and executing other orders.""2
More force was added to the prohibition against trading by tippees
in Ross v. Licht.3 3 The court in that case defined tippees as "persons
given information by insiders in breach of trust .... .3. Although
this was a civil action brought under Rule lob-5, a finding of
violation by the "tippees" is implicit 5 in the court's holding that the
"tippees" were civilly liable. " Also, the court's opinion in Texas
Gulf Sulphur stated that an insider will be found in violation for
"tipping," and intimates that tippees would be found to be in
violation, as well, because their conduct could be as reprehensible
as the insider's.
3 7
C. Subsequent Generation Tippees
An expansion of the tippee concept is that of the tippee's tippee.
If an insider has told another, thus making the other a tippee, then
that tippee may in turn disclose this information to still another,
making him a second generation tippee. Information travels rapidly
and may reach many ears after it has been initially divulged. Thus,
in a matter of hours the number of subsequent generation tippees
could be large. A 10b-5 violation has not yet been found on the
part of subsequent generation tippees, but the possibility is not
remote.
The question which must be resolved relates to how far the
disclosures can go in the ladder of tippees and still be a violation of
10b-5. Bromberg suggests that "not all tippees are in the same
position."'Ss He proposes the following criteria for determining a
tippee's violation: "A tippee violates if he (1) trades with specific
material information which he knows (or should reasonably know)
comes from an inside source and (2) knows (or should reasonably
know) that the information is undisclosed to the public.'' 3 9 Such a
test might be an answer to the problem of avoiding a finding of
violation on the part of remote tippees who may not be cognizant
of the quality of their information.
32 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
3 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
341d. at 410.
35 In order to find someone civilly liable under iob-5, there must, of course, be a
violation of the Rule.
36 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This holding is somewhat
weakened by the fact that the court also held the "tippees" liable on the alternative
ground of aiding and abetting a violation of lob-5.
37 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968).
38 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 747.
3 9Id. at 749.
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I[. TIPPING AS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE
The above discussion has focused primarily on the question of
finding a violation of Rule 10b-5 on the part of certain classes of
persons, particularly tippees, when such persons trade in the stock
in question. However, the question here under consideration involves
a tipper who does not trade in the stock. Civil liability, if any, must
be based upon the act of tipping - selective disclosure to a tippee"
who trades in the stock. The status of tipping as a violation of 10b-5
will be briefly considered here.
Perhaps the classic and most common tipping situation is that
suggested by the Cady, Roberts case.4" In that case a partner of
Cady, Roberts & Co., a broker-dealer firm, received material inside
information from an insider of the issuer of the securities in question.
The partner thus became a tippee or "first generation tippee" of the
insider. Although the Cady, Roberts decision held that such a tippee
was prohibited from trading the securities affected by the information
not only for his own account, but for discretionary accounts as well,41
the "first generation tippee" (broker-dealer) could just as well have
passed the inside information on to the discretionary accounts or
other preferred customers ("second generation tippees"), thus allow-
ing them to trade the securities based upon the inside information.
The problem is one of deciding what action was permitted the
broker-dealer on receipt of the corporate information. Superior
knowledge in the field of securities and a greater understanding
in the interpretation of information received are the skills of a
broker. Yet, does the broker have the duty to disclose all information
he receives to his customers? In Cady, Roberts, Commissioner Cary
answered the question negatively by stating:
While Gintel [the broker] undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary
relationship to his customers, this relationship could not justify any
actions by him contrary to law. Even if we assume the existence of
conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt which is
primary here. On these facts, clients may not expect of a broker
the benefits of his inside information at the expense of the public
generally.42
Although the Cady, Roberts case itself involved a trading viola-
tion by a tippee, the recent Texas Gulf Sulphur case squarely held
tipping to be a violation of Rule lob-5.
43
4040 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
41 id. at 912.
42 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). See also Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule
iob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121, 155 (1962).
4SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968). See also SEC v.
Glen Alden Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 4080, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. August 7, 1968).
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It is interesting to note that the disclosure problem of broker-
dealers is not confined to the infrequent receipt of "tips" from cor-
porate insiders. Broker-dealers frequently undertake to underwrite
a securities issue of a corporation, thus becoming an insider of the
issuer having special access to inside information. In this situation,
if the broker does not have a primary duty to disclose to his
clients the information he receives, what procedure should be em-
ployed when he receives such information?4 4 Three alternatives seem
to exist. He could disclose to the public the information he possesses;
he could refrain from trading in the stock and from disclosing the
information to others until the corporation disseminates this infor-
mation; or underwriting departments could be kept entirely separate
from sales departments.
Complications arise in using either of the first two alternatives.
First, most brokerage firms do not possess the facilities to dis-
seminate this information quickly to the public.45 Also, dissemination
by the broker (who is also an underwriter) may violate his duty to
the corporation.46 It has been suggested that if a broker were to
reveal the information to all of his clients to their satisfaction, this
would relieve him from liability.47 However, it has been held that
when specific antifraud sections are violated, it is not a defense that
all the broker's clients are content.48 This is justified on the grounds
that the broker's duty is to the general public and is not limited
to his clients.49
There are also problems in using the second alternative - pro-
hibiting the broker from making a market in securities about
which he possesses inside information. If a client should request
to sell the specific stock, and the broker must reply that he is unable
to trade that stock this week, the broker's function may be sub-
stantially impaired. One author suggests that the refusal to trade
may deter legitimate investments." ° Loss, on the other hand, states
that "a broker or dealer who becomes a corporate insider must
44 See Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB And Rule lob-5: A Suggestion For
Replacing The Doctrine O Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 675 (1965). See also Cary,
Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REV. 408, 415 '(1962). The broker
should not be permitted to remain silent, while continuing to deal in the security,
"by reason of the inherent unfairness involved where a person takes advantage of
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id.
4See Comment, 75 H~Av. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1962).
4" 3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1453.
47 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
8Id.
49 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961); Comment, Insider Liability Under
Securities Exchange Act Rule 1ob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CL L. REv.
121, 155-58 (1962).
50 Failure to Disclose, supra note 20, at 356.
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assume the risk that his duty to the corporation may sometimes pre-
vent him from making a market in its securities."51
The third alternative appears to be the most satisfactory. By
keeping the underwriting and sales departments entirely separate,
the problem of conflicting interests may be alleviated by preventing
the information from reaching the point at which it could be used
in trading in violation of the Rule.
52
It is worthy of note that this problem is not unique to under-
writing and sales departments of brokerage firms. Similar problems
exist as to attorneys, C.P.A.'s, banks, 3 and financial specialists. They
are in constant contact with corporations and have access to inside
information. Speaking to the question of who may be an insider,
the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.5 4 stated: "Thus, anyone
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."55 Under
the court's ruling, if an attorney, accountant, or bank were to relay
his corporate information to another or trade in the stock, he would
be in violation of Rule lob-5. In normal circumstances, a means to
avoid liability would be to disclose to the public the information.
However, in the case of this select group, such disclosure would
frequently constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration. Thus the only course of action open to these individuals,
once they receive the corporate confidence, is to refrain from trading
in or recommending the stock while the information is undisclosed.
Financial specialists, however, present a somewhat different
problem. They are theoretically not allowed access to the corporate
confidences, yet, due to their expertise in the evaluation of infor-
mation, a fact not material to the general public may have high
significance to the specialist. The SEC, in Cady, Roberts, stated that
'perceptive analysis of generally known facts" would not constitute
a violation of the Rule.5"
Sections I and II above have presented part of the legal context
in which the questions raised at the beginning of this Note must
51 3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1453 (footnote omitted).
52 The Commission has taken this position in its Statement of Policy appended as
Exhibit A to its ruling Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 77,629, at 83,351 (SEC November 25, 1968).
53 See generally, Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Internal Procedures Between
the Trust and Commercial Departments, 86 BANKING L.J. 869 (1969).
54 401 F.2d 833 '(2d Cir. 1968).
5 Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
5
6 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961).
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be considered. It appears that Rule lOb-5 has been extended to
first generation tippees who trade in the securities in question.
Coverage may be extended to subsequent generation tippees who
trade in the securities. The focus of this Note, however, is directed
to the question of whether such a person can be held civilly liable
for tipping- selective disclosure to a subsequent generation tippee
who trades in the stock. Although tipping has been found to be
within the prohibition of Rule lob-5, the resolution of the question
of civil liability for such acts depends upon certain legal consid-
erations to be discussed in subsequent sections of this Note.
III. TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE RULE
Securities transactions have traditionally fallen into two cate-
gories:
(1) direct face-to-face transactions in which the parties have an
opportunity to disclose to one another anything that may be
required;
(2) indirect or market transactions in which the parties have
no direct dealings and may make representations and dis-
closures only indirectly through the public media.
Rule 10b-5 case law developed initially in direct transactions, but
courts gradually have begun to find 10b-5 violations in indirect
transaction cases.57 This section will address itself to a brief survey
of the cases finding violations in both types of transactions. It will
not be the purpose of this section to analyze all of the developments
concerning transaction violations, but to establish a point of reference
for a discussion of civil liability in various transaction situations
discussed in section IV of this Note.
A. Direct Transactions
Direct transactions may be of varied types. For example, when a
seller holding stock in a closed corporation sells directly to a pur-
chaser, without using a broker, nondisclosure of a material fact in
connection with such a transaction, while disclosing other facts, is a
violation of the second clause of Rule 10b-5. 58 Another example of
a direct transaction violation is a broker failing to disclose a material
fact during negotiations with his customer.5" A survey of the myriad
5 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
S8Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947)
(where failure to disclose the possibility of a sale of corporate assets during negoti-
ations was held a violation).
59 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952) (holding a broker in violation for




of direct transactions is beyond the scope of this Note, and the area
has been thoroughly explored by Professor Bromberg.60 Suffice it
to say that direct transactions are clearly within the scope of Rule
lob-5.6 x Furthermore, in private 10b-5 actions based on direct trans-
actions of all types, the courts will entertain the suit, acknowledging
that privity and the other requirements based upon the relationship
of the parties to the transaction are present.62
B. Indirect Transactions
The typical indirect transaction is the open market purchase,
where the seller has no face-to-face contact with the purchaser. While
early cases involved direct transactions, the Cady, Roberts and Texas
Gulf Sulphur decisions set precedents for market transaction
violations. " The SEC in Cady, Roberts stated that "[njeither the
statutes nor Rule 10b-5 establish artificial walls of responsibility,"64
in applying the Rule to a market transaction violation. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur the Second Circuit cited the Cady, Roberts decision
with approval in holding the corporate defendant in possible violation
of the Rule for trading in an indirect transaction.6"
In another administrative action, 6 the Commission has taken
the position that a 10b-5 violation can be found where the registrant,
a broker-dealer, did not trade in the market itself, but effected trans-
actions in the market for its preferred customers based on inside
information.
7
The discussion of civil liability in the next section of this Note
will assume, for purposes of analysis, a violation of lob-5.68
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE
Prior discussion has focused upon the questions of whether or
not a "tipper" can be found to be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for
selectively disclosing material inside information to subsequent gen-
eration tippees who thereafter trade in the securities, and whether
60 BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, §§ 4.1-6.6.
61 Id.
62 Id.
83 Early cases brought for broker violations of 10b-5 raised the issue of indirect trans-
action violation but did not resolve the issue due to decisions on other grounds.
Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 '(E.D. Pa. 1947); Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C.
623 (1946).
40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
65 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
66 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,629 (SEC Novem-
ber 25, 1968).
6
7 Id. at 83,349.
"The reader who seeks a detailed discussion of indirect transaction violations will
find such a discussion in BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, §§ 7.1-7.6.
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or not such a violation can be found where the tippee trades in an
indirect transaction. Assuming that a violation can be found in such
a situation, the remaining discussion will center on the question of
whether or not civil liability can arise from these situations, and, if
so, what is or ought to be the extent of liability? The analysis here
will be in terms of the distinctions drawn in the first three sections
of this Note.
A. The Development of a Theory of Liability
Rule lob-5 does not specifically provide for a private cause
of action for a violation of its provisions. Sections 12(2)"' and
17(a)70 of the Securities Act of 1933, and section 16(b)7 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also relate to the regulation of
insider securities transactions, but have not been utilized to protect
the outsider to the same extent as Rule lob-5.72
Civil liability under lob-5 began, and is presently based on an
implied right of recovery. 73 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.74 was
an early case establishing insider civil liability based on a tort theory
that violation of a statute (section lob) makes the actor liable in
a private action for injury to another.7" Some decisions have attached
69 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). The relevant portion of section
12 states:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
thereof) [by the use of interstate commerce] . . . by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing
of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him . . . . (Emphasis
added).
This section, in imposing civil liability for violations similar to lob-5 violations,
seems to be the logical statutory provision under which an action for misrepresen-
tation would be brought by a purchaser under the securities laws. Nevertheless,
10b-5 has found more favor as a remedial cause of action. It may be surmised that
this is so because of the scienter criteria stated in section 12(2), because of the early
expansion of Rule i0b-5 liability by the courts, and because lob-5 provides a remedy
for the seller as well as for the purchaser. See text accompanying notes 80 & 81 infra.
7 0 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964). This section reads very nearly the
same are Rule lob-5.
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
72 Note that section 16(b) is rather restrictive in limiting liability to corporate offi-
cers, directors and principal stockholders who sell within 6 months of date of pur-
chase. Thus, its utility as a pervasive antifraud provision is similarly restricted.
73 For a discussion of the development of an implied right of recovery see BROMBERG,
FaAUD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1).
74 69 F. Supp. 512 '(E.D. Pa. (1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798.
modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
7 Id. at 513.
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liability based on the theory that section 29(b) of the Exchange
Act7 6 makes a contract consummated in contravention of section
10(b) voidable at the option of the innocent party. 77 The existence
of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 is now well
established. 8
Less established has been the right of a buyer to sue under the
Rule. Early decisions79 did not recognize the right of recovery by
a defrauded buyer, though the Kardon case8 0 had previously per-
mitted recovery by a defrauded seller. More recent decisions have
permitted a buyer to bring suit under Rule lob-5. s1 Thus, case law
has developed the notion that private causes of action by defrauded
buyers or sellers may be brought under Rule lob-5.
B. Doctrines Limiting Liability
Where 10b-5 cases have been prosecuted by the SEC, the only
showing necessary for injunctive or other relief has been a violation
of the Rule. 2 However, when private litigants initially brought suits
under iob-5, the notion of privity came to the forefront, along with
materiality, reliance, and causation as the elements of common law
deceit. In private actions, the courts felt that there must be some
relationship between the defendant's violation of the Rule and the
plaintiff's injury to permit recovery." This requirement was de-
scribed in 1951 as "[a] semblance of privity between the vendor and
purchaser of the security ...."" Since 1951 the trend has been
away from requiring any direct dealings between plaintiff and
76 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964).
77 Bromberg discusses the development of the notion of statutory voidability in
BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1) (b).
78 Ten of the eleven courts of appeal have recognized a private cause of action.
See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; 6 Loss, supra note 29, at 3871-73;
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954), and authorities cited therein.
79Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
80 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
81 Doelle v. Ireco Chemicals, 391 F.2d 6, 9 (10th Cir. 1968); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The Ellis
case specifically considered the development of the notion of a buyer's right to
recovery concluding that such right was concomitant with that of a seller. Ellis v.
Carter, supra at 272-74.
8 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914-15 (1961). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 77,629
at 83,345 n.5 (SEC November 25, 1968).
8 See text accompanying note 112 infra.
8 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), alf'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). For an interesting discussion of what is meant
by the term "semblance of privity," see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIEs LAW 600
(1966).
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defendant.8 5 Decisions in the Second and Sixth Circuits have mini-
mized the importance of privity between plaintiff and defendant
in private actions .8  The current approach seems to be that absence
of privity "does not amount to a fatal defect of proof.""7
A requirement that a defendant only be sued by those to whom
he sold or from whom he bought has the advantage of limiting
potential damages. If the class of potential plaintiffs is expanded to
include all persons who bought or sold in the market, the possibility
of recoveries against one defendant for an amount greater than the
damages caused by his own transactions greatly increases.88 This
would be possible because once a causal link is established to one
plaintiff in the market, a similar link could be found with many
other potential plaintiffs in the same position. One way to avoid
this pitfall would be to limit the plaintiffs' recovery to the amount
of the defendant's profit. But such an approach would cause other
problems such as a rush to get an early execution of judgment before
the defendant's liability limit was reached.
On the opposite side of this question there is the argument that
equating plaintiffs' recovery to defendant's profit would mean that
plaintiffs could have no cause of action where the defendant did
not make a profit. This would seem to be contrary to the intent of
the Rule and to holdings that a person may be in violation of 10b-5
even when he loses money in the transaction.89 Elimination of a sig-
nificant avenue of recourse in 10b-5 private actions in this manner
would decrease their deterrent effect.90
If materiality of the information is assumed and privity is
found present, factors such as causation and reliance are assumed to
be present.91 When privity limitations on the relationship between
85Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb.5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 663 n.31 (1965).
86Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Brown v.
Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
But see Kuenhert v. Tekstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969).
87 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also
3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1767-71; 6 Loss, supra note 29, at 3896; BROMBERG,
FRAUD, supra note 29, § 8.5 n.28.
88See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
In Rule 1Ob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 441-44 (1968).
89 [W]e are not convinced of any difference in substance between a successful fraud
and an attempt. The statutory phrase 'any manipulative or deceptive device,' 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), seems broad enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its out-
come." Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
90 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 '(1964). The Borak case, a section 14
Exchange Act case, lends judicial sanction to the notion that private actions have a
strong position in the scheme of federal securities laws and that appropriate civil
remedies should be provided to effect the purpose of these laws.
91 Note, Civil Liability Under Section 1ob and Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion For Replacing
The Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 684-85 (1965) ; Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 433-34 (1968).
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the parties were removed, these other factors were looked to inde-
pendently in order to establish (or limit) liability." It is the
development of causation and reliance and to a lesser extent for-
seeability as tests of liability, and specifically their application to
insider and tippee violations involving market transactions, that will
be discussed in the following subsections.
C. Civil Liability in Direct Transactions
It is now seen that in order to sustain a private civil action
under Rule lob-5, a plaintiff must not only show a violation of
lob-5, but must also show some sort of relationship between his loss
and the defendant's violation - whether this relationship be couched
in terms of a concept of privity or a formulation for causation and
reliance or foreseeability.98 The remainder of this analysis will con-
sider this theory of civil liability in terms of the distinctions delineated
in sections I, II, and III of this Note.
1. Corporate Insiders
A face-to-face transaction between an insider acting in violation
of Rule 10b-5 and an innocent purchaser has generally been held
to result in insider civil liability. For example, when the purchaser
of securities in a direct transaction is the deceiving party (though
incomplete disclosure or nondisclosure), and the seller, in reliance94
on the presumed full disclosure of the purchaser, suffers damage,
liability of the purchaser ensues. 5 The courts, whether through a
theory of tort liability96 or statutory voidability of the transaction,97
have permitted recovery in these direct transactions. 8
92Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in
Rule iob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 434 n.61 (1968); see
text accompanying note 112 infra.
93 The element of "scienter," which is also arguably necessary to sustain liability in
iob-5 cases, will not be considered in this analysis. For a general discussion of
"scienter" in 1ob-5 civil actions, see Veber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) and authorities cited therein.
94 "Reliance is an essential element of a cause of action under Rule lob-5." Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
9Id. at 411; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73 F.
Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
"Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds,
73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
7 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
The Kardon case also discussed the alternative holding that the contract involved
in the transaction would be voidable under section 29 of the Exchange Act.
9A recent decision has permitted recovery also where the corporate insider failed to
disclose material information to existing shareholders of the corporation. Reynolds
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,494, (Civil No. 132-66)
D. Utah Oct. 17, 1969).
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2. First Generation Tippees
While the language of Rule 10b-5 refers to "any person" who
"directly or indirectly" engages in certain acts,'9 early cases required
privity - similar to privity in contract law - in the transaction be-
tween plaintiff and defendant to sustain a private cause of action.100
Though the requirement of privity has been generally obviated,'
the notion retains some validity here in a discussion of tippee liability
in a direct transaction. In a face-to-face transaction where a first
generation tippee sells directly to or purchases directly from a party,
privity of contract is present. Certainly a tippee in such a situation,
being under the same duty as an insider,1 °2 and meeting the criteria
of the Rule as "any person," should be a logical person to hold
liable in a private 10b-5 action. Notions of statutory tort liability
and statutory voidability are applicable to such a tippee who is the
violator of the Rule.1 3 Ross v. Licht was a private action where
tippee liability was mentioned but was not the sole ground for
imposing liability. The court noted that "[i]f Sidney Grapel and
Bluestone were not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees'
(persons given information by insiders in breach of trust) and
subject to the same duty as insiders.
' '1
04
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, in a private action involving a
tippee who had violated Rule 10b-5 has noted that "tippees...
present the same threat to the investigating public as do insiders
.... 105 Although this case involved the denial of recovery to a
tippee seeking redress from a tipper for giving a false tip, the court
said in dictum that if the information had been true, the lippee
would, "of course, be liable to his vendors or vendees ....106
While the courts have not considered tippee liability in direct
transactions to any great degree, the reasoning of the Ross case is
persuasive in extending liability in a private action to such persons.'0 7
3. Subsequent Generation Tippees
A tippee's tippee who violates Rule 10b-5 should stand in
much the same position, insofar as civil liability is concerned, as
9 See text accompanying notes 16 and 22 supra.
1W See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), arfd 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (requiring some "semblance
of privity").
01 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 24 (W.D.
Ky. 1960). But see Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 '(5th Cir. 1969).
102 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See 3 Loss, supra note 29,
at 1451.
103 See BROMBERG, FRAuD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1) (a-b).
104 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
105 Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
106 Id.
107 See Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 749.
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the tippee himself. No case law has been found, however, sustaining
such liability.' 0 8 Nevertheless, the purpose of protecting the investing
public from unfair inequalities in bargaining power would be fur-
thered if liability were imposed on a subsequent generation tippee in
a direct transaction. 109 Similarly, the fact that privity exists in a
direct transaction sustains this theory of liability. Unlike the indirect
transaction,11 ° the extension of liability to persons who materially
misrepresent in a face-to-face transaction does not raise the question
of holding persons liable whose acts in fact have no causal relation
to the losses of the innocent party. In this context it should not
ordinarily matter how a defendant received his inside information,
but only that in a transaction with the plaintiff he failed to disclose
such information. Certainly the defendant falls within the meaning
of the Rule's criterion of "any person."
4. Persons Subject to Civil Liability in Direct Transactions
In summary, it appears that persons who violate Rule 10b-5
through direct transactions may also be subject to civil liability for
the violation. The requirement of privity can easily be met by the
plaintiff who has traded directly with the person who has violated
Rule lob-5. However, as indicated in section I of this Note, sub-
sequent generation tippees have not yet been held to be in violation
of the Rule.
D. Civil Liability in Indirect Transactions
As mentioned in section III(B) supra, the courts have recently
extended the scope of application of Rule 10b-5 to include indirect
transactions for purposes of determining a violation of the Rule.
For purposes of finding civil liability under lob-5, however, the
fact that the transaction involved is indirect is significant. It will
have a decisive effect in determining the existence of privity - or
causation and reliance - which is necessary in a civil action under
the Rule. Certainly privity is not present between a plaintiff and a
defendant who have traded the same security in an impersonal
market. However, the requirement of privity has not been emphasized
in recent decisions. The courts have, rather, looked to the elements
of reliance or causation in order to find a connection between a de-
fendant's violation of 10b-5 and a plaintiff's losses. The status of
1
08However, the Cady, Roberts opinion suggests such liability when it states: "Section
17 and Rule iob-5 apply to securities transactions by any person. Misrepresentations
will lie within their ambit, no matter who the speaker may he." Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (emphasis added).
109 The Cady, Roberts opinion indicates that the purpose of the antifraud provisions is
to prevent the taking of undue advantage of investors and others. Id.
110 See section IV(D) infra.
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concepts limiting civil liability under Rule 10b-5 has been well sum-
marized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:"'.
[A] requirement of privity was at first suggested... but has more
recently 'been ignored .... However, the search for limiting doctrine
has continued. Thus, some courts have looked to see whether a
plaintiff actually relied on the allegedly fraudulent statement,
whether such reliance was reasonable, whether the fraud actually
caused harm to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff's injury was
foreseeable, and whether plaintiff falls within the category of
buyer or seller of securities. l12
This subsection will consider briefly the application of these
various limiting doctrines to a violation of lob-5 occurring in con-
nection with an indirect or market transaction.
1. Causation and Reliance
In Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,1 1 the court stated that in order
to sustain a claim under section 10(b) there must be "at least some
causal relationship to the damage complained of."' 14 It has been
suggested, though not held, that the causal relationship should be
one of proximate cause." 5 Whether characterized as proximate cause
or not, the question of causation is one of ultimate fact.1
Without any further refinement of the test of causation, a find-
ing of a causal relationship between a person who violates Rule
lob-5 by nondisclosure or selective disclosure of inside information
in connection with a market transaction and a person who has traded
the stock in the same market would be difficult at best, because in
an indirect transaction there is no face-to-face contact or communi-
cation between plaintiff and defendant.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc." 7 the court did refine the test
of causation when it discussed the requirement that reliance be
placed on the misrepresentation in a civil suit under Rule lob-5." 8
After equating the reliance requirement with the principle of causa-
tion in fact,"' the court set forth the following test: "T]he proper
test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act dif-
ferently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the
1I Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
12 Id. at 543-44 (citations and footnotes omitted) ; see also section IV(B) supra.
113 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
114I. at 775. See also West v. Zurhorst, 280 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Miller v. Stein-
bach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp.
201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
115 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F.
Supp. 766, 775 n.6 '(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
116 West v. Zurhorst, 280 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
117 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).




undisclosed fact." ' This test has been followed by a number of
courts,' and although it was originally formulated in a direct
transaction case, its potential application to an indirect transaction
case would not be beyond the bounds of logic. If the duty upon an
insider or tippee trading in a security is to make his inside information
public,' and the plaintiff can show that he would have acted
lOld. (citations omitted). This test has been characterized as a constructive reliance
test, applicable to cases of nondisclosure. That is, plaintiff would have relied had
he been informed. Note, Insider Trading on the Open Market: Nondisclosure and
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 309, 322 (1969).
It has been suggested that the court did not properly phrase its test question.
"[W]hat the court should have been asking in List was whether the plaintiff would
have sold if defendants had refrained from trading, not whether he would have sold
if defendants had disclosed." Note, Insiders' Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 78 YALE
L.J. 864, 871 (1969). This attack on the test is derived from the premise that the
"formula's basic defect is its implicit assumption that insiders are subject to an
unconditional duty to disclose." Id. at 870. Although this attack on the List test
is appropriate in some fact situations, the situation under consideration here involves
selective disclosure rather than partial disclosure or nondisclosure. See note 124 infra.
The fact that selective disclosure is involved has significance for two reasons. First,
it establishes an apparent violation of at least the Rule's intent to have all segments
of the investing public equally informed. Second, such selective disclosure should
take away any defense based on the business judgment rule's implication that total
secrecy is a matter for determination by the corporation without interference from
the courts. Clearly these business reasons that dictate secrecy cannot be agued to
exist if part of the public has already been told. See Note, Civil Liability Under
Section lob and Rule lob-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine ot Privity,
74 YALE L.J. 658, 677 (1965). Although the List test may assume the disclosure
requirement, if the duty to disclose exists independently of the test, the test should
be applicable.
121 See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967); Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
122See note 120 and text accompanying note 55 supra. The recent case of Reynolds v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,494 (Civil No. 132-66) (D.
Utah Oct. 16, 1969), appears to support the conclusion that the List test can be
applied to cases of nondisclosure in connection with indirect transactions, where a
duty to disclose can be found. In considering the claims of Plaintiff Karlson, the
court said:
Plaintiff Karlson sold his stock on December 11, 1963, through a stock
exchange. There was no face-to-face transaction. Fogarty did not purchase
the particular shares sold by Karlson. While it is not necessary for Karlson
to establish privity of contract in order to recover for violations of the
statute or rule, and the fact that there was a total non-disclosure would
not prevent recovery if some form of manipulation was involved [citing List
v. Fashion Park, Inc.], it nevertheless is necessary for Karlson to prove
some causative connection between Fogarty's actions or omissions and the
damage Karlson claims he suffered. The court finds no such causative
effect.
Id. at 98,314 (footnotes omitted). The court goes on to explain the lack of causation
in terms of the fact that the duty which the corporation owes to its stockholders to
keep them reasonably informed as to corporate affairs does not surpass all other duties
owed to stockholders: For instance, the duty to not make information concerning the
mineral discovery public until the company could first protect itself by acquiring
mineral interests in adjoining lands. The court concluded that "it is not necessary
to pass upon the materiality of the information available to defendants on December
11, 1963, because of his findings that there was no duty at that time on the part of
either defendant to disclose the information then available with respect to drilling
results, and that Fogarty's violations of the statute and the rule by purchasing TGS
stock did not cause any damage to Plaintiff Karlson." Id. at 98,314 (emphasis added).
Although the court denied recovery to Plaintiff Karlson for nondisclosure where there
was no duty to disclose, other plaintiffs in this case recovered on the basis of the
false and misleading press release issued in connection with the indirect transactions
involved in the case. Id.
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differently than he did had he been informed prior to his market
transaction, then it can be said that the defendant's failure to dis-
close the information - his violation of lob-5 - caused the injury
to plaintiff.
2. Privity or "Semblance" Thereof
Few cases, however, have actually sustained a private cause of
action for a violation of Rule 10b-5 in connection with an indirect
or market transaction, and judges faced with a claim that lob-5
liability should be imposed in indirect transactions have wrestled
with the requirement of privity or a "semblance" thereof.
In one such case, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,"' the situation
was that the plaintiff's claim involved misrepresentation by false
or misleading statements in connection with an indirect transaction,
rather than selective disclosure.. 4 or nondisclosure of material inside
information. The court dismissed the privity requirement but appeared
to rely on the fact that the alleged misstatements (financial state-
ments) were intended for public information and to induce the
public to buy securities.'12 The court also found reliance on the
alleged misstatements and concluded that the registrant's accounting
firm could be liable regardless of whether it had benefited from
the supposedly inflated market price.
126
It is possible to suggest that privity, or rather a "semblance"
thereof, deserves rehabilitation as a limiting doctrine in the context
of indirect or market transactions. Professor Bloomenthal discusses,
with reference to the "faceless" transaction, the relationship of a
defendant's intent to induce action to the requirement of privity
in terms of foreseeability:
The key to what the [United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, per Judge Sugarman, speaking in Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,127 ] meant by "semblance of
privity" can perhaps be found in its quotation from Judge Frank's
opinion in [Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,128s suggesting that
the plaintiff amend his complaint so as to allege that the corporation
made false statements for the purpose of inducing the plaintiffs
to purchase the common stock in the market. On this basis the
12 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I1. 1967).
124 It should be noted that there is a difference between selective and partial disclosure.
Selective disclosure is disclosure of information to some but not all, while partial
disclosure is a disclosure of some but not all facts to the same person or persons.
The former is akin to nondisclosure in that the public is denied information provided
to select individuals; the latter is the substance of a iob-5 violation in that the
partial nondisclosure makes the disclosed information false or misleading.
1
25Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
126 Id. at 104-05.
12799 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
1288 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951).
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required semblance of privity would be present if the issuer or
insiders made false statements which they intended to (or could
have foreseen would) be relied upon by others purchasing the
security in the market even though the issuer or insiders themselves
were not selling the particular shares being purchased. Conceiveably,
this could be extended to cover the failure to disclose material
information and could be equally applicable to false or misleading
statements or failure to disclose material facts intended to (or
which could have been foreseen would) induce persons to sell the
particular security.1 29
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., much cited
and maligned 3 ' - for its requirement that 10b-5 liability cannot
be found in the absence of at least a "semblance of privity," may
actually be enunciating a requirement which is not practically dif-
ferentiable from the classic requirement of proximate cause con-
necting a plaintiff's loss and the misrepresentation of defendant.
According to Prosser,
[TJhe damage upon which a deceit action rests must have been
'proximately caused" by the misrepresentation. So far as the fact
of causation is concerned, any loss which follows upon a transaction
into which the misstatement induces the plaintiff to enter may be
said to be caused by it; but the same considerations which limit
liability in cases of tangible harm have operated here. In general,
with only a few execptions, the courts have restricted recovery to
those damages which might foreseeably be expected to follow from
the character of the misrepresentation itself.'
3 '
Analogizing the Federal tort law of Rule 10b-5 to the common
law of deceit, the List test of reliance - would the plaintiff have
acted differently, if he had known' - can be seen as a formulation
for causation in fact. The List test, however, is conceivably over-
129 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 600 (1966).
Professor Loss' most recent comment regarding "privity" is worthy of note:
Again, more and more under the impact of Texas Gulf and Heit
v. Weitzen, on which the Supreme Court denied certiorari the other day,
and similar cases, we have a great problem that nobody can answer today:
the unexplored consequences of imposing liability on corporate insiders to
the market generally, without regard to traditional notions of privity.
I know it's fashionable for law professor's particularly to pooh-pooh privity
as a concept in deceit, and I have done it along with others, but when you
abandon the privity concept and make a director or officer liable to
everybody who has bought or sold in the market because there is a false
press release or a false report, or something of that sort, the potential
liability is, really, quite horrendous in relation to the crime, if it be a crime.
Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW.
27, 35 (1969) (citations omitted).
130 In Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
Judge Lord, in speaking of the Farnsworth decision, said: "The language of the
district court in that case was: ' .. ..A semblance of privity .. . seems to be
requisite . . . .' I find it unnecessary to attempt a definition of this, at best, cloudy
phrase, for if 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity' '(like 'a little bit pregnant'),
I reject it."
131W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 748 (1964). See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
132 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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broad. It is well enough to concentrate on reliance or causation alone
in cases where foreseeability and privity are never mentioned because
they are not a problem. In such cases - cases involving direct trans-
actions - one is dealing with people whose relationship to de-
fendant's action is clear and direct. However, difficulties arise in
attempting to go from those cases to cases of faceless, indirect non-
disclosure (or selective disclosure). In the latter cases the List test
could be answered in the affirmative by almost anybody. It is sug-
gested that the List test of reliance is not overbroad, however, if
a foreseeability test - Farnsworth's "semblance of privity" - is
coupled with it. This "semblance of privity" requirement, thus under-
stood, may, needless to say, bear less kinship to the classic concept
of privity of contract than it bears to the classic concept of fore-
seeability, viewed as an element of proximate or legal cause in the
law of torts."' 8 In any event, it should not be overlooked as an
available, and arguably appropriate, limiting doctrine in a context
where application of now established 10b-5 law in connection with
an indirect transaction might raise the specter of unlimited liability
to an unlimited class of plaintiffs. Moreover, it is also suggested
that limiting the extent of liability, an arguably valid consideration,
134
should not be so regarded as to preclude liability altogether.135
3. Persons Who May be Liable in Indirect Transactions
This subsection has not analyzed civil liability for violations of
10b-5 in terms of the three classifications of persons described in
section I supra - corporate insiders, first generation tippees, and
second generation tippees. It has been assumed for purposes of this
subsection that, if a violation were found on the part of a member
of any of these categories, concepts of causation, reliance and fore-
seeability would apply equally to each class of violators. 136 It would
seem that the legal criteria for determining a violation on the one
hand, and civil liability via causation, reliance and foreseeability, on
the other, ought to operate more or less independently.
E. Civil Liability for Tipping
The original question posed at the beginning of the Note is,
Can civil liability be imposed on one who "tips" -i.e., selectively
discloses material inside information to one who thereafter trades
233 For the suggestion that proximate cause ought to be required in 10b-5 cases see,
Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F.
Supp. 766, 775 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
134The courts view underwriting in its present form to be vital to the growth of
American industry. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
135 For a discussion of alternative limitations on extent of liability, see p. 480 infra.
136 Such a conclusion was reached in section IV(C) (4) supra.
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in the security in question? If so, under what circumstances can the
tipper be held liable, and to what extent?
The aspect of this question which has not been considered is
whether a person with inside information can be held civilly liable
for tipping.
It has been established that tipping is itself a violation of the
Rule." 7 However, no case has yet imposed civil liability for tip-
ping.'38 This subsection will consider various theories by which the
legal conclusion that civil liability might be imposed for tipping
might be reached.
1. Violation Plus Causation and Reliance
An orthodox theory that civil liability should exist whenever
a lob-5 violation occurs which causes the injury of another does
not on its face appear to be unreasonable. Applying the List test of
reliance, 39 the problem of proving reliance and causation and per-
haps foreseeability as well, should not be impossible for a prospective
plaintiff. There are two problems, however, which should be con-
sidered.
First, the tipper did not trade in the stock in question. Rule
10b-5 requires that the prohibited acts be performed "in connection
with" a purchase or sale of securities. 40 This problem, however, is
one inherent in finding a violation of the Rule, and it has been
assumed for purposes of this discussion that tipping is a violation.'
It is also probable that the tipper's tippees will have traded in the
stock, 42 thus providing a "connection" with a transaction, and,
even if they have not, it is possible to view the plaintiff's purchase
or sale which was "caused" by the tipper's selective disclosure as
sufficiently "connected with" the tipper's actions to establish a
violation.
The second problem is that any damages which were sustained
did not accrue to the benefit of the tipper- but rather accrued to
the benefit of the tipper's tippees."4 3 Although this may be a
legitimate objection, at least one case has sustained civil liability
3
7 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
138 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 746. For the nearest case so holding, see Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 70 SAN. L. REv. 347 '(1968).
139 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
14
0 See text of Rule quoted in text accompanying note 16 supra.
141 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
142According to Bromber& "there can hardly be liability unless it [tipping violation]
results in some damage, e.g., through trading by the tippees." Bromberg, TGS, supra
note 21, at 746.




in the face of the objection. In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,14 4 the
court, after rejecting the privity requirement, said, "[djefendant
Peat, Marwick, in independently auditing Thor's financial statement,
remains liable regardless of whether it had benefited from the sup-
posedly inflated market price. The position of an independent auditor
is different from that of other corporate insiders.' 1 45 Although the
position of an independent auditor may be different from that of
an underwriter, for instance, or that of a tippee who tips, the cases
holding independent auditors liable for fraudulent disclosure or
nondisclosure may provide initial theoretical justification for holding
someone liable who does not directly benefit from his tortious con-
duct. 4 ' The problem should be one of determining what sort of
duty is owed to the public by one possessed of inside information.
2. Aiding and Abetting
Another theory of liability applicable to cases involving tipping
is that of "aiding and abetting." This concept has evolved from the
law of torts and has been applied in 10b-5 cases. 147 The statement of
the theory was borrowed from the Restatement of Torts: "For harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he . . . (b) [k]nows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the other so to conduct himself .... 148
The application of this theory to a set of facts can best be seen
in the case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.1 49 In
that case, replete with a complex set of facts, the defendant insur-
ance company was found to be an aider and abettor to a fraudulent
securities broker dealing in its stock, by referring potential customers
to the broker while knowing of the broker's fraudulent dealings.
The court found "that MULIC (Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.]
engaged in an affirmative course of conduct which aided and abetted
Dobich's violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.""1 0 The de-
144 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
145 Id. at 104-05.
14' For another case involving the lob-5 civil liability of an accounting firm who did
not trade in the securities in question but failed to disclose certain after-acquired
information relevant to a financial statement, see Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Here the court sustained liability on the basis of an "aiding and
abetting" theory.
147 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D. Ind.
1968). See also Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fischer v. Kletz,
266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
'
48 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
10 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
150 Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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fendant argued that it could not be liable for plaintiff's damages
because such damages would have occurred despite defendant's
conduct. The court rejected this argument stating that the notion
"that liability might ... result from aiding and abetting a violation
of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5- has continued to find accept-
ance in the courts." ' 1 Finally, the court observed that defendant
could also be found guilty of aiding and abetting by mere failure
to report the broker's fraudulent activities to the Indiana Securities
Commission.1
52
Analogizing the reasoning of the Brennan case to the situation
of an insider or tippee tipping another leads to a theory of liability
for tipping in certain circumstances. Where the insider or tippee tips
and pursues an affirmative course of conduct' 5 3 in assisting his tippee
(or second generation tippee) in violating the Rule,"' or fails to
report his tippee to proper authorities when he knows the latter
is violating the Rule, the tipper would be liable as an aider and
abettor of his tippee's violation. The application of this theory of
liability "cannot be confined to an abstract rule but must be fashioned
case by case as particular facts dictate."'
1 55
3. Vicarious Liability
Professor Bromberg has suggested another theory for holding
a person civilly liable as a tipper. His suggestion is analogous to
vicarious liability for tipping:
Although tipping is itself a violation [of Rule 10b-5], there can
hardly -be any liability unless it results in some damage, e.g., through
trading by the tippees. Given the nature of the financial world, an
insider who tips a friend should probably be charged with foreseeing
the friend will tell one or two others and that the information will
continue to spread. Quite conceivably he will be liable for all the
trades which can be traced to information emanating from him.
In the abstract, there is reason to hold the original tipper even
for trades by tippees which - because of the muted form in which
the information reaches the tippees - are not violations by them. If
the overriding policy is to prevent informational inuities in the
market, it would be served by such a rule, which would also operate
as a powerful deterrent to tipping.15 6
The theory rests on the tort principle of foreseeability, and would
probably require proof of a chain of causation running from defend-
ant to plaintiff. If a test of factual causation were to be employed,
151 Id. at 725.
1
5 2 Id. at 727.
13 It may be suggested that the mere act of "tipping" is sufficient "affirmative conduct"
to establish this element of aiding and abetting
254 For a discussion of first and second generation tippee violations of lob-5, see text
sections I (B-C) supra.
155 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963).
156 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 746 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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inequities might be prevented. Holding tippers liable for the actions
of their tippees might have the benefit of discouraging all forms
of dissemination of information in violation of the Rule, because
the sources of the information would be deterred from divulgence.157
While there is merit in holding a tipper liable in a private
action, care should be taken to assure that a defendant is not held
liable where his action (in disclosing or not disclosing) is innocent
and could result in no foreseeable harm.
CONCLUSION
The question raised at the beginning of this Note is, Can civil
liability be imposed on one who "tips" - i.e., selectively discloses
material inside information to one who thereafter trades in the
security in question? If so, under what circumstances can the tipper
be held liable, and to what extent?
The answer to this question is that no court has ever so held,
but the theoretical framework exists which would rationally justify
such a holding, even where the tipper's tippees traded in an indirect
transaction.
First, it was concluded that a first generation tippee could be
held civilly liable for a violation of lob-5, at least for a violation
involving trading in a direct transaction. Once a trading violation
of Rule 10b-5 has been established, the status of a person as an
insider, first generation tippee, or subsequent generation tippee
should not ordinarily be relevant to the question of imposing civil
liability on the person for his violation. The status of a violator
does become relevant, however, in considering the question of im-
posing civil liability for a tipping violation. The three theories by
which a "tipper" could possibly be held civilly liable- causation
and reliance, aiding and abetting, and vicarious liability-seem
to suggest that the tipper's liability depends upon his tippee's viola-
tion of lob-5. Although this reasoning is not absolutely necessary
to the causation and reliance liability approach, such reasoning
would raise the problem of determining a violation by the tipper's
tippee. If the tipper is himself a tippee, then his "subsequent gener-
ation tippee" would have to be found in violation of lob-5.
A second problem arises in attempting to hold a tipper liable
for his tippee's violation, if the tipper's tippee (or second generation
tippee) has traded in an indirect transaction. It was concluded,
however, that existing notions of causation, reliance and foresee-
ability, as well as the meager authority addressing the issue, would
not be offended by imposing civil liability on the basis of an indirect
157 Failure to Disclose, supra note 20, at 357.
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transaction, particularly if some limiting notion such as proximate
cause were retained.
Although no court has yet held an insider or tippee liable
for tipping- selectively disclosing material inside information to
subsequent generation tippees who trade the securities in question
in an indirect or market transaction - such a legal conclusion does
not seem to be beyond the realm of possibility or sound reasoning.
The major objection to such a holding is that the potential liability
could be unconscionable - unlimited liability to an unlimited number
of plaintiffs.
However, it is suggested that considerations regarding the
extent of liability should not necessarily preclude liability itself, so
long as there are alternative limitations on the extent of liability.
Several factors bearing on the damages question might be con-
sidered to reduce the extent of liability so that the total potential
recovery by all plaintiffs would be one which a court could
countenance.15
A court could:
(1) Include only the plaintiff's measure of actual damage
losses on shares bought during days when subsequent generation
tippees sold, and limit the number of shares upon which re-
covery could be based to the number the subsequent generation
tippees sold each day or the number plaintiff bought that day,
whichever was greater;
(2) Require that the damages question be decided in
an action wherein the subsequent generation tippees were
joined as parties, but only require for the plaintiff to
recover a showing that the subsequent generation tippees traded
in the relevant period, that they had received the tip, and that
they had reason to know it was inside information. This would
have the effect of mandatorily spreading the liability to more
of the culpable parties without making the burden on plaintiff
excessive.
(3) Limit recovery in the normal case to the amount
of profit actually realized. Provisions for punitive re-
158 An example of the method in which courts compute damages is the recent case in
Utah based on the facts of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,494, (Civil No. 132-66) (D. Utah Oct. 17,
1969). In this case the court applied the "New York Rule" which determines that
the measure of damages in a stock transaction is "the highest intermediate value
reached by the stock between the time of the wrongful act complained of and a
reasonable time thereafter, to be allowed to the injured party to place himself in the
position he would have been in had not his rights been violated." The court deter-
mined a reasonable time to be 20 trading days, and then computed the average of
the high market prices on those 20 days to arrive at a figure to compute damages. Id.
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coveries could be provided to avoid the possibility of blatant
violations without recourse in cases where no defendants made
profits or the small profits made by the solvent defendants
are inadequate compensation for plaintiff's loss in light of
the nature and intent of defendant's violation.' 59
The question of damages should not, however, influence the
question of liability. Persons, whether insiders or first generation
tippees, who selectively disclose material inside information which
they know will cause trading based on the information, should be
held liable to those defrauded in the market by such a violation of
Rule lob-5. The more properly debatable question is to what extent




159 But in connection with the suggestion that punitive damages should be allowed, see
the arguably contrary holding in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. REP. f 92,474 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1969).
indicating that punitive damages could not appropriately be allowed in an action
based on alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which
parallels Rule i0b-5 in many respects.
*The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance and advice of Professor Glenn W.
Clark, University of Denver College of Law, and the assistance of Darryl G. Kaneko,
in the preparation of this Note.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS AND STATUTORY PRE-
SUMPTIONS - SELF-INCRIMINATION AND MARIHUANA REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS. - Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
O N December 22, 1965, Timothy F. Leary's attempt to enter
Mexico was denied.' While returning to the United States, he
was stopped and inspected at the American secondary inspection area
and was found to have marihuana in his possession. He was sub-
sequently convicted2 of knowingly transporting marihuana into the
United States" and of knowingly transporting marihuana without
having paid the transfer tax.' On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed on the basis that a presumptive provision of the
importation statute was not "rationally connected" with the facts
of the case and was thus a denial of due process.' Also, the Court
concluded that the Marihuana Tax Act 7 contained a " 'real and ap-
preciable' hazard of incrimination"' resulting in a denial of Leary's
fifth amendment privilege.'
1 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Dr. Leary drove across the International
Bridge where he was stopped by the Mexican authorities and after apparently being
denied entry, he returned across the bridge to the United States.
2 United States v. Leary, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing denied, 392 F.2d
220 (1968).
321 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whoever, knowingly, with
intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the United States
marihuana contrary to law, or smuggles or clandestinely introduces into the
United States marihuana which should have been invoiced, or receives, con-
ceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment,
or sale of such marihuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the
same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law, or whoever conspires to do any of the foregoing acts, shall be im-
prisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in addition,
may be fined not more than $20,000.
426 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(1) (1964) provides:
(a) Persons in general.
It shall be unlawful for any person who is a transferee required to pay
the transfer tax imposed by section 4741 (a) - (1) to acquire or otherwise
obtain any marihuana without having paid such tax, or (2) to transport or
conceal, or in any manner facilitate the transportation or concealment of,
any marihuana so acquired or obtained.
5 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
6395 U.S. at 33-36.
7 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1964).
8 395 U.S. at 18.
9Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court in Leary. Justice Black concurred
specially as to the due process issue and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart
concurred with reservation as to the issue of self-incrimination.
Chief Justice Warren felt himself bound by his dissents in Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 '(1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes
COMMENT
I. DUE PROCESS AND PRESUMPTION
Due process, a bastion of protection against aribitrary use of
power by the sovereign, is a concept that has been with us since the
Magna Charta.10 Though the concept has broadened, its meaning
continues to be elusive - best understood within a specific context.
Fundamental to the concept of due process is the presumptive in-
nocence of an accused until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, with the burden of establishing guilt resting upon the prosecu-
tion. 1 Theoretically then, the prosecution must prove all elements of
a crime. 2 However, Congress often includes presumptions within a
statute by which various elements of a crime are inferred from a
central fact and by so doing lessens the prosecution's burden of
proof.'" Congress creates these presumptions for a number of reasons:
(1) they may save time by focusing the courts attention on a central
issue; (2) they may shift the burden of proof to the party with
superior access to the facts; (3) they are procedurally more con-
venient; or (4) because of social or economic policies.' 4 The effect
v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). In Grosso, the Chief Justice stated that "by its
sweeping declaration that the congressional scheme for enforcing and collecting the
taxes imposed on wagers and gamblers is unconstitutional, the Court has stripped
from Congress the power to make its taxing scheme effective." Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 77 (1968).
Justice Stewart expressed the hope that some day the Court would reexamine
the whole line of cases which has broadened the original conception of self-incrimina-
tion. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 54 (1969).
10 "The Crown or its ministers may not punish, imprison, or coerce the subject in an
arbitrary manner." MAGNA CHARTA 1215 art. 39, from 7 HALSBURY'S LAW OF
ENGLAND § 483 (3d ed. 1954).
11 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958) ; United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349, 363 (1950) ; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910) ; Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895) ; Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 118 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968) ; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Torres, 161
F. Supp. 699, 700 (D.C.V.I. 1958).
12Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273-76 (1952) ; Christoffel v. United
States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) ; Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 118-20 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 100 (1968); Pauldino v. United States, 379 F.2d 170, 172
(10th Cir. 1967) ; Thurmond v. United States, 377 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1967);
People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 439 P.2d 741, 747-50 (Colo. 1968).
13 A presumption has been defined as follows: "A presumption is an assumption of fact
resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE rule 13 (1965). Extensive literature has developed concerning the
nature and effect of presumptions: C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 307-18
(1954); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31-44 (1963); J. THAYER,
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313-52
1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2490-93 (3d ed. 1940); Brosman, The Statu-
tory Presumptions, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930); Morgan, How to Approach
Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 34 '(1953) ; Comment,
1964 DUKE L. J. 867; Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1955).
4 Defendants of presumptions have gone to great lengths to provide rationale for the
existence of these policies. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 309 (1954);
E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32-33 (1963). But see Chamberlain,
Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928).
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of a presumption may be to force a party to come forth and give
evidence or it may shift the burden of persuasion. 5
The power of legislatures to create presumptions has long been
recognized by the courts and is limited only by the dictates of the
Constitution."6 Consequently, a number of lines of attack on the con-
stitutionality of presumptions has developed, notably in the areas of
equal protection,' 7 trial by jury,18 self-incrimination,' 9 and due process
of law.2°
15 This is a simplification of the basic effects of a presumption. Much discussion and
debate has dealt with this issue, particularly regarding whether or not a presumption
continues to have evidentiary effect once evidence as to the issue has been presented.
Thayer and Wigmore have taken the position that once evidence comes out regarding
the validity of the issue, the presumption drops out of the case and only has a pro-
cedural effect. See Laughlin, In Defense of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953). This view was adopted by the American Law Institute
in its MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942). Other authorities feel that
a presumption continues to have evidentiary effect even after some evidence to con-
tradict the presumption has been brought forth. Morgan postulates eight gradients of
effect that a presumption may take. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
34-37 (1962).
'6 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) ; United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan,
365 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1966) ; Shaw v. United States,
357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966). See generally Brosman, The Statutory Presumption,
5 TUL. L. REv. 17, 178 (1930); Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the
District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928) ; Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their
Constitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEX. L. REV. 34 (1932).
17 Presumptions cannot discriminate against a particular industry-McFarland v. Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911)-or race-Cockrill v. People, 268 U.S. 258 '(1925). It has been
established that although legislatures have a great deal of freedom in the making of
presumptions, "(Ilt is not within the province of a legislature to declare an indi-
vidual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523-24 (1958) (emphasis added). See also McFarland v. American Sugar Refining
Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
18 justice Black feels that presumptions can unconstitutionally deny a defendant trial
by jury in that "it flaunts the constitutional power of courts and juries for Congress
to tell them what shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction.' "
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 77 (1965) (dissenting opinion). See also
People v. Lyon, 27 Hun 180 (N.Y. 1882); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856); State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 80 A. 12 (1911) ; State v. Beswick, 13 R.I. 211
(1883); Francis v. Baker, 11 R.I. 103 (1875) ; Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283
(1860). Contra, see generally Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. 1010.61 Acres of Land,
146 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1944).
19 Justice Black has said that: "The undoubted practical effect of letting guilt rest on
unexplained presence alone is to force a defendant to come forward and testify ....
The compulsion here is of course more subtle and less cruel physically than com-
pulsion by torture, but it is nonetheless compulsion and it is nonetheless effective."
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
The issue of whether presumptions create self-incrimination has been raised
before the courts a number of times unsuccessfully. See Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U.S. 178 (1925); United States v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1955);
Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 F. 305 (9th Cir. 1917) ; People ex rel. Woronoff
v. Mallon, 166 App. Div. 840, 150 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1914), aft'd, 222 N.Y. 456,
119 N.E. 102 (1918); State v. Humphrey, 42 S.D. 512, 176 N.W. 39 (1920).
20 The due process requirements have followed two fundamental paths: (1) the necessity
of a rational connection between the fact presumed and the fact proved-see Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ;
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) ; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943)-and; (2) the unfairness of placing the burden of proof on the defendant
as to a particular issue. "[T]he burden of going forward with the evidence at some
stage of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant, but only after the State has
Iproved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has
been proved with excuse or explanation .... " Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524
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The most successful ground of attack on legislative presumptions
has probably been that of due process where a "rational connection"
between the established facts and the facts presumed is required.2
Although not the first Supreme Court decision to apply this test,
Tot v. United States clearly established the "rational connection" test
as the controlling rule." In Tot, the Court invalidated section 902 (f)
of the Federal Firearms Act, which made it a presumption that a
firearm was unlawfully transported from the fact that a felon or
fugitive had a firearm in his possession.23 The court said:
A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed
.... [W]here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not
(1958), quoting from Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). See also
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89
'(1933); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Shaw v. United States,
357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
It was once held that the burden of proof could be shifted so long as it didn't
subject "the accused to hardship or oppression." Morrison v. California, 291 U.S.
82, 89 (1933). However, it seems it would be impossible to find a criminal case
where the shift in the burden of proof would not work to the disadvantage of the
accused. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
21See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969) ; see also United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Mc-
Farland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Barrett v. United
States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Garcia v. United States, 250 F.2d 930 (10th
Cir. 1957) ; Minski v. United States, 131 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1943) ; United States
v. Platt, 31 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Tex. 1940) ; United States ex rel. Murphy v. Warden
of Clinton Prison, 29 F. Supp. 486 (N.D.N.Y. 1939), affd, 108 F.2d 861 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661, (1940), rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 696 (1940).
22 319 U.S. 463 (1943). There are a number of very early cases which applied the
rational connection test. E.g., Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279, 38 P. 326 (1894);
Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S.E. 170 (1928), reversed on other grounds, 279
U.S. 1 (1929) ; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N.E. 949 (1896) ; People v. Cannon,
139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893). Later, rational connection was considered as an
optional test applied in conjunction with other tests. See Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82 (1934) ; Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (dissenting opinion);
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
One such test, the comparative convenience, or balance of convenience test,
determined whether or not it would be more convenient for the defendant to produce
the evidence. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) ; Yee Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). Although never altogether abandoned, the comparative
convenience test was later relegated to a mere "corollary'' test. Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
Similarly, the Court once considered whether or not the legislature might have
considered the presumed act to be a crime. See Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
But see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965) ; Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463 (1943).
2Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), noted in 56 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1943);
17 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1943). The Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964)
provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or [who) is a
fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession
of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evi-
dence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or
received ... by such person in violation of this chapter.
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competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the
procedure of courts.
2 4
Some courts have applied the rational connection test with great
exactitude, 5 others merely using it in a broad, rhetorical context.26
Furthermore, the rule has been subject to criticism because of its lack
of clarity (e.g., who makes the rational connection - judges, juries,
mankind, or possibly some other independent standard?) .27 Also, a
confusing aspect, but essential to the question, is how strong an
inference is necessary to sustain the presumption as constitutional -
a mere inference, a preponderance of evidence, a substantial assur-
ance, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
By considering the facts and language of recent Supreme Court
decisions one finds clues as to what the test means today. In United
States v. Gainey,- the Court upheld a presumption that one who was
found in the presence of a still was "carrying on" the business of
illegal distillation.29 Although it is possible to be in the vicinity of
illegal conduct without being involved, the Court felt the inference
was permissible because: (1) the statute is broadly worded in that it
encompasses a large class of persons who are involved or connected
with the illegal activities; 30 and (2) "strangers to the illegal business
rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy.' '-3
24 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). Cf., Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). It appears that there are two tests implicit within this
rule; (1) there must be a rational connection, and (2) the inference must not be
strained. The courts, however, have put the emphasis on the first and more stringent
portion of the rule. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 '(1969) ; United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
25 See United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Torres, 161 F. Supp. 699 (D.C.V.I. 1958).
2 6 See People v. Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774, 151 P.2d 517 (1944); State v. Grinnett, 33
Idaho 203, 193 P. 380 (1920) ; State v. Spiller, 146 Wash. 180, 262 P. 128 (1927) ;
Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930); Note, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1955).
27 See Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1955). The test has been faulted because it is
called a rational connection test whereas it is really an inferential test. id.
2 380 U.S. 63 (1965), noted in 51 A.B.A.J. 482 (1965); 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1137 (1965); 79 HARv. L. REV. 159 (1965); 27 MONT. L. REv. 216 (1966).
Gainey was apprehended late at night as he approached the still, flashlight in hand.
He was surprised by revenue agents and attempted to flee, but was caught after a
short chase.
29Id. at 67. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1964) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant
is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the
business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such
presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury).
30 26 U.S.C. § 5601'(a) (4) provides: "Any person who.., carries on the business of
a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law... shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each such
offense."
3' 380 U.S. at 67-68 (1965). The Court also noted that the circuit courts had differed
as to the significance of one's presence at a still and thus the question was proper
for legislative determination. Id. at 67. See also Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160
(1947) ; United States v. Freeman, 286 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1961).
VOL. 46
1969 COMMENT
In United States v. Romano,32 a similar case involving a still,
decided a few months after Gainey, the Court came to a different
conclusion. The Court considered the question of whether possession,
custody, or control can be inferred from mere presence at the site of
an illegal still, and concluded that -[p]resence is relevant and admis-
sible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some show-
ing of the defendant's function at the still, [such presence] is too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt ..... " The Court,
in Romano, distinguished Gainey on the basis that section 5601
(a) (1), is narrow in scope, addressing itself to "only one of the
various aspects of the total undertaking," 4 whereas Gainey in-
volved a violation of section 5601 (a) (4), a "sweeping prohibition
of carrying on a distillation business. ' 1 5 That is, the prohibition
against "carrying on" the business is aimed at a broad category of
persons (e.g., those in supply, delivery, or operational activities as
well as those having possession and/or control), while the statute
enjoining "possession, custody or control" affects a mere subclass of
the former. 6 It is more probable that one who is present at a still is
"carrying on" the business because of the large number of persons in
this category. Thus, it appears, the Court will scrutinize carefully the
language of the applicable statute with a view toward determining
the breadth of its application, particularily where the offense is defined
narrowly and the presumption seems far afield.
3 382 U.S. 136 (1965), noted in 52 A.B.A.J. 82 (1966), and 8 WM. & MARY L. REV.
164 (1966). Romano was apprehended when federal authorities, armed with a
search warrant, surprised the defendant and found him standing a few feet from an
operating still.
33 382 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). A number of circuit courts had already concluded
that something more than presence at a still was necessary to prove possession. See
Pugliese v. United States, 343 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1965) ; McFarland v. United States,
273 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Vick v. United States, 216 F. 2d 228 (5th Cir. 1954)
Graceffo v. United States, 46 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1931).
34 United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 141 (1965).
35 1d. at 140. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (1) (1964) provides that: "Any person who...
[hias in his possession or custody, or under his control, any still or distilling appa-
ratus set up which is not registered, as required by section 5179 (a) ... shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each
such offense."
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(4) (1964) supra note 30.
Judicial determination of whether a statute is broad or narrow in effect some-
times seems like speculation into the mysteries of the unknown, though it seems that
more people would fit into the category of carrying on the business than would fit
into the categories of possession, custody, or control. For one such speculation see
Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1928).
3 Both categories are quite broad in light of the fact that accessories come within the
statute and are treated as principals. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) provides that:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punish-
able as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,
is punishable as a principal.
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Although the Court's distinction based on breadth of the ap-
plicable statute has logical validity, an alternative interpretation
is that the Court is today applying the test in a more critical fash-
ion.37 The very fact that it drew such a fine distinction may be an
indication that the Court has begun to move toward a more strict
application of the Tot rule.
Few courts have tried to define how strong a connection is
necessary to sustain a presumption, but it appears that they are
making an effort in this direction. A recent district court decision did
try to define this threshold question and required a surprisingly
strong nexus. 8 The court felt that a presumption should in no way
lighten the burden of proof and therefore must be abandoned if the
relationship cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.39
The most recent case in the series applying the Tot rule, Leary v.
United States,4" strikes down a presumption whereby all the elements
of knowingly transporting marihuana are inferred from its posses-
sion.41 The Court noted that the validity of a presumption is not a
"matter within specialized judicial competence" and "'significant
weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the
stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it.' "42 However,
the Court did consider a vast amount of empirical data in order to
negate the presumption and indicated that if Congress did not limit
presumptions to the "circumstances of life as we know them," the
Court would.43 It concluded that the presumption was "' highly
empirical,' ,,44 and must be based on a consideration of all the avail-
able and pertinent facts. Thus, when ascertaining the constitutionality
of a presumption the Court will keep three considerations in
mind: the particular wording of the statute, the empirical bases of
37 See 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 164 (1966).
38 United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
39 Id.; but see Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied;
Romero v. United States, 357 U.S. 931 (1958) ; State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. 458,
217 A.2d 236 (1965).
40 395 U.S. 6 '(1969).
41 The elements which are presumed from possession are that: (1) the marihuana was
smuggled; (2) the defendant knew it was smuggled; and (3) it was smuggled with
intent to defraud the United States. Id. at 37. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) provides
in part that: "Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant
is shown to have or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession
shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant
explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
42 395 U.S. at 38, quoting from United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
4 Id. at 34, quoting from Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943) ; cf. United
States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
44 395 U.S. at 38; cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
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the inferences, and the determinations of Congress, if any, with
respect to these bases.
In Leary, the Court indicated that the inference must necessarily
be quite strong, saying "unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proven fact on which it is made to depend," the statutory presump-
tion will be deemed unconstitutional. 45 An analysis of the Leary
decision indicates just how strong the connection between the actual
facts and the presumption must be. The presumption of knowledge
that the marihuana was of foreign origin was found invalid even
though: (1) "most domestically consumed marihuana is still of
foreign origin" -possibly as much as 90 percent;46 and (2) there
are five possible ways by which the consumer may become aware of
the source. He may: (a) be aware of the high percentage of mari-
huana which is smuggled and deduce that his was illegally imported;
(b) have smuggled the marihuana himself; (c) have specified that
he wanted foreign marihuana when he bought it; (d) be able to
tell from the appearance, packaging, or taste of the marihuana; or
(e) know by indirect means that his supplier smuggled it.4" These
possibilities could obviously lead one to the presumption that the
user knew the source of the marihuana. But in applying the test,
the Court refused to uphold this presumption and held that there
must be "substantial assurance" of a rational connection.48
It appears that the Court has adopted a strict application of the
Tot rule. A number of statutes may therefore be in jeopardy as a
result of the Court's stringent application of the test, specifically
those statutes concerning smuggled goods, " kidnapping, 50 obscene
45 395 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). The Court uses the phrase "substantial assurances"
for the first time in a case of this nature and seems to put a good deal of emphasis
on it in that the term appears in the opinion at least three times. To determine how
strong an inference must be in order to constitute a rational connection is necessarily
difficult. However, one court has stated that a presumption should in no way lighten
the burden of proof and therefore must be abandoned if not able to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
But see Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Romero v.
United States, 357 U.S. 931 (1958) ; State v. Knudsen, 3 Conn. Cir. 458, 217 A.2d
236 (1965), appeal granted 222 A.2d 810 (1966).
46 395 U.S. at 41. Ninety percent of all marihuana seized is said to be smuggled from
Mexico, but this may in part reflect the positioning and activities of the federal
authorities. Id. See also S. REp. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 13 (1956);
H.R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956); BUREAU OF NARCOTICS,
REPORT ON THE TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS 67 (1965).
47 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
48Id. at 36.
49 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964) provides that smuggling is presumed from possession of
smuggled goods.
50 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964) provides that transportation in interstate commerce is pre-
sumed from a victim's absence for 24 hours.
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publications,51 narcotics,5 2 heroin," opium,5 4 stills,5 and firearms.5"
It also appears from the holding of the Court that, in the future,
statutory presumptions will be subject to attack wherever there is a
question as to the empirical validity of the inference. 7
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment provides that; "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . 8
This privilege has broadened since its inception, and has always
been a "powerful symbol of individual liberty."5" The protection
from self-incrimination has no clear-cut standards implicit within it
51 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964) provides that transportation of obscene publications for
sale or distribution is presumed from possession of any five such publications.
52 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) provides that smuggling of a narcotic into the United States
is presumed from its possession. 26 U.S.C. § 4724(c) (1964) provides that failure
to register and pay special tax is presumed from narcotics possession. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4755(a)(2) (1964) provides that production of illegal marihuana is presumed
from its presence on the land.
5 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (1964) provides that illegal importation of heroin is presumed
from its possession.
5 21 U.S.C. § 181 (1964) provides that illegal importation of opium is presumed from
its possession.
5526 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(3) (1964) provides that unlawful production of distilled
spirits is presumed from one's presence at the place where mash, wort, or wash is
being fermented. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(4) (1964) provides that unlawful produc-
tion of distilled spirits is presumed from one's presence at the site of a still.
56 26 U.S.C. § 5851(1) (1964) provides that unlawful receipt of firearms in violation
of interstate commerce is presumed from their possession.
57 In Leary, the Court went to great lengths to examine the probability of the validity
of the presumption in light of the habits of marihuana users and indicated that this
is a proper function of the Court, especially where the legislature's fact finding was
not conclusive. 395 U.S. at 39. 18 U.S.C. § 837(c) (1964) is an example of how
statutes could be written and probably withstand the test of constitutionality. It
provides that:
The possession of an explosive in such a manner as to evince an intent
to use,... damage or destroy any building... creates rebutable presump-
tions that the explosive was transported in interstate or foreign commerce
... provided, however, that no person may be convicted under this section
unless there is evidence independent of the presumption that this section
has been violated.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The courts have construed the fifth amendment liberally.
See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Gilbert v. United
States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947). It has been held that this constitutional
guarantee includes a freedom from prejudicial remarks about the defendant's silence.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, petition for rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 957
(1965); De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). The privilege
is a personal right and does not apply to papers of a public nature. Thus, with
exceptions such as required records, tax forms, licenses, and other records required
under an appropriate regulation the immunity does not extend to all areas. See
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) ; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927) ; Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 812 (1947). In defining an appropriate regulation, the required records doc-
trine has been limited to noncriminal and regulatory areas rather than areas permeated
with criminal statutes. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). Cf. Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
5 Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 18 U. Cii. L. REv. 687 (1951). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and "yields to no convenient formula." 60 Nevertheless, the courts
have specified a number of guidelines. In order to invoke the
privilege, the testimony in question must be compelled by some
coercive force, legal or factual.6" Both oral and written testimony are
treated equally; 2 however, the privilege is limited to "testimonial"
or "communicative" evidence (diaries, letters, other written com-
munications, or statements) rather than "real" and "physical" evi-
dence (blood tests, handwriting and voice tests, and a large number
of other police investigatory techniques)."s The privilege has been
held to apply to any testimony which would furnish "a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute .... 6 4 However, there are
limitations placed upon the privilege. For example, until recently
a person's communications with the government (e.g., registra-
tion or income and excise tax forms) were outside the privilege and
6 0 McKay, Self-incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194; see
generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Kalven,
Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL.
ATM. ScI. 181 (1953) ; Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda v. Arizona Dissent;
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966); Morgan, The Privilege against Self-incrimination,
34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of
the Privilege Against Self-incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935);
Symposium, Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1966);
Note, 45 DENVER L.J. 427 (1968).
61 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) ; United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427
(2d Cir. 1967). Where the defendant was a juvenile, the court found psychological
domination by the authorities sufficient to satisfy the necessity of compulsion, indi-
cating that youths must be treated with even greater care. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
62 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); People ex rel.
Ferguson v. Reardon, 197 N.Y. 236, 90 N.E. 829 (1910).
63 This distinction has recently been the subject of a large amount of litigation particu-
larly as to handwritten samples which have been deemed to be physical and real
evidence and thus not within the privilege. Granza v. United States, 381 F.2d 190
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939 (1967) ; Weaver v. United States, 379
F.2d 799 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) ; United States v. Serad,
367 F.2d 347 '(2d Cir. 1966), vacated, 390 U.S. 1034 (1968); Shelton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion
denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955). But see Lewis v. United States, 382 F.2d 817 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) ; United States v. Green, 282 F. Supp. 373
(S.D. Ind. 1968). Some types of evidence, considered to be real and physical, is
outside the scope of this privilege, e.g..- fingerprints-Pearson v. United States, 389
F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1968) ; United States ex rel. O'Halloran v. Rundle, 384 F.2d 997
(3d Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio
1968); stand and give name-Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Cowans v.
Warden Md. Penitentiary, 276 F. Supp. 696 (D. Md. 1967); blood samples-
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Brent v. White, 276 F. Supp. 386
(E.D. La. 1967); psychological examination-United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d
719 (4th Cir. 1968); Early v. Tinsley, 286 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 830 (1961), rehearing denied. 365 U.S. 890 '(1961); police line up-
United States v. Hutto, 393 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1968); Schmidt v. United States,
380 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908 (1968) ; Gilbert v. United
States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967) ; voice
identification-Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968); Wise v. United States,
383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968).
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159, 161 (1950) ; United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968). See also
United States v. Klehman, 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 987
(1969).
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thus had to be filed regardless of their nature.6" However, Leary is
the fourth in a series of recent decisions wherein the privilege has
been extended to include excise tax registrations if such disclosures
are likely to lead to arrest or conviction.66
In Leary, the Court found "real and appreciable risk of self-
incrimination"67 based on the fact that an individual's coming for-
ward and registering makes him highly suspect and increases the
possibility of investigation."' Also, the information required was "in
an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of
the form's questions in context might involve the petitioners in the
admission of a crucial element of a crime."' 9 Not only does the Sec-
retary of the Treasury become aware of the individual's activities,
but these activities become a matter of public record as well."°
In light of the fact that 48 states have statutes restricting the
distribution and use of marihuana, 71 Justice Black has described the
65 See United States v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded,
390 U.S. 203 (1968) (bringing the case in alignment with the Haynes decision);
United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957) ; cf. Myres v. United
States, 174 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949). It was felt that
the government needed information to carry on its day to day business and that it
must be able to compel disclosure so that the information would be received in a
timely manner. The government's argument breaks down when a tax is a tax only
on its face, collecting only negligible revenue, but is in fact a regulatory statute.
See generally Mansfield, The Albertson case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
103; McKay, Self-incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193.
66 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). A number of other decisions
have also considered this question and reached similar results. See United States v.
Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969) ; United States v. Walden, No. 12,849 (4th Cir.,
June 10, 1969) ; United States v. Freeman, 412 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Lewis
v. United States, 408 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1969); Whaley v. United States, 394
F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1968), where the privilege, though recognized, was found to be
waived because of lack of proper assertion.
67 395 U.S. at 16. In Marchetti the court said: "The central standard for the privilege's
application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896).
68 395 U.S. at 18. See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the
Privilege against Self-incrimination and the Government's need for Information,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103; McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling
Tax, 5 DUKE B.J. 86 (1956).
69 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965); see also
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,
47 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64 (1968).
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 4773 provides that:
[Sltatements or returns . .. shall be open to inspection by officers and
employees of the Treasury Department duly authorized for that purpose,
and such officials of any State or Territory, or of any organized munici-
pality therein.., as shall be charged with the enforcement of any law or
municipal ordinance regulating the production of marihuana or regulating
the sale, prescribing, dispensing, dealing in, or distribution of narcotic
drugs or marihuana.
71 These states have enacted a prohibition similar to the provisions of the UNIFORM
NARcOTIc DRUG AcT. See 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 409-10 (1966). Section 2 of
this act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess ... any narcotic
drug, except as authorized in this act." Section 1(14) includes "cannabis" in the
category of "narcotic drugs."
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effect of federal registration statutes as a "squeezing device contrived
to put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a
state prison . ".. ,72
Presuming that tax measures are valid, 73 the courts have tradi-
tionally deferred to Congressional power; "[s]o long as Congress acts
in pursuance of its constitutional power, the judiciary lacks authority
to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of
that power. ' 74 This freedom gives Congress a great deal of power
because "[elvery tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it
imposes an economic impediment on the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed. ' '7 However, the Supreme Court has recently
stated: "This Court must give deference to Congress' taxing powers,
and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise; but we are no
less obliged to heed the limitations placed upon those powers by the
Constitution's other commands. ' "7 Thus, the freedom from self-
incrimination will provide a complete defense to a registration re-
quirement unless there is no substantial risk of self-incrimination,
77
the plea is untimely, 78 or the privilege has been waived.
79
The successful invocation of this privilege in a number of taxa-
tion areas (e.g., the excise taxes on gambling, firearms, and mari-
huana) indicates that the Court has considered the question carefully
and even in light of the changing complexion of the Court, the ques-
72 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (dissenting opinion). Justice
Black's dissent became the accepted view when Kahriger was overruled by Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
3 See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S.
486 (1904) ; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).
74 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959). Cf. United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 '(1937); Costellano
v. United States, 350 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 949 (1966).
7 5 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). The use of taxing measures
to regulate behavior is frequently used. This device has generally been held to be
constitutional. -[A) tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, dis-
courages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed." United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). See also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
76 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968). See also United States v. Covington,
395 U.S. 57 (1969) ; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ; Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
7 Risk of incrimination is an absolute necessity to the application of this privilege and
where the activity involved is not illegal '(i.e., liquor manufacture and sales) there
is no defense available to a charge of failure to register and pay the tax. See Anderson
v. United States, 403 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Shoffeitt v. United States, 403 F.2d
991 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1969) ; Brown v. United States,
401 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 962 (1969).
78 United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969). The Court has held that "A plea
on motion to dismiss the indictment is plainly timely." Id. at 60.
S9 See 18 U.S.C.A. rule 12(b) (3) (1969). A defendant may waive the privilege against
self-incrimination; this waiver must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and with full
knowledge of his rights. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; United States v. Neilsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.
1968).
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tion will continue to be answered in a like manner.8 0 By invalidating
the registration requirement under the Marihuana Tax Act, the
Court has cast doubt on the validity of a number of other statutes.8'
Similarly, the Court's willingness to invalidate a tax act puts Congress
on notice that the Court will not allow Congress to do indirectly,
through taxation, what it could not do directly. 2 Moreover, this
decision seems to signal at least a temporary return to an earlier posi-
tion of the Court where tax measures were scrutinized carefully in
order to determine if they were a proper exercise of the tax power.83
The Leary decision is well founded in reason and justice. There
appears to be no reason to allow Congress to circumvent the dictates
of the Constitution by use of its taxing power. Unquestionably, the
freedom from self-incrimination is so fundamental to our values that
the court should and will go to great lengths to protect this and all
other rights.
Vance E. Halvorson
80 Only two justices of the Court, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart, have ex-
pressed reservations as to the self-incrimination issue, thus it appears that a strong
majority of the court approves of the discussion and will be of like mind in the future.
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
81 In the past, a number of registration requirements have been challenged, although on
the whole unsuccessfully, e.g.: United States v. Toussie, 280 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y.
1967) ; Foreign Agents Registration Act-22 U.S.C. § 612 (1958), see United States
v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951) ; distilleries-26 U.S.C.
§§ 5173, 5179, 5222, 5801 (1964), see United States v. Young, 284 F. Supp. 1008
(E.D. Tenn. 1968); United States v. McGee, 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
82 When the Marihuana Tax Act was passed, Congress was fully aware of the pub-
licity a user would receive from registration yet it did not really consider the impli-
cation in light of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Two objectives have dictated the form of H.R. 6906, first, the develop-
ment of a plan of taxation which will raise revenue and at the same time
render extremely difficult the acquisition of marihuana by persons who
desire it for illicit use, and second the development of an adequate means
of publicizing dealings in marihuana in order to tax and control the tax
effectively.
H.R. REP. No. 792, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 900 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 103 (1937). The Court does not challenge Congress' powers of
taxation, but it demands that the methods used be "entirely consistent with constiti-
tional limitations .... " Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968).
8 See Child Labor Tax Case, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922);
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 '(1819). McCulloch was the first
case in which the Court exercised power of judicial review over congressional legisla-
tion and since that case was decided, the Court has broadly expanded the use of
that power.










